GST Weekly Case Laws Newsletter | 24 August to 29 August 2026

In Shivani Enterprise v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1361 HC, the petitioner, engaged in scrap trading, challenged a show cause notice dated 29.2.2024 and the consequential order in original dated 30.8.2025 passed after departmental intelligence suggested fraudulent input tax credit availed from M/s Ganpati Enterprises. The challenge centred on alleged non-service of the complete notice, non-supply of relied upon documents, and a mismatch in the period mentioned in the notice.

The Court recorded that the petitioner had an efficacious statutory remedy by way of appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act and that, despite this, it examined the matter on merits. It noted that physical verification under Section 67(1) on 9.12.2020 found the declared business premises to be only open space without infrastructure. On the allegation that only three pages of the notice were supplied, the Court found that the petitioner had participated in the proceedings, filed replies, and never raised that objection earlier. As to the relied upon documents, the Court accepted the respondents’ explanation that the reference to 2021 was a typographical error and that the actual investigation related to October 2018 to November 2019; the petitioner was found to have been aware of the relevant documents and the order in original dealt with them.

The Court held that no violation of natural justice or statutory provision was made out. It declined to interfere in writ jurisdiction, treating the disputed service and document-supply objections as factual issues suitable for the appellate authority. The writ petition was dismissed, and the impugned notice and order in original were left undisturbed.

In In re: Aditya Birla Global Trading (India) Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 23 AAARGST, the appellant sought an advance ruling in Tamil Nadu on whether supplies of goods under a sales contract and handling services under a separate service contract were independent supplies, and, if so, how the service supply should be classified. The Authority for Advance Ruling rejected the application on the ground that the issue had already been decided or adjudicated in Gujarat and that the first proviso to Section 98(2) barred the application.

The Appellate Authority examined the statutory scheme and focused on Section 100(1) of the CGST Act, which permits an appeal only against an advance ruling pronounced under Section 98(4). It held that an appeal is maintainable only where the original ruling is one under Section 98(4). Because the impugned order was a rejection under the first proviso to Section 98(2), and not a substantive ruling under Section 98(4), the appellate forum had no jurisdiction to entertain the challenge.

The appeal was therefore held not maintainable and dismissed as inadmissible under Section 100(1). The Appellate Authority did not decide the merits of the contractual and classification questions raised by the appellant.

In Avt Mccormick Ingredients Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1401 HC, the petitioner, an exporter of spice extracts and oleoresins, challenged the rejection of refund to the extent it disallowed input tax credit reflected in the Electronic Credit Ledger under the head SGST. The dispute arose from transitional credit carried forward from the earlier VAT regime through Form GST TRAN-1 and later claimed as part of the refund for November 2017.

The Court explained the statutory scheme under Section 140 of the CGST Act and Rule 117 of the CGST Rules, noting that transitional credit is carried forward from the closing balance as on 30.06.2017 and would be available in the Electronic Credit Ledger as on 01.07.2017 if properly declared. On the facts, however, the petitioner failed to produce the TRAN-1 declaration said to have been filed within the prescribed time and also failed to produce satisfactory material proving that the amount claimed was actually credited in the Electronic Credit Ledger on 01.07.2017. The Court therefore found no basis to interfere with the refund rejection on merits.

The Court also declined to entertain the writ petition because it had been filed after the statutory appeal period had expired. Relying on settled principles regarding limitation and Article 226, it held that discretionary writ jurisdiction cannot be used to revive a barred remedy or unsettle a matter that has attained finality. The petition was dismissed.

In Fellah Global Commerce v. Assistant Enforcement Officer, (2026) taxcode.in 1402 HC, the appellant challenged initiation of proceedings under Section 130 of the CGST Act in circumstances where a vehicle carrying goods, originally covered by an invoice and e-way bill for delivery to a consignee at Nedumbassery, was intercepted on a route described as abnormal. The appellant relied on its own explanation in Ext.P6 to contend that the action was illegal.

The Division Bench treated the facts as substantially undisputed because Ext.P6 itself stated that, during transit and for commercial reasons, the consignor decided to divert the goods to another registered dealer in Kerala and that such changes are lawfully made only by generating a fresh tax invoice and a fresh e-way bill before delivery. The appellant also said the driver was instructed to stop and wait until those fresh documents were generated. The Court noted, however, that these statements required corroboration and had not yet been proved. It also recorded that the interception took place at Mundur, away from the normal route, and that the appellant’s factual explanation remained unsubstantiated at that stage.

The Court held that the appellant would have an opportunity to establish its case in the proceedings under Section 130 and that, at the present stage, the argument that Section 130 was inapplicable could not be accepted. Finding no error in the learned Single Judge’s judgment, the writ appeal was dismissed, though liberty was reserved to seek release under the statutory provisions and to pursue all other remedies open in law.

In Abdullatheef Pallithoduvil v. Deputy Commissioner State Goods & Services Tax Department and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1403 HC, the appellant challenged an order passed under Section 74(1) of the KGST Act and the learned Single Judge’s decision relegating it to the alternative statutory remedy. The dispute concerned the appellant’s liability in a transaction with a supplier said to have fake or fraudulent registration, with the appellant asserting bona fide conduct and actual supply of goods.

The Court reiterated that availability of an alternative remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction where the impugned order is null and void or without jurisdiction. Examining Ext.P7, it found that the Deputy Commissioner had not properly dealt with the appellant’s specific reply, including the assertion that the appellant was unaware of the supplier’s credentials and had acted bona fide through the bank. The Court also found that the appellant’s contention that goods had in fact been supplied was not specifically addressed. Because these material submissions were left unattended, the Court concluded that the adjudication was legally vulnerable.

The Court held that Ext.P7 was illegal and that the writ petition was therefore maintainable notwithstanding the statutory remedy. It allowed the appeal, set aside the learned Single Judge’s judgment and Ext.P7, and remitted the matter to the Deputy Commissioner for fresh consideration after specifically adverting to the appellant’s reply and passing a fresh order in accordance with law. The merits of the substantive tax dispute were left open.

In Biswajith Thandar v. Enforcement Officer and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1399 HC, the petitioner, a registered taxpayer under the CGST/KSGST Act, challenged the rejection of objections to proceedings under Section 130 arising from seizure of a gold bar and sought release of the seized gold without insisting on payment of fine or penalty.

The Court examined Ext.P8 and held that it was not a mere reply to objections. It contained specific findings determining the petitioner’s liability to pay fine in lieu of confiscation and penalty as proposed in Form GST MOV-10. On that basis, the Court found that the order had finally determined liability and that the proper course was to pursue appellate remedies rather than invoke writ jurisdiction. In consequence, the request for release of the gold on furnishing bank guarantee was also not entertained in the writ proceedings.

The writ petition was dismissed, but expressly without prejudice to the petitioner’s right to invoke appellate remedies against Ext.P8.

In O.P. Biju v. Superintendent Central Tax and Central Excise Paravur Range and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1400 HC, the petitioner questioned a further demand under Ext.P4 and sought permission to pay the arrears in instalments under Section 80 of the CGST Act, together with de-freezing of two bank accounts.

The Court noted that the petitioner had already remitted the amounts covered by Exts.P1, P2 and P4, and took this prompt payment into account as reflecting bona fides. Without examining the correctness of the Commissioner’s rejection of the instalment request, the Court proceeded on the peculiar circumstances of the case, the petitioner’s stated financial difficulty, and the view that the financial stability report was not conclusive merely because it considered business income. On that basis, the Court granted instalment relief.

The petitioner was permitted to pay the amount covered by Ext.P4 in fifteen equal monthly instalments, beginning on 5 September 2026. Default in any instalment would cancel the facility and allow recovery in lump sum. The Court also directed de-freezing of the bank account on payment of the first instalment and execution of a bond.

In Jaiswal Construction v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1398 HC, the petitioner challenged a show-cause notice and final order issued under Section 73 of the GST Act, alleging denial of personal hearing and service defects in the proceedings concerning alleged excess input tax credit.

The Court recorded the respondents’ objection that statutory remedies were available under Section 107 and, now that the GST Tribunal had started functioning, under Section 121 as well. It noted that earlier writ interventions had been entertained when no tribunal existed, but that position had changed. The Court therefore declined to examine the merits of the challenge under Article 226 and held that the existence of the appellate and tribunal framework made writ interference unwarranted in the circumstances.

The writ petition was dismissed, while expressly leaving all grounds open to be urged in appeal and clarifying that the dismissal would not prejudice the petitioner’s statutory remedies.

In In re: Gokulram Shanmugam Kantharajan (Jay Kay Trans), (2026) taxcode.in 140 AARGST, the applicant sought an advance ruling on the classification of services for upkeeping and maintenance of burial grounds in Zones 6 to 10 of the Greater Chennai Corporation and on eligibility for exemption under Serial No. 3A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).

The Authority held that the application was admissible under Section 97(2)(b). Examining the agreement, it found that the dominant activity was sweeping, cleaning and garbage collection, with personnel, bins and consumables deployed to perform the service. Applying the classification scheme and explanatory notes, it concluded that the service was more appropriately classifiable under SAC 999424, General Waste collection services – others not elsewhere specified, rather than a residuary heading. On exemption, the Authority held that the contract did not involve supply of goods to the Greater Chennai Corporation and therefore did not satisfy the threshold requirement of a composite supply of goods and services.

The ruling classified the service under SAC 999424 and denied exemption under Serial No. 3A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) and the corresponding State notification.

In Vayuputra Electricals v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Audit-1), (2026) taxcode.in 1373 HC, the petitioner challenged an adjudication order under Section 73(9) of the KGST/CGST Act and the consequential demand in Form GST DRC-13, contending that no personal hearing had been granted despite proposed adverse action.

The Court declined to interfere merely because the adjudication order repeated the show-cause notice, noting that the petitioner had not filed any response despite service by RPAD, email, dealer login and portal access. However, it accepted the broader submission that an opportunity of personal hearing under Section 75(4) cannot be made contingent on a request from the assessee when an adverse order is contemplated. The Court also noted the petitioner’s assertion that documents could be produced to establish the genuineness of the transactions.

The writ petition was allowed in part: the adjudication order and DRC-13 demand were quashed, liberty was reserved to file a response with documents, and the Adjudicating Officer was directed to provide personal hearing. The petitioner was required to submit the response by 24.08.2026 and deposit 10% of the tax in demand by that date, subject to the final assessment order.

In Pardeep Kumar Prashar v. Commissioner of Customs (Airport and General), (2026) taxcode.in 1369 HC, the High Court considered whether the CESTAT’s affirmation of revocation of the appellant’s customs broker licence, forfeiture of security and penalty disclosed any substantial question of law under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962. The appellant had admitted that he permitted his G-card holder to use his licence and dongle for Rs.10,000 per month, and that a shipping bill was filed in the name of M/s Deepnidhi International without authorisation from that exporter.

The Court held that Regulation 1(4) of the CBLR, 2018 prohibits a licence from being sold or otherwise transferred, and that lending the licence and dongle for consideration amounted to an impermissible parting with the use of the licence. It further held that Regulation 10(a) required authorisation from the exporter, which was absent here, and that merely verifying IEC and GST particulars did not cure the failure to obtain authorisation or to verify the identity and functioning of the named exporter under Regulation 10(n). The Court distinguished the appellant’s reliance on Kunal Travels and held that absence of proof of knowledge of Red Sanders was irrelevant to these independent regulatory breaches.

The Court found that the finding under Regulation 10(e) could not be independently sustained because the impugned order did not identify any incorrect information imparted by the appellant to a client for which due diligence was lacking. However, the sustainable findings under Regulations 1(4), 10(a), 10(d) and 10(n), taken with the admitted conduct and the attempted export of prohibited Red Sanders, justified the disciplinary action. The punishment was not shockingly disproportionate, and the appeal was dismissed.

In Intellimech Systems v. Superinendent of Central Tax, (2026) taxcode.in 1376 HC, the petitioner challenged an adjudication order under Section 74 of the CGST Act for the period April 2018 to February 2019. The proceedings arose from scrutiny showing excess input tax credit claimed in GSTR-3B compared with eligible credit reflected in GSTR-2A, and the show cause notice stated that admissibility had not been ensured and tax payment by suppliers had not been confirmed.

The Court noted the petitioner’s response that the supplies were bona fide, that action should be taken against erring suppliers, that invoices wrongly reported under other registrations should be excluded, and that certificates contemplated by Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST were being arranged and should be considered. While the Court found no fault with the adjudicating officer’s observation that complete documents had not been filed, it held that the petitioner’s expressed willingness to produce the contemplated certificates warranted interference, so that the matter could be restored for fresh consideration. All questions were left open to the adjudicating authority in the restored proceedings.

The Court quashed the adjudication order and permitted the petitioner to file the relevant documents by 14.08.2026, subject to deposit of 10% of the demand by that date. The petition was allowed in part, with the restored proceedings to proceed on the basis of the additional material and with the parties’ rights and contentions preserved.

In Lalitha S. v. Deputy Commissioner Mandya District and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1377 HC, the petitioner sought reimbursement of GST deducted from compensation paid for acquisition of 10.08 guntas of land for widening of the Mysuru–Madikeri Highway, together with interest. An award had fixed compensation at Rs.8,89,035.20, from which Rs.1,14,815.29 was deducted towards 18% GST.

The Court held that immovable property, including land and buildings attached to it, cannot be treated as goods, and that GST is a tax on the supply of goods or services or both. It reasoned that compulsory acquisition is an expropriation under statutory power, not a sale or provision of service by the landowner, even on a broad view of the term “supply”. The respondents failed to identify any provision of the GST Act authorising levy or deduction of GST on such compensation.

The award notice was quashed insofar as it deducted GST from the compensation. The Court directed refund of Rs.1,14,815.29 with interest at 15% per annum from the date of the award till payment, ordered that the interest burden be recovered personally from respondent No.2, and awarded costs of Rs.50,000 to the petitioner. The writ petition was disposed of accordingly.

In Chand Pasha and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1375 HC, registered taxable persons facing show cause notices under Sections 73 and 74A(8) of the CGST/KGST Act sought a direction that the authorities must give seven days’ prior notice of any intended arrest under Section 132. They relied on repeated summons, alleged refusal to acknowledge documents, advice to reverse input tax credit, and an asserted threat of arrest if the reversals were not made.

The Court held that the question was whether a prior-notice requirement could be read into the GST statutes, and answered it in the negative. Relying on the Supreme Court’s exposition in Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India and Others, it stated that apprehension of arrest may be addressed through an application under Section 482 of the BNSS, 2023, and that contrary views are not binding. In that light, the Court declined to infer any statutory obligation to issue prior notice of intent to arrest.

The Court also declined to examine the broader grievance on the restricted pleadings before it, observing that a fuller adjudication required proper pleadings and prayer. The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioners to approach the Court again on appropriate pleadings, and the respondents’ defences were kept open.

In Raj Iron & Building Materials v. Union of India and Ors., (2017) taxcode.in 25 HC, the petitioner challenged seizure and penalty orders relating to goods, mainly TMT rod, imported from West Bengal. The seizure was made on the sole recorded ground that the E-Way Bill was not found accompanying the goods, although they were admittedly covered by a regular tax invoice.

The Court noted that the petitioner’s stand was that the E-Way Bill had been downloaded from the department’s website on 05.12.2017 and that, though produced with some delay, it was available before the conclusion of the penalty proceedings. It further observed that no allegation of evasion of tax liability was established from the show cause notice, seizure order or penalty order, and that the record did not show any intention to evade tax. The Court also noticed practical difficulties then existing concerning downloading and submission of E-Way Bills.

On those facts, the Court held that the breach was merely technical and did not justify seizure or penalty. Both orders were quashed, and the vehicle and goods were directed to be released forthwith. The writ petition was allowed with no order as to costs.

In Athani Primary Agricultural Cooperative Credit Society Ltd. v. Superintendent of Gst and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1381 HC, the writ petition challenged an order rejecting input tax credit on the ground that returns were filed belatedly under Section 16(4) of the applicable GST enactments.

The petitioner relied on Section 16(5), contending that the returns had been filed within the extended period. The respondents objected that Section 16(5) was not in force when the impugned order was issued. The Court held that Section 16(5) applies retrospectively and accepted that the dates of filing of returns and payment of taxes, as recorded in the order, fell within the extended time limit under that provision.

As the rejection under Section 16(4) could not stand in light of the retrospective operation of Section 16(5), the Court set aside the impugned order. The writ petition was disposed of without costs, and the connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.

In Karuppusamy Madhankumar v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1382 HC, the petitioner challenged rejection of his appeal as time-barred, contending that limitation under Section 107(1) of the applicable GST enactments begins only when the assessment order is communicated, and that uploading on the portal is not enough.

The Court held that the Limitation Act, including Section 5, does not apply of its own force to quasi-judicial tax proceedings where the statute prescribes a fixed period and a limited further extension. Reading Section 107 as allowing only three months from communication plus one additional month for sufficient cause, the Court ruled that there was no scope to condone delay beyond four months. It also held, in the GST setting and with Section 169 in view, that making the order available on the common portal constitutes valid service/communication.

Accordingly, the challenge to the appellate order failed. The writ petition was disposed of without interference, though the Court left it open to the petitioner to challenge the original order in accordance with law. The connected miscellaneous petitions were closed and there was no order as to costs.

In P. Raju Contractor v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1383 HC, the appellant, a civil contractor, assailed an assessment under Section 73 for 2018-2019 and the consequential demand, contending that he had not been properly notified after surrender of his GST licence and that the turnover adopted by the Department was excessive.

The Court found that the appellant had not paid GST in time, had responded only after the final order was passed, and had made the later payment after the assessment. It treated the dispute over the turnover figures as factual and noted that the assessment rested on the A.G.’s audit report. The Court also observed that the appellant’s explanation for non-payment was ignorance, and that non-participation in the hearing could not justify failure to discharge tax when due.

Holding that the appellant had not approached the Court with clean hands and that the issues raised were factual and beyond the scope of belated writ interference, the Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal. The liberty already granted by the Single Judge to seek instalment payment, if permissible in law, was left undisturbed.

In Noyyal Common Effluent Treatment Company Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (ST), (2026) taxcode.in 1380 HC, the petitioner challenged confirmation of interest liability of Rs.72,25,154/- arising from belated payment of tax for 2017-2018, along with the Department’s invocation of Section 74 in the summary forms.

The Court held that Sections 73 and 74, read with Section 75(12) and Section 79, form a complete recovery scheme for the situations covered by the GST enactments. It noted that the petitioner had initially paid tax at 5%, later paid the differential amount after the Department pointed out the error, and had even indicated willingness to pay interest in instalments. On that basis, the Court held that interest under Section 50(1) remained payable on delayed tax and that proceedings under Section 74 were maintainable notwithstanding the reference to that provision in the summary forms.

While rejecting the challenge on merits, the Court remitted the matter to the respondent to reconsider the reply and pass a fresh order within three months. The writ petition was thus disposed of with that limited remand, and the connected writ miscellaneous petition was closed.

In Anandaraj v. State Tax Officer, (2026) taxcode.in 1385 HC, the petitioner, as legal heir and representative of a deceased proprietor, challenged two orders relating to tax periods 2020-21 and 2021-22 that demanded tax, interest and penalty.

The petitioner stated that after his mother’s death and cancellation of the GST registration, he had not carried on the business and had therefore not responded to the DRC-01 notices. The respondent relied on Section 93(1)(b) of the GST enactments, 2017, contending that the legal representative could be liable to the extent of the deceased’s estate. The Court recorded these rival positions and also noted the petitioner’s offer to furnish his residential property as security.

Rather than finally determining liability, the Court remitted both matters for fresh adjudication. It directed the petitioner to file a reply within thirty days and to furnish details and title documents of the residential property, which would stand deemed attached and serve as security. If he complied, the authority was to pass a fresh order preferably within three months; if not, recovery could proceed in accordance with law after due notice. No costs were awarded.

In Aarthi Enterprises v. Southern Railways and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1387 HC, the petitioner sought modification of an earlier writ order dated 06.08.2025, complaining that Southern Railways was insisting on an undertaking even for release of the petitioner’s security deposit of Rs.68,16,788/- and two bills of Rs.48,85,460/-, although those amounts had been directed to be paid independently.

The Court construed the earlier order as containing two distinct directions. One concerned the security deposit and bills, which the Court held were not subject to any undertaking and had to be paid on their own footing. The second related to reimbursement of ESI and EPF amounts and was linked to furnishing employee particulars and an undertaking tied to the result of the GST challenge. The Court rejected the respondents’ attempt to extend the GST undertaking to the admitted payment heads, while noting that the undertaking requirement remained confined to the GST liability issue.

The modification petition was disposed of with a clarification that Southern Railways could not insist on an undertaking as a precondition for paying the security deposit and the two bills. The Court directed strict compliance with paragraph 15 of the earlier order and extended the time for payment by six weeks from the date of the present order.

In Ravi Prakash Singh v. Commissioner Commercial Tax and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1388 HC, the writ petition challenged the seizure of cash of Rs.13,04,000/- under Section 67(2) of the West Bengal GST Act and the later reasoned order dated 29.06.2026 that upheld the seizure.

The Court noted the competing submissions that cash is excluded from “goods” and therefore cannot be seized, while the State argued that the cash was seized as a “thing” relevant to proceedings arising from a fake GST invoice racket and round-tripping of funds. It recorded the divergence between the Delhi High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court on whether cash can be seized as “things”, and declined to finally decide that larger question because the issue was already pending before the Supreme Court. The Court nevertheless found that its earlier direction required respondent No. 3 to pass the order, whereas the impugned order was passed by an officer below that rank. It also held that the order failed to decide the core jurisdictional questions, including whether the cash fell within “things” and whether it constituted stock in trade.

The Court quashed the order dated 29.06.2026, remanded the matter to respondent No. 3 for a fresh reasoned decision within four weeks, and required a personal hearing and liberty for supplementary representation. Until then, the respondents were restrained from appropriating or utilising the cash and were directed to inventory the denominations and keep the amount in a Government Treasury/SDR Account.

In Umen Chandra Roy v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1389 HC, the petitioner challenged rejection of a rectification application filed to avail Input Tax Credit under Section 16(5) of the Central GST Act. The revenue had rejected the application as time-barred on the footing that it was not filed within the period stated in the relevant notification and circulars.

The Court held that Section 16(5) confers a substantive right to seek rectification for availing Input Tax Credit and does not itself prescribe any time limit. It further held that the executive notifications and circulars, being issued in exercise of executive power, could not override the statute and were therefore only directory. On that basis, the Court accepted that, depending on the facts of a case and absent exceptional delay, it could extend the period under Article 226.

The impugned rejection order dated 08.04.2026 was quashed. The jurisdictional authority was directed to reconsider and dispose of the rectification application by a reasoned order within eight weeks, with no opinion expressed on the merits and no equitable right created in the petitioner’s favour.

In Kanan International Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1390 HC, the petitioners challenged appellate orders dated 31.05.2024 that had rejected their refund appeals solely on limitation after the authorities had earlier remanded the refund matters and later rejected them again on 03.10.2022, followed by rectification applications under Section 161 rejected on 14.09.2023.

The Court held that the petitioners’ rectification applications had been filed within the statutory period and that this fact was material to computing limitation under Section 107. Relying on its earlier analogous decision, the Court concluded that where a rectification application is timely filed and disposed of, the period for filing an appeal runs from the rectification order rather than from the original adjudication order. The Appellate Authority, therefore, erred in calculating limitation from 03.10.2022 and in refusing to examine the appeals on merits. The Court also noted that if the appeals were still late even after taking 14.09.2023 as the starting point, they could be rejected on that basis.

The impugned limitation orders were quashed and the matters remanded for fresh decision on merits after hearing the petitioners, to be completed within twelve weeks.

In Ushaben Kalpeshbhai Patni v. State Tax Officer Ghatak 5 (Ahmedabad), (2026) taxcode.in 1391 HC, the petitioner challenged GST notices and a consequential demand order issued in the name of her deceased husband, who had carried on business as a sole proprietor and died on 03.05.2021.

The Court noted that the proceedings were initiated nearly three years after the proprietor’s death and continued in the name of a dead person, notwithstanding that the proprietorship registration had already been cancelled. It accepted that the petitioner was only the widow, had no connection with the business, and was unaware of the GSTN portal proceedings. On those facts, the Court held that the notices and the order could not be sustained because they had been issued against a deceased assessee.

The notices and subsequent order were quashed and set aside. The petition was allowed, rule made absolute, and liberty was reserved to the respondent to initiate proper proceedings in accordance with law against the petitioner for the outstanding demand.

In Synchrony International Service Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Assistant Commissioner (ST) and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1392 HC, the petitioners sought interest under Section 56 of the CGST Act on refunds already sanctioned for periods between July 2018 and March 2021, and challenged repeated deficiency memos issued while those claims remained pending.

The Court recorded the State’s reliance on Circular No. 125/44/2019-GST and on Rule 89(2)(m), but noted the petitioners’ case that the claim concerned only interest on amounts already refunded. Since the principal refunds had already been disbursed, the Court accepted that the question was not one of passing on the refund to consumers, but of scrutiny of delayed-interest entitlement on the basis of the refund history and summary sheet. In that setting, the Court held that the certification contemplated by Rule 89(2)(m) was not the appropriate requirement for such a claim.

The Court directed the petitioners to produce the summary sheet and relevant particulars before the Proper Officer, who was to scrutinise the claim and decide it in accordance with law within two weeks, without insisting on Rule 89(2)(m) certification. The writ petitions were disposed of on that basis, with no order as to costs.

In Rishi Pal Singh v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1394 HC, the petitioners challenged a show cause notice and consequential Order-in-Original raising a GST demand, contending that neither document had been formally served and that they came to know of the proceedings only much later through a portal check prompted by a phone call.

The Court noted the respondents’ stand that upload on the GST common portal constituted service under Section 169 of the RGST Act. However, on the pleadings and the reply as a whole, the Court treated the matter as one where the notice had been placed in the wrong folder or tab on the portal, so that the petitioners had no real occasion to notice it or respond. On that basis, the Court held that there was no valid service within Section 169 and that the absence of proper service necessarily meant denial of a personal hearing.

The writ petition was disposed of by quashing both the show cause notice dated 31.07.2024 and the Order-in-Original dated 29.01.2025, with liberty to the respondents to issue a fresh show cause notice and proceed afresh in accordance with law after affording an opportunity of hearing.

In Baker Hughes Oilfield Services India Pvt. Ltd. v. Customs Authority for Advance Rulings and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1370 HC, the appellant sought exemption under Serial No. 5 of Notification No. 45/2017-Cus. for equipment originally imported concessionally for petroleum operations and later moved from DTA to FTWZ to await possible use in a future contract.

The Court held that the arrangement had to be read in the context of Notification No. 50/2017-Cus., under which the equipment had been imported against an Essentiality Certificate tied to a specific contract and project. It found that the notification itself contained a structured mechanism in Condition No. 48 for continued use, transfer to another eligible petroleum operation, and related accountability. Against that scheme, the Court held that the appellant could not create an additional route by sending the equipment to FTWZ and then treating its return to DTA, on a fresh Essentiality Certificate, as a re-import. The SEZ/FTWZ deeming provisions were held not to override the specific conditions of the customs exemption.

The Court concluded that the later movement into DTA was a fresh import, not a re-import, and that the same transaction could not simultaneously be treated as an import under Notification No. 50/2017-Cus. and a re-import under Notification No. 45/2017-Cus. The appeals were dismissed.

In TMB Electronics v. Shanti Developers and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1371 HC, the appellant challenged an arbitral award and the dismissal of its Section 34 petition, disputing the contractor’s entitlement to payment under the final bill for construction of a factory building.

The Division Bench noted that the arbitrator had not accepted the contractor’s claim mechanically on the final bill alone, but had relied on admitted WhatsApp communications, photographs, the defence pleadings, and the absence of any contemporaneous complaint that the work had been abandoned or that a third party had been engaged to complete it. The arbitrator found the abandonment plea vague, accepted that work had continued into August-September 2020, and treated the dispute over the final bill as one of factual proof rather than legal invalidity. The Court also recorded that the GST objection did not displace the award, because any issue about deposit of GST was for the tax authorities and not a ground to undo the adjudicated contractual liability.

Finding no perversity or patent illegality, and emphasising the limited scope of interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the Court dismissed the appeal. It upheld the award of Rs. 6,14,97,594/- with interest, while noting that the appellant could seek proof of GST deposit after paying the awarded amount with up-to-date interest.

In E2E Supply Chain Solutions Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner (ST) GST Appeal Chennai-I and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1384 HC, the Court considered a batch of writ petitions raising the effect of rectification proceedings under Section 161 on limitation for appeals under Section 107 of the GST statutes.

The Court held that the Limitation Act does not directly apply to GST quasi-judicial authorities, and that Section 5 principles cannot be invoked to extend the fixed and capped appellate period under Section 107. It further held that limitation runs from communication of the particular order appealed against, but that the principles underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act can apply to GST appeals because they advance justice and are not excluded by the statutory scheme. A rejected rectification petition may, in suitable cases, amount to a proceeding prosecuted in good faith and with due diligence, so that the time consumed in it can be excluded, but only if there was some real basis for filing that petition.

Applying those principles, the Court granted relief in several matters where the rectification petition disclosed an arguable error or non-consideration of material, while refusing exclusion where no such basis existed. It allowed certain writ petitions outright, directed others to be treated as timely if appeals were filed within thirty days, and in some cases remanded the matters on consent terms involving partial pre-deposit. No costs were awarded.

In Union of India and Ors. v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (2026) taxcode.in 55 SC, the Supreme Court considered whether the Commissioner of Customs could validly approve the Mumbai Port Trust as custodian under Section 45(1) of the Customs Act despite the Trust’s custody arising under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, and whether such approval could attract liability under Section 45(3) for pilfered imported goods.

The Court held that Section 45(1) contains a saving clause, but that clause does not exclude approval of a person whose custody also exists under another enactment unless that other law already fastens customs duty liability for pilferage on that person. It distinguished the civil, compensatory liability of a bailee under the Major Port Trusts Act from the independent statutory duty created by Section 45(3), which is meant to protect revenue where the importer is absolved by Section 13. The Court found no true inconsistency between the two statutes because the Major Port Trusts Act does not create a tax liability for pilferage, whereas Section 45(3) does. The Court also held that the non obstante clause in Section 45(3) gives that provision overriding effect once approval under Section 45(1) exists.

The Supreme Court upheld the Notification dated 11.10.2000 approving the Mumbai Port Trust as custodian under Section 45(1) and set aside the High Court’s ruling that it was without jurisdiction and ultra vires. However, because the demands in issue related to pilferage before that notification and the respondent had not then been approved under Section 45(1), the pre-notification show cause-cum-demand notices could not be sustained and that part of the High Court’s relief was left undisturbed.

In Amazon Development Centre (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Tax and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 97 GSTAT, the Tribunal examined whether an appeal under Section 112 of the CGST Act was maintainable when the mandatory pre-deposit was not made at the time of initial presentation but was paid later, after the Registry pointed out the defect and before issuance of the Final Acknowledgement.

The Tribunal noted that the appeal was filed on 24.06.2026, a defect notice was issued for non-payment under Section 112(8), and the appellant then remitted 10% of the disputed amount through FORM GST DRC-03 within the period allowed for rectification. The jurisdictional officer confirmed the payment, and the Tribunal held that the statutory requirement was thereby satisfied. It accepted that, under the Explanation to Rule 110(4) of the CGST Rules, an appeal is considered filed in law only upon issuance of the Final Acknowledgement. On that basis, the later payment cured the defect and the Department’s objection that the appeal had been instituted without pre-deposit was rejected.

The Tribunal overruled the Department’s objection, held that Section 112(8) stood complied with, and directed the Registry to admit and register the appeal and list it for hearing on merits.

In Rodman Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Karnataka State GST Bengaluru, (2026) taxcode.in 98 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered whether the appellant could obtain waiver of interest and penalty under Section 128A of the CGST/KGST Acts on a demand confirmed for excess ITC availed in GSTR-3B for December 2020, by arguing that the underlying debit note and transaction related to FY 2018-19.

The Tribunal held that Section 128A is a limited statutory scheme applicable only to demands pertaining to the period from 1 July 2017 to 31 March 2020, and that its temporal scope cannot be enlarged by interpretation. It examined the returns and found that the disputed ITC was first availed in December 2020, not carried forward from 2018-19. The fact that the underlying debit note may have originated earlier did not alter the period to which the confirmed demand actually pertained. The Tribunal also held that the appellant had not shown compliance with the scheme’s procedural requirements and that circulars or cited decisions could not override the express statutory period.

The appeal was dismissed, and the interest and penalty confirmed under Section 73(9) were upheld, with the Tribunal concluding that the demand fell outside Section 128A and therefore no waiver was available.

In Tata Steel Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 56 SC, the Supreme Court addressed whether a show cause notice issued on 13.06.2025 for the financial years 2018-2019, 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 was time-barred under Section 73 of the CGST Act, and whether it could be sustained under the extended period in Section 74.

The Court held that, even after accounting for extended annual return due dates and the exclusion of limitation during the pandemic period, the notice remained beyond the limitation under Section 73. It further held that Section 74 could not be invoked unless the notice itself disclosed foundational facts showing fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression, and that the Assessing Officer had independently reached the requisite satisfaction. The Court found only a bare, mechanical allegation of suppression, without supporting facts, and noted that the Department’s own treatment of the matter in the call book reflected the absence of such satisfaction. The Court also rejected reliance on an explanation that had been omitted.

The show cause notice and the consequential order-in-original were set aside. The Court allowed liberty to the Department to initiate fresh proceedings under Section 74 only if the notice itself states foundational facts and any order is passed within the time indicated by the Court.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. SJR Prime Corporation Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 103 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered whether the respondent real-estate developer had retained an additional input tax credit benefit requiring passing on under Section 171 of the CGST Act, or whether a claimed reversal of unutilised ITC attributable to Blue Water Phase II eliminated any profiteering.

The Tribunal noted that the DGAP’s initial re-investigation had quantified profiteering, but after remand and acceptance of a Chartered Accountant’s certificate the supplementary report concluded that no additional benefit remained. The Tribunal, however, held that the record did not clearly establish the basis, reason, period attribution, or project-specific foundation for the reversal of Rs. 1,88,97,878. It stressed that a Chartered Accountant’s certificate could not be accepted as conclusive without examination of the underlying books, ledgers, working papers, DRC-03 and related documents, and that the DGAP also had to verify whether the reversal affected the denominator in the ITC-to-purchase-value ratio used for computation.

The Tribunal declined to accept the supplementary report as final, remanded the matter for limited verification and fresh computation, and directed the DGAP to submit a revised report after examining the documentary basis and the correct effect of the reversal on profiteering, if any.

In D.S Traders v. Commissioner State Goods and Services Tax Department and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 99 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered a challenge to penalty proceedings under Section 129(3) of the U.P. GST Act arising from interception of an excavator being moved in vehicle No. UP78GN8559 without an e-Way Bill, despite a delivery challan and the appellant’s claim that the machine was being returned from a project site to its registered place of business.

The Tribunal held that movement of goods, including movement for reasons other than supply, remains subject to the statutory requirements of Section 68 and Rule 138 unless a specific exemption is established. It rejected the argument that ownership of the excavator or its return from site dispensed with the e-Way Bill requirement. The appellant also failed to prove the alleged 20-kilometre exemption or produce satisfactory evidence of the tax treatment of the alleged hire/use charges. In that setting, the Tribunal found that the absence of an e-Way Bill, coupled with incomplete proof about consideration and GST discharge, supported an inference that the lapse was not merely technical.

The Tribunal upheld the seizure/penalty orders, finding the action under Section 68 read with Rule 138 and Section 129 justified. It dismissed the appeal and confirmed the original and first appellate orders imposing a total penalty of Rs. 3,24,000.

In Neptune Sales Corporation v. Additional Commissioner GR-2 Appeal- IV Lucknow Addl. Commr. Lucknow and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 102 GSTAT, the Tribunal examined detention and penalty under Section 129 of the CGST/UPGST Act where goods were accompanied by invoice, e-invoice and valid e-way bill, yet were treated as if transported a second time on the basis of earlier verification entries.

The Tribunal found no discrepancy in description, quantity, value or ownership of the goods. It held that the department’s case depended mainly on inference from the earlier scan and location of the vehicle, but no independent and cogent evidence established that the same goods had already completed an earlier journey or had been delivered. The Tribunal also relied on authorities stating that presumption cannot replace proof and that detention cannot be sustained on suspicion alone when the movement otherwise complies with the GST law.

The Tribunal concluded that the finding of reuse of the e-way bill and intention to evade tax was unsustainable. It allowed the appeal, set aside both the appellate and original detention orders, and directed refund of the amount deposited by the appellant in the impugned proceedings.

In Jai Enterprises v. Pankaj Gandhi Additional Commissioner GR-2 Appeal IV and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 101 GSTAT, the Tribunal dealt with a challenge to detention and penalty under Section 129 of the CGST/UPGST Act after goods moving from Kanpur to Fatehpur were intercepted twice the same day and the authorities inferred that the invoices and e-way bills were being reused.

The Tribunal found that the goods were accompanied by invoices, e-invoices and e-way bills, and that the record showed no discrepancy in description, quantity, value or ownership. It held that the conclusion of re-transportation was drawn mainly from the earlier scan and later interception, but no cogent evidence established that the same goods had already completed their journey or had been delivered. The Tribunal further held that intention to evade tax could not be presumed merely from suspicion, and that the cited precedents supported the principle that seizure must be backed by proof, not inference alone.

The Tribunal set aside the appellate and original orders, allowed the appeal, and directed refund of the Rs. 6,06,844 deposited under the detention and penalty proceedings.

In Santosh Mani Mishra v. Islam Trading Co., (2026) taxcode.in 100 GSTAT, the Tribunal heard the Revenue’s appeal against an order that had set aside tax and penalty imposed under Section 129(3) of the UPGST Act for movement of iron scrap without an e-way bill.

The Tribunal held that carrying an e-way bill during transportation was mandatory under Rule 138 and that the absence of the e-way bill at the time of interception was an admitted violation. It accepted the Revenue’s submission that later production of invoice, returns and payment records could not retrospectively cure the breach committed during transit. The Tribunal also noted that the cited precedents relied on by the first appellate authority were distinguishable on their facts, and it treated the short distance involved and the nature of the goods as circumstances supporting the inference of evasion.

The Tribunal allowed the Revenue’s appeal, set aside the first appellate order, and restored the original order imposing tax and penalty under Section 129(3).