GST Weekly Newsletter | 17 Aug to 22 Aug 2026

In Bambiah Stores v. State Tax Officer (FAC) Tiruchendur Assessment Circle and Ors., (2025) taxcode.in 358 HC, the petitioner challenged Notification No. 09/2023-Central Tax, the corresponding State notification issued under Section 168A of the Tamil Nadu GST Act, and the consequential assessment order for 2017-18, contending that the notifications were ultra vires, could not operate retrospectively, and violated Articles 14, 246A and 265.

The Court treated the controversy as covered by the Principal Bench decision in M/s. Tata Play Limited v. Union of India and others. It reproduced the operative conclusions from that decision, including the exclusion of the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for limitation purposes under Sections 73(2) and 73(10) of the CGST Act, and the conclusion that Notification Nos. 9 and 56 of 2023 were vitiated. The Court also noted that issues such as natural justice, jurisdiction, and apparent errors had to be re-examined by the assessing authority on remand.

The writ petition was allowed. The assessment order dated 28.12.2023 was quashed and the matter remitted for a fresh order on merits in terms of Tata Play, preferably within three months. The impugned order was to be treated as an addendum to the show cause notices, the petitioner was given six weeks to reply, and the petitioner was to be heard before any fresh decision. No costs were awarded.

In Pulse Global Exim v. State Tax Officer (FAC) Avinashi Assessment Circle, (2026) taxcode.in 380 HC, the petitioner challenged two GST assessment orders for the same tax period 2020-2021, both issued after show cause notices fixing personal hearing dates. The petitioner had not appeared for hearing, and the writ petitions were filed after the appellate limitation under Section 107 had expired.

The Court accepted the petitioner’s submission that part of the demand confirmed in one order had been repeated in the other, and it recorded that the impugned orders had been passed without proper notice. Referring to the approach taken in similar cases, the Court found no reason to depart from the practice of quashing ex parte orders and remitting matters for fresh consideration, while balancing the interests of the assessee and the Revenue. It directed a consolidated show cause notice and a consolidated final order because of duplication and overlapping of demand relating to reconciliation of E-way bill turnover and GSTR-1.

The writ petitions were disposed of by remand subject to deposit of 25% of the disputed tax and payment of Rs. 30,479 towards interest and late fee within thirty days. On compliance, the respondent was to pass a consolidated order within three months, the bank attachment would stand automatically vacated, and the petitioner had to remain free from other arrears. If the conditions were not met, recovery could proceed as if the writ petitions had been dismissed in limine, after due notice.

In Black Ticket Film Company Pvt. Ltd. v. State Tax Officer (ST) Alwarpet Assessment Circle, (2026) taxcode.in 397 HC, the petitioner challenged an assessment order dated 05.02.2025. The record showed that the petitioner had not responded to the notice or the reminder calling for reply and personal hearing, and that a rectification application under Section 161 had later been rejected. The writ petition itself was filed after expiry of the statutory appeal period under Section 107.

The Court noted the petitioner’s willingness to pre-deposit 25% of the disputed tax and observed that, in similar cases, ex parte orders had been quashed and matters remitted for fresh adjudication subject to graded deposit conditions. It therefore remitted the matter, directing that the impugned assessment order be treated as an addendum to the show cause notice and that the petitioner file a reply with supporting documents within thirty days. If the petitioner complied, the respondent was to pass a fresh order on merits within three months; otherwise, recovery could proceed after due notice.

In a subsequent correction order, the Court recorded that no bank account of the petitioner had in fact been attached. It therefore deleted the sentence in paragraph 10 of the earlier order dealing with automatic vacation of bank attachment and also deleted paragraph 11. The Registry was directed to issue a corrected copy, while all other observations in the original order were left unchanged.

In KPN Travels India Ltd. v. Office of Assistant Commissioner (State Taxes), (2026) taxcode.in 477 HC, the Court disposed of six writ petitions challenging separate assessment orders for the tax periods 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20. The assessments had been made ex parte because the petitioner had not filed replies to the notices that preceded them, and the writ petitions were filed long after the appeal limitation under Section 107 had expired.

The Court followed the same approach adopted in similar GST matters, namely that ex parte orders could be quashed and remitted for fresh adjudication on terms, with the amount of pre-deposit varying according to delay. It accepted the petitioner’s willingness to make such deposit as directed and, to balance the interests of both sides, decided to send the matters back for fresh orders on merits. The Court required replies to the respective show cause notices, with the impugned orders to be treated as addenda to those notices.

The writ petitions were disposed of with a structured remand. The Court prescribed distinct pre-deposit percentages for each case, ranging from 10% to 100%, to be paid within thirty days, and directed fresh orders within three months of compliance. Subject to compliance and absence of other arrears, any bank attachment would stand automatically vacated. If the petitioner defaulted, recovery could proceed as if the writ petitions had been dismissed in limine, after due notice.

In Jain Granites v. Assistant Commissioner (ST) Velandipalayam Circle and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 374 HC, the petitioner challenged both a GST assessment order for 2019-20 and the appellate order rejecting its appeal as time-barred. The assessment had followed a show cause notice and a reply in DRC-06, but the subsequent appeal was filed 14 days beyond the condonable period under Section 107 and was rejected on limitation.

The Court noted the petitioner’s submission that it had a case on merits and sought permission to defend the matter before the appellate authority on terms. Taking into account that the petitioner had approached the Court promptly, it considered the case fit for partial relief. Rather than reopening the assessment itself, the Court focused on restoring the statutory appeal so that the dispute could be decided on merits without further reference to limitation. It also directed consequential treatment of any amount already recovered, so that it could be adjusted towards the further deposit required.

The appeal was restored and the Appellate Commissioner was directed to decide it on merits, subject to an additional pre-deposit of 15% of the disputed tax over and above the 10% already paid. In light of that restoration, the separate writ petition challenging the assessment order was dismissed. Any recovered amount was to be adjusted against the additional deposit, and any bank attachment, if in force, would stand raised on compliance. Failure to comply would permit recovery in accordance with law after due notice.

In Velly Restaurant v. State of Uttarakhand and Ors., (2025) taxcode.in 530 HC, the writ petition concerned the cancellation of the petitioner’s GST registration and the availability of revocation under Section 30 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The respondents pointed out that the petitioner had an alternate remedy by way of revocation, while the petitioner fairly admitted that no such application had been filed within the prescribed time.

The Court noted that the Section 30 application had to be made within 90 days, but held that limitation should not prevail in the circumstances. It reasoned that the GST regime was at an initial stage of enforcement and that a common businessman might face practical difficulty in fully understanding its requirements while focusing on day-to-day business. The Court further observed that cancellation of registration directly affects livelihood and also impacts State revenue, and that trade cannot be carried on without compliance with registration requirements under the constitutional and statutory scheme.

Accordingly, the Court condoned the delay in invoking Section 30, permitted the petitioner to file an application within three weeks along with returns up to the date of cancellation, and directed the competent authority to decide it within three weeks thereafter. The appellate order dated 23.06.2025 was set aside, and the writ petition, along with any pending application, was disposed of.

In Balaji Traders v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Ors., (2025) taxcode.in 371 HC, the petitioner challenged an assessment order and a recovery notice issued under the TN GST Act, 2017/CGST Act, 2017, asserting that the show cause notice and reminders had only been uploaded on the GST portal and were never physically served, so no reply could be filed. The petitioner also sought remand and relief against bank attachment, offering to deposit 25% of the disputed tax.

The Court held that uploading notice on the GST portal is a sufficient mode of service, but stressed that effective service must be real and not merely formal. Because repeated portal reminders had elicited no response, the officer ought to have explored other valid modes of service under Section 169, preferably RPAD, instead of proceeding ex parte on empty formalities. The Court found that the petitioner had not been afforded an effective opportunity or personal hearing before confirmation of the proposals.

The impugned order dated 08.07.2024 was set aside subject to payment of 25% of the disputed tax within two weeks, and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration. The petitioner was directed to file a reply with supporting documents, the respondent was directed to issue a clear 14 days’ notice and grant personal hearing, and the bank account was to be de-frozen upon proof of payment. The writ petition was disposed of with no costs.

In Torrent Power Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1333 HC, the petitioners, holding companies that had furnished corporate guarantees for subsidiaries, challenged the vires of Rule 28(2) of the CGST Rules, Section 15(4) of the CGST Act, and related CBIC circulars, contending that GST on corporate guarantees without consideration was illegal and arbitrary. The dispute also included proceedings invoking Section 74 and, in one matter, an IGST demand concerning guarantees for foreign subsidiaries.

The Court held that a corporate guarantee by a holding company to its subsidiary is a supply of service under Section 7(1)(c) read with Schedule I Entry 2, because the parties are related persons and the activity is in the course or furtherance of business. It further held that the subsidiary is the recipient of the service, that the transaction is not an actionable claim, and that the guarantee is not a mere shareholder activity. The Court also rejected the argument that it was a continuous supply, but accepted that valuation under Rule 28(2) should be read in light of the actual charge where ascertainable.

The Court upheld Rule 28(2) and Section 15(4) in principle, but read down the expression “whichever is higher” as arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g), holding that valuation should reflect the actual commission or charge. It also held that levy under Rule 28(2) could not be imposed for the period prior to 26.10.2023, though it could operate thereafter if the guarantee continued. Proceedings under Section 74 were quashed for absence of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression, and the petitions were allowed in part with consequential relief including refund or adjustment of excess tax.

In In re: Chemizone Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 134 AARGST, the applicant sought an advance ruling on refund and input tax credit in respect of GST paid on the upfront lease amount for a long-term industrial plot taken from Eldeco Sidcul Industrial Park Limited, intended for construction of a factory. The jurisdictional officer objected that refund questions were outside Section 97(2) and that ITC was blocked under Section 17(5)(d) because the land would be used for construction of immovable property.

The Authority accepted that refund is not one of the questions listed in Section 97(2), and therefore declined jurisdiction on that aspect. On ITC, it examined Section 16 and the blocking provision in Section 17(5)(d), together with the explanations defining construction and excluding land, building and civil structures from plant and machinery. It also referred to prior Gujarat rulings that had treated ITC on lease rental for land used to set up industrial facilities as blocked credit.

The Authority held that, because the land was to be used for construction of the applicant’s factory building and not for plant and machinery, GST paid on the upfront lease amount was not eligible as input tax credit. The refund issue was rejected as beyond the advance ruling power, and the applicant was held ineligible for ITC on the lease payment.

In In re: Luxor International Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 133 AARGST, the applicant sought an advance ruling on uncoated paper classifiable under HSN 48025590, proposing to supply it only for manufacture of notebooks and exercise books. The applicant relied on the 2025 rate notifications, including the exemption entry for paper used for exercise books, graph books, laboratory notebooks and notebooks, and said it would obtain declarations, purchase orders and related end-use documents from buyers.

The Authority held that the goods were already understood to fall under Heading 4802, and the dispute concerned only the exemption in Entry 128 of Notification No. 10/2025-Central Tax (Rate). It accepted that the notification creates a use-based distinction, but held that the wording speaks of paper “used for” specified notebooks and does not create a class of eligible purchasers or make buyer declarations conclusive proof. The Authority emphasized that exemption notifications must be construed strictly, and that it cannot add a procedural verification mechanism absent from the text.

Finding no statutory machinery for end-use verification, the Authority declined to treat purchaser declarations, purchase orders, or contractual stipulations as sufficient by themselves to secure exemption. It concluded that Entry 128 exempts uncoated paper and paperboard used for the specified notebook purposes, but no advance ruling could be issued on the manner or procedure for availing that exemption, as that would lie outside Section 97(2).

In Rathi Cement House v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1335 HC, the petitioner challenged a single show cause notice issued under Sections 74 and 122 of the 2017 Act for multiple financial years, along with the ensuing order-in-original.

The Court relied on its earlier decision in State Bank of India and held that clubbing several financial years into one notice was not permitted and amounted to a jurisdictional error. It rejected the Revenue’s reliance on M/S. Rollmet LLP, noting that the issue there had merely been referred to a Larger Bench. The Court also held that the writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding the statutory appeal, applying the Supreme Court’s approach in Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. because the challenge went to the very authority to issue the notice. The fact that separate DRC-01 demands had been raised later did not cure the defect in the foundational notice.

The Court quashed the show cause notice dated 2 September 2025 and the consequential order-in-original dated 27 March 2026. It left the Revenue at liberty to proceed afresh, but only in accordance with law, and disposed of the writ petition without costs.

In H.R. Constructions v. Superintendent of Central Tax and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1341 HC, the petitioner, a registered dealer, challenged an assessment order directing reversal or payment of input tax credit availed after the original statutory cut-off.

The Court recorded that, under Section 16(4), the credit for financial year 2018-19 ought to have been availed by 20.10.2019, whereas the petitioner had availed it on 20.12.2019. However, the Court accepted the parties’ position that Section 16(5) subsequently extended the time for availing input tax credit in returns filed under Section 39 up to 30.11.2021 for the relevant financial years. The petitioner also stated that it did not wish to pursue the challenge to the validity of Section 16(4) and Section 20 of the IGST Act.

Taking the later statutory amendment into account, the Court set aside the assessment order dated 18.02.2021. The writ petition was allowed, the impugned order was quashed, and pending applications were closed without costs.

In Rupak Modak v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1339 HC, the petitioner challenged cancellation of his GST registration after a notice alleged non-filing of returns for six continuous months.

The Court found that the notice did not specify the month from which default commenced, did not identify the exact period of non-filing, and referred to a personal hearing without stating any date or time. It held that a show cause notice must clearly inform the noticee of the case to be met. The cancellation order was also defective: it gave no reasons, incorrectly referred to a reply dated 30.06.2020 despite the petitioner’s stand that none had been filed, and did not comply with the requirements of Rule 22 and FORM GST REG-19. The Court further noted that the petitioner had filed the pending returns by the time the officer acted, so the original ground for cancellation no longer survived.

The cancellation order dated 05.06.2024 was quashed, the matter was restored to the stage of the show cause notice, and the Proper Officer was directed to proceed afresh under Rule 22 and pass an appropriate order within one month. The writ petition was allowed to that extent, with no order as to costs.

In Santosh Agrawal (Goyal) v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1343 HC, the petitioner sought directions for a fair, independent and time-bound investigation into alleged GST and income tax evasion by identified private parties, along with supervision, examination of documents and recovery of dues.

The Court held that merely labelling a petition as a public interest litigation did not create genuine public interest. The controversy concerned alleged tax liability arising from commercial transactions, which had to be determined by the statutory authorities under the GST and Income Tax regimes. The Court found no material showing failure of statutory duty or mala fides, and observed that enquiries had already been initiated. It also noted that the petitioner had previously filed a substantially similar petition that had been dismissed for lack of locus standi, and that the present petition did not overcome that defect by repackaging the grievance as PIL. Non-disclosure of enquiry progress did not justify a writ of mandamus, particularly where tax investigations were subject to statutory confidentiality.

The Court dismissed the petition as not a bona fide PIL and directed forfeiture of the security amount deposited at institution. No relief was granted.

In Bhavani Industries v. State of Telangana and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1353 HC, the petitioner challenged an SGST assessment for financial year 2020-21 that confirmed tax, interest and penalty on two grounds, including disallowance of input tax credit and underreporting of tax liability.

The Court noted that CGST authorities had already initiated and concluded separate proceedings for the broader period 2017-18 to 2020-21 on allegations of irregular ITC availment without receipt of goods and against fake invoices. Applying the test referred to from M/s. Armour Security (India) Ltd., the Court found that the ITC-disallowance component in the SGST proceedings appeared to overlap substantively with the CGST proceedings, even though the latter covered a larger period. At the same time, the SGST order also included a separate audit-based charge of underreporting, which was distinct and could still be examined independently. The Court also noted the petitioner’s case that a reply had been filed and that the rectification application had not dealt with the overlap issue.

The assessment order dated 12.05.2025 was set aside and the matter remanded to the SGST authorities for fresh adjudication after giving the petitioner an opportunity to reply and produce documents. The authorities were left free to drop the overlapping charge or adjudicate the separate underreporting issue in accordance with law, and the writ petition was disposed of without costs.

In Arun Kumar Jain v. Additional Commissioner CGST Delhi West Commissionerate and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1346 HC, the Delhi High Court disposed of twelve connected writ petitions challenging a common Order-in-Original imposing penalties under Sections 74, 76(2) and 122(1) of the CGST Act arising from alleged fraudulent availment and utilisation of input tax credit by associated companies and their directors.

The Court held that the writ petitions should not be entertained because a statutory appeal under Section 107 was admittedly available. It declined to decide the question whether Section 122(1) applies to a person who is not a taxable person, noting that the same issue was pending before the Supreme Court in Mukesh Kumar Garg. The Court also observed that the petitioners’ other factual and legal grounds, including their individual roles and the materials relied upon by the adjudicating authority, were better left for appellate scrutiny.

The petitions were disposed of with liberty to pursue the statutory remedy. The Court directed that pre-deposit would be governed by Section 107(6) as it stood when the show cause notices were issued in 2020, that any appeal blocked by the electronic portal should be accepted in physical form, and that applications for exclusion of time spent in writ proceedings should be considered pragmatically. All merits were left open, subject to conformity with the Supreme Court’s eventual ruling on Section 122(1).

In Venkatasubbaiah C and Anr. v. Superintendent of Central Tax and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1352 HC, the Karnataka High Court considered a petition for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of BNSS, 2023 filed after summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act in a case alleging wrongful availment of input tax credit on fraudulent invoices.

The Court noted the petitioners’ case that they held a valid GST registration, had purchased goods, paid invoice value plus tax through bank transactions, filed regular returns, and had cooperated with the authorities. It held that cancellation of a supplier’s registration or later non-existence of the supplier does not, by itself, disentitle a purchaser from claiming ITC unless collusion is proved. On the material before it, the Court found no prima facie basis to conclude that the suppliers had violated clauses (a) and (b) of Section 132(1), and therefore no sufficient basis to say that the petitioners had used fraudulent invoices merely because the suppliers could not presently be traced.

Relying on established anticipatory bail principles and the absence of criminal antecedents, the Court granted relief subject to strict conditions. It directed release in the event of arrest pursuant to the summons, required appearance before the authorities on a specified date, permitted custody only if necessary for interrogation on that date, and imposed bond, surety, cooperation, non-interference, location-sharing, and passport-related conditions, while reserving liberty to seek cancellation for breach.

In Shakti Enterprises v. Principal Commissioner of Central Tax GST Commissionerate, (2026) taxcode.in 1351 HC, the Karnataka High Court examined whether a mandatory pre-deposit under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as applied to service tax matters, could be discharged by debiting transitioned CENVAT credit reflected in the Electronic Credit Ledger under the GST regime.

The Court held that Section 35F requires the prescribed percentage of duty or penalty to be deposited for maintainability of the appeal, but it does not prescribe an exclusive mode of payment. It treated the credit preserved under Section 140 of the CGST Act as a vested right carried forward into the GST system, not as a newly created credit. Referring to pre-GST practice, Section 140 and Rule 142(3), and the decisions in Yasho Industries and Army Welfare Housing Organisation, the Court concluded that transitioned credit may validly be used for pre-deposit. It further held that the CBIC Instruction dated 28.10.2022 was only administrative and could not override the statute or curtail vested rights.

The writ petition was allowed. The Tribunal’s defect order refusing to accept the pre-deposit made through the Electronic Credit Ledger was quashed, the deposit of Rs. 79,77,301/- was declared valid compliance with Section 35F, and the Tribunal was directed to entertain and decide the appeal on merits.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Pareena Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 88 GSTAT, the Principal Bench of the GST Appellate Tribunal considered a redetermined anti-profiteering report concerning construction services in multiple projects, including “Laxmi Apartment”, under Section 171 of the CGST Act.

The Tribunal recorded the DGAP’s revised computations for several projects and noted the respondent’s objections that unsold units in ongoing projects had not undergone transactions, that 13 units were cancelled after the report, that some units were booked only after GST came into force, and that certain buyers had paid no consideration in the pre-GST and post-GST periods. The respondent stated that it would file an affidavit regarding passing on benefits to ultimate purchasers, while the DGAP maintained that cancellations occurring after the report could not be considered at the investigation stage.

Without finally adjudicating profiteering liability, the Tribunal held that the factual objections required further examination. It directed the DGAP to submit a supplementary report within two months addressing cancelled units, the effect on buyers who had not paid consideration, and the position of post-GST bookings, and required the respondent to cooperate and furnish documents. The matter was listed for further hearing, with merits left open.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Laureate Buildwell Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 89 GSTAT, the Principal Bench of the GST Appellate Tribunal dealt with a remanded anti-profiteering dispute relating to the project “Parx Laureate” and the alleged failure to pass on input tax credit benefits to homebuyers under Section 171 of the CGST Act.

The Tribunal considered the original and supplementary DGAP reports, the respondent’s objections, and the material showing that the respondent had passed on substantial ITC benefit through invoices and receipts describing a “Discount @ 7% u/s 171(1) of the CGST Act, 2017”. On the supplementary report, the respondent accepted that some benefit remained unpaid. The Tribunal therefore held that Section 171 had been contravened to the limited extent of Rs. 14,94,622 not passed on to 25 eligible recipients. It further held that the methodology and record showed substantial though incomplete passing on of benefits, and rejected the attempt to treat general discounts as a substitute for statutory ITC benefit.

The Tribunal directed payment of the shortfall with interest at 18% from 01.07.2017 under Rule 133(3)(b), and held that penalty under Section 171(3A) was attracted for the period after 01.01.2020, subject to the proviso that no penalty would apply if the profiteered amount was deposited within thirty days of the order. It accepted limited adjustment for one disputed allottee, rejected set-off against the original complainant’s dues because consumer forum proceedings were pending, and then closed the matter.

In Rupender Singh Chhikara v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1355 HC, the Punjab and Haryana High Court considered a challenge under Articles 226/227 to the petitioner’s arrest, the remand order, and related GST proceedings arising from alleged offences under the CGST and IGST Acts. The petitioner complained that he was detained at his residence, was not told he had been arrested, and was not supplied the grounds of arrest or the arrest authorisation, while also relying on contradictory arrest timings and a claimed mechanical remand.

The Court reaffirmed that Article 22(1) requires the grounds of arrest to be communicated in writing within a reasonable time and, in any event, at least two hours before production for remand. On the record, however, the Court found that grounds of arrest dated 29.07.2026 were available, were detailed, and were not vague: they identified the petitioner’s role in M/s Rebuild Energy, the alleged wrongful availment of input tax credit, and the involvement of bogus suppliers, with a supporting table setting out relevant particulars. The Court rejected the argument that the document was merely general or ambiguous, and declined to make factual findings based on a pen drive containing CCTV footage in writ jurisdiction.

The writ petition was dismissed. The Court held that the inconsistency in recorded arrest timings did not invalidate the arrest because the petitioner was produced before the Magistrate on the same day and no prejudice was shown. It also held that the cited precedent did not require supply of the Commissioner’s reasons to believe, and that the remand order reflected independent judicial satisfaction, including written communication of grounds of arrest and intimation to the petitioner’s wife. The Court found no merit in the challenge and left the underlying prosecution unaffected on the merits.

In Dot Truckers Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer Faridabad (West) Ward 5 Faridabad and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1354 HC, the Punjab and Haryana High Court took up, by consent and after preponement, a writ petition questioning whether uploading a notice and order-in-original in the “View Additional Notices and Orders” tab on the GST common portal amounted to proper service under Sections 169 and 146 of the CGST Act, 2017.

The Court held that the controversy was no longer res integra and was already covered by its earlier decision in Luxmi Traders, later clarified in The Amar Cooperative LC Society Ltd.. It reproduced those conclusions, including that mere uploading on the common portal does not by itself amount to sufficient service unless receipt is acknowledged or a reply is filed, and that where service is defective the matter may be restored to the relevant stage. The revenue’s reliance on Section 115 of the Finance Act, 2022 and the retrospective amendment to the notification under Section 146 was noted, but the Court, drawing on the clarification in The Amar Cooperative LC Society Ltd., found no basis to depart from the earlier view merely because of that amendment.

The writ petition was disposed of in the same terms as Luxmi Traders and The Amar Cooperative LC Society Ltd.. The Court allowed the preponement application and directed that all pending miscellaneous applications also stood disposed of. The decision thus left intact the earlier binding approach that portal uploading alone is not necessarily sufficient service for GST notices or orders.

In Mohd Hazzak Lohar and Anr. v. Commissioner State Tax and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1358 HC, the Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court examined a challenge to notices and the final penalty order passed under Section 129(3) of the J&K GST Act, 2017 after a vehicle carrying goods was intercepted and detained. The central complaint was that the penalty order dated 22.09.2025 was passed beyond the seven-day period prescribed after service of the show cause notice.

The Court analysed Section 129 and held that the timelines in Section 129(3) are mandatory. It reasoned that the legislature used the word “shall” twice, that the provision operates in the context of coercive statutory power, and that strict compliance is required in fiscal legislation. The absence of an express statutory consequence for breach was held not to make the provision directory. The Court aligned its view with other High Court decisions, including the Gujarat decision in Allcargo Logistics Limited, and emphasised that the purpose of the timeline is to prevent prolonged detention and harassment.

The writ petition was allowed and the impugned notice/order dated 22.09.2025 was quashed because it was issued one day after the statutory period expired on 21.09.2025. The Court noted the intervening issues concerning revaluation and contraband polythene, but held that those circumstances did not excuse non-compliance with the mandatory deadline. It clarified that proceedings, if otherwise permissible under the Act, could still be pursued independently.

In Rajib Agarwala v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1340 HC, the Gauhati High Court considered a challenge to an Order-in-Original dated 13.03.2024 denying the petitioner input tax credit. During hearing, the petitioner relied on the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2024 inserting Section 16(5) into the CGST Act, 2017, and submitted that the writ could be disposed of on that basis.

The Court reproduced Section 16(5) and read it as a non obstante provision overriding Section 16(4) for invoices or debit notes relating to Financial Years 2017-18 to 2020-21, where the return under Section 39 had been filed up to 30.11.2021. On perusal of the impugned order, the Court found that the petitioner had filed the return on 23.10.2019 for Financial Year 2018-19, which fell within the covered period. On that footing, the Court concluded that the claimed input tax credit of Rs. 84,58,480/- could not be denied in light of Section 16(5).

The Court set aside and quashed the Order-in-Original dated 13.03.2024, vacated the interim order, and made no order as to costs. The writ petition was accordingly disposed of. The decision turned on the new statutory entitlement under Section 16(5) and its application to the petitioner’s return for the relevant financial year.

In Shibani Guha v. Assistant Commissioner of Revenue (WBRS) and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1334 HC, the Calcutta High Court dealt with a writ petition challenging an assessment order passed under Section 63 of the WBGST/CGST regime. The petitioner contended that Section 63 applies only to assessment of an unregistered person, whereas she was a registered person, and that the order related to 2017-2018 transactions, which she described as pre-registration period transactions. The respondents objected that a statutory appeal under Section 107 was available.

The Court held that the availability of an alternative remedy does not create an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction, but remains a self-imposed restriction. It observed that writ interference may be justified where there is an ex facie jurisdictional error requiring no factual inquiry. Here, however, the Court found that deciding whether pre-registration transactions of a registered person fall within Section 63 would require factual investigation and proper adjudication. It therefore concluded that the order was not demonstrably without jurisdiction on the face of the record and that the first appellate authority was the proper forum. The Court also noted that Section 107(4) permits condonation of delay upon sufficient cause.

The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to file a statutory appeal within six weeks. If filed, the appeal was to be considered strictly in accordance with law. The Court expressly left open the question whether Section 63 applied on the facts, stated that it had not gone into the merits, and directed that all points remained open before the appellate authority. No costs were awarded.

In Banka Constructions v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1342 HC, the petitioner challenged the dismissal of its appeal against a GST demand order passed under Section 73(1) of the CGST Act, 2017. The petitioner said it learned of the order only later, after its bank account was frozen, and that the appeal was within time from the date of knowledge.

The Court examined Section 107 and reiterated that an appeal must be filed within three months from communication of the order, with a further condonable period of one month on sufficient cause being shown. It noted that the impugned order was dated 03.07.2019, while the appeal was filed only on 07.09.2021. Relying on Nandan Steels and Power Limited, the Court held that the Appellate Authority had no power to condone delay beyond the statutorily permitted additional month. The petitioner’s reliance on M/s. Sri Mutharamman Traders was rejected as factually distinct because that case involved only a short delay.

The writ court found the delay of about two years to be huge and inadequately explained. It therefore upheld the appellate authority’s refusal to entertain the appeal, declined interference under writ jurisdiction, and dismissed the petition.

In M Devi v. Deputy State Tax Officer, (2026) taxcode.in 1348 HC, the petitioner challenged an assessment order imposing tax, interest and penalty even though it had already paid the full amount demanded in Form GST DRC-01A. The dispute arose because the payment of Rs. 1,21,002/- had been made under the IGST head, whereas the liability was towards CGST and SGST.

The Court held that the petitioner had effectively discharged the entire tax liability, but by remitting the amount under the wrong head. It concluded that the case did not fall within Section 77(2) of the CGST Act, because that provision addresses a different situation involving mistaken treatment of an inter-State supply. Instead, the Court characterized the payment as an inadvertent clerical error. On that basis, it found no justification for interest or penalty, and held that the petitioner should not be mulcted with either.

The impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded. The respondent was permitted to appropriate the amount paid under the IGST head towards the CGST and SGST liability, and the petitioner was left free to file any necessary application for refund and transfer. Since the assessment order was set aside, the bank attachment was directed to be raised.

In KPIL-JWIL Joint Venture v. State of Bihar and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1350 HC, the petitioner sought refund of excess balance in its Electronic Cash Ledger. The refund claim had been rejected, then allowed in appeal, after which the revenue filed a revision before the Commissioner and later an appeal before the GST Appellate Tribunal. Meanwhile, a fresh refund application led to a deficiency memo in Form GST RFD-03.

The Court noted that the impugned communication was only a deficiency notice under Rule 90(3), which requires deficiencies to be pointed out so a fresh application may be filed after rectification. It further held that the record did not show any exercise by the Commissioner under Section 54(11) of the CGST Act to withhold refund during the pendency of proceedings before the Tribunal. In the Court’s view, pendency of appellate proceedings by itself did not justify non-release of the refund without a specific order under Section 54(11).

The Court therefore directed the Commissioner to issue a show cause notice within one week, allow a reply, grant a personal hearing, and then pass a reasoned order under Section 54(11) within one month from closure of hearing. The writ petition was disposed of on those directions.

In Atanu Mondal v. D.R. Steel Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 90 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered whether the taxpayer had defaulted in reversing allegedly excess input tax credit for FYs 2018-19, 2019-20 and 2020-21. The dispute arose from a Section 73 notice alleging excess ITC of Rs. 53,95,795/- based on comparison of GSTR-3B with GSTR-2A/2B. The taxpayer maintained that the disputed credit had already been reversed with supporting DRC-03, reconciliation statements and returns.

The Tribunal rejected the adjudicating authority’s reliance on Section 16(4), holding that Section 16(5) specifically permitted ITC in respect of invoices or debit notes for the relevant years, subject to the statutory time frame stated there. It also held that failure to fill column 8 of DRC-03 with reasons was not fatal, because that field is only “reasons, if any.” After examining the ledger entries and the department’s own acknowledgments, the Tribunal found that the taxpayer had in fact reversed the disputed excess ITC and that the entire disputed amount stood covered. It accepted the taxpayer’s position that the Revenue’s objection on mapping and ARN details was untenable.

However, the Tribunal accepted that interest and penalty had not been separately and properly examined. It therefore remanded the matter to the first appellate authority for fresh computation of interest and penalty, if any, with reference to the relevant circulars. The Tribunal also noted that the taxpayer could seek waiver under Section 128A, subject to the prescribed procedure. The appeal was disposed of with directions to complete the exercise within three months.

In Gajmukhi Bullion v. Additional Commissioner Central Goods and Service Tax and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1349 HC, the petitioner challenged a penalty order under Section 122 of the CGST Act and the affirming appellate order. The petitioner, a bullion, gems and jewellery dealer, objected that the same Additional Commissioner had earlier examined and approved the investigation report and proposal for prosecution, and later acted as the adjudicating authority in the very same matter.

The Court found that the investigation report had indeed been signed by a Deputy Commissioner and then countersigned and approved by the Additional Commissioner, who later passed the impugned order in a quasi-judicial capacity. It held that this combination of roles undermined the foundation of fair adjudication. The Court did not decide whether there was actual bias, but held that a reasonable apprehension of bias could not be ignored where the officer who helped initiate proceedings then adjudicated them. The Court considered the respondents’ reliance on their cited authorities to be of limited assistance in these circumstances.

On that basis, the Court quashed both the Order-in-Original dated 16.01.2025 and the Order-in-Appeal dated 28.01.2026, and remanded the matter for fresh decision by a competent authority not associated with the earlier investigative or approving roles. All other contentions were left open for decision in accordance with law.

In Bhagwati Electronics v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1344 HC, the Delhi High Court considered a batch of writ petitions challenging Orders-in-Original arising from a GST anti-evasion investigation based on seized electronic data, handwritten slips, and related material from a third party’s premises.

The Court held that the real controversies concerned appreciation of evidence, adequacy of corroboration, service of hearing notices, compliance with Section 75(4), denial of cross-examination, admissibility of electronic records, and alleged coercive deposits. It found that these complaints were not uniform across petitioners and would require examination of the individual adjudication records. Relying on the settled rule of alternative remedy, the Court concluded that Section 107 of the CGST Act provided a complete and efficacious appellate mechanism capable of examining both facts and law. The Court further noted that questions about the Section 63 BSA certificate, the evidentiary value of kachcha parchis, and the sufficiency of corroboration were matters for the appellate authority rather than writ jurisdiction.

The writ petitions were dismissed, with liberty to pursue appeals under Section 107. The Court left all merits open, including admissibility and authenticity of the material relied on by the Department, and clarified that a petitioner who had already filed an appeal could seek exclusion of the writ-pendency period before the appellate authority in accordance with law.

In Liberty General Insurance Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of CGST Delhi South Commissionerate and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1347 HC, the Delhi High Court was asked to quash an Order-in-Original primarily on the ground that Central GST proceedings were barred by Section 6(2)(b) because State GST authorities had earlier proceeded on the same subject matter.

The Court held that Section 6(2)(b) is procedural and intended to prevent parallel proceedings on the same subject matter, but that identifying whether two proceedings are truly on the same subject matter requires factual comparison of the respective SCNs, allegations, periods, computations, and supporting material. It noted that the State case concerned FY 2020-21, while the Central SCN covered FY 2018-19 to FY 2023-24, and that the petitioner had not raised the Section 6(2)(b) objection in its written reply despite knowledge of the earlier State proceedings. Because the enquiry was factual and the petitioner had an appeal remedy, the Court declined to enter upon the merits under Article 226. It also left open the petitioner’s challenge to limitation under Section 74, the ITC demand, and the portal/rectification grievances.

The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue the statutory appeal and raise the Section 6(2)(b) plea there. The Court directed that the appellate authority consider limitation and any request for exclusion of time spent in writ proceedings in accordance with law and without being influenced by the Court’s observations.

In Surendra Sharma v. State of Assam and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1337 HC, the Gauhati High Court examined a search, seizure, and prohibition action taken at the petitioner’s GST consultancy office, where documents, digital signatures, and electronic items were seized and the premises were subsequently sealed.

The Court held that Section 67(4) of the Assam GST Act is not an independent power of sealing and operates only in conjunction with a search under Section 67(2), and only where access to the premises, almirah, electronic devices, box, or receptacle is denied. On the record before it, there was no indication that the petitioner had denied access. The Court further held that the power under Section 67(4) cannot be used to keep premises sealed as a storehouse for seized material once the search has culminated. It also interpreted the provisos to Section 67(2) to mean that seized books, documents, or things remain with the officer only so long as necessary for examination and inquiry, and found it unusual that custody of the seized items had been handed back to the petitioner while the office remained sealed.

The Court declared the sealing illegal and directed immediate de-sealing and handover of possession. It quashed the Order of Prohibition in FORM GST INS-03, but permitted the authorities, if still necessary, to take custody of the relevant books, documents, or things by issuing a fresh seizure order related back to the original date, and to consider supplying copies subject to statutory limits.

In Amit Agarwal @ Vicky Bhalotia v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2026) taxcode.in 1356 HC, the Jharkhand High Court considered a successive bail application in a PMLA prosecution arising from alleged fake GST invoicing, shell entities, and laundering of proceeds of crime through layered transactions.

The Court held that the earlier rejection of bail on merits remained the governing position and that, apart from the grant of bail to one co-accused, no fresh circumstance or material change had been shown. It reiterated the earlier findings that the petitioner’s arrest complied with Section 19 of the PMLA and that the prosecution material attributed to him a central role in the syndicate, including creation and use of shell entities, unexplained banking transactions, and alleged laundering activity involving substantial sums. The Court rejected the argument that the petitioner’s non-naming in the predicate offence was decisive, stating that money laundering under Section 3 is an independent offence. It also held that prolonged incarceration and trial delay, by themselves, could not override Section 45 in a grave economic offence, especially where the alleged role was serious and the risk of witness influence and evidence tampering persisted.

The Court declined bail, holding that parity with a co-accused was unavailable on the facts because the petitioner’s role was materially distinct and more central. The application was dismissed, with the Court clarifying that its observations were confined to bail and would not affect the trial on merits.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. L&T Construction Equipment Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 91 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered an anti-profiteering report alleging that the respondent had retained GST benefit in relation to its Bengaluru project, L&T Raintree Boulevard (Cluster-2).

The Tribunal identified the central issue as the proper method of calculating the benefit of input tax credit to be passed on under Section 171 of the CGST Act. It noted that the DGAP had used a ratio-based approach comparing total ITC to purchase value before and after GST, while the respondent relied on an EY report using invoice-level data and applying corresponding pre-GST taxes to actual post-GST procurements. Referring to the Delhi High Court’s reasoning in Reckitt Benckiser and to its own prior view in SVP Builders, the Tribunal considered the respondent’s method more closely aligned with the principle that actual project-level tax savings should be ascertained. It therefore directed re-verification of the data, assumptions, and computations in the EY report.

The matter was remanded to the DGAP under Rule 133(4) for fresh investigation and recomputation of any profiteering amount. The respondent was directed to cooperate, the DGAP was directed to file a fresh report within three months, and the matter was listed for further hearing.

In Shivani Enterprise v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 51 SC, the Supreme Court considered a Special Leave Petition challenging a High Court order that had noted the availability of an alternative statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

The Court heard learned senior counsel for the petitioner and examined the materials on record. It concluded that interference was not warranted because the High Court had rightly held that the petitioner had an efficacious alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 107. The order does not record detailed submissions from the respondents, and the Court confined itself to the availability of the statutory remedy rather than entering into the merits of the underlying controversy.

The Special Leave Petition was disposed of without interference. The Court granted the petitioner four weeks to file the statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority and expressly reserved liberty to raise all submissions available in law, including objections relating to deficiencies in the show cause notice. Pending applications, if any, were also disposed of.

In Galaxy Heights v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1364 HC, the Patna High Court examined a challenge to the appellate order dismissing the petitioner’s appeal on limitation, the cancellation of its GST registration, and the rejection of its revocation application, together with a request for restoration of registration.

The Court noted the petitioner’s explanation that illness had caused delay in filing returns and in handling business affairs, and that once cancellation was noticed, pending GSTR-3B and GSTR-1 returns were filed and taxes and late fee were later paid. On that basis, the Court held that the competent authority had to consider the request for revocation afresh. It also observed that permanent cancellation would likely inflict “civil death” on the petitioner’s livelihood. The Court declined the respondents’ suggestion to remand the matter to the appellate authority.

The appellate order dated 14.06.2024 and the revocation rejection order dated 26.12.2023 were set aside. The matter was remitted to the Assistant Commissioner, Purnea-1, to consider the revocation application afresh and pass an appropriate order within two months from receipt or production of the Court’s order.

In Rajkonwar and Sons and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1365 HC, the Gauhati High Court dealt with a writ challenge to a notice issued under Section 74 of the Assam Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017, while later proceedings under the CGST Act had culminated in an Order-in-Original demanding tax, interest, and penalty.

The Court held that the original writ challenge to the AGST notice had become infructuous once the later CGST proceedings were concluded. It also found that the Order-in-Original could not properly be attacked through an interlocutory application in the pending writ petition, describing that course as misconceived. No jurisdictional error was found in the Order-in-Original, so there was no occasion to invoke Article 226 on the merits of that adjudication. At the same time, the Court accepted that the petitioners had acted on mistaken legal advice and had diligently pursued the matter.

The writ petition was disposed of. Liberty was granted to file an appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act against the Order-in-Original within 30 days, and the Appellate Authority was directed to consider any such appeal on merits without insisting on limitation. The interim order stood vacated.

In Hazarika Brothers v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1366 HC, the Gauhati High Court considered a challenge to the rejection of an application under Section 30 of the CGST Act seeking revocation of cancellation of GST registration.

The Court held that Section 30(2) requires an opportunity of being heard before rejection, and that such opportunity must be proper and effective. Although the notice stated that failure to appear could lead to an ex parte decision, it did not intimate the date and time fixed for personal hearing. In those circumstances, the Court found that the petitioner had not been afforded a meaningful hearing. It also described the impugned order as cryptic and non-speaking.

The order dated 07.05.2026 rejecting revocation was set aside and quashed. The Proper Officer was directed to proceed from the stage of the show cause notice, issue a fresh notice of personal hearing through the common portal and by e-mail, and then pass a reasoned order under Section 30 in accordance with law if the petitioner appeared.

In Pr. Commissioner CGST & CX Siliguri Commissionerate v. Agarwala’s Bitumex Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 92 GSTAT, the Tribunal heard Revenue appeals against appellate orders that had allowed refund claims of accumulated input tax credit on exported goods.

The Tribunal held that the Department’s objections did not survive scrutiny. It found that the show cause notices had raised only two issues: whether goods purchased from M/s KS Metals were dispatched from West Bengal, and whether KS Metals had purchased from suppliers whose registrations had been cancelled. The Tribunal accepted the respondent’s Bill to Ship to model, noted that export of goods and tax payment were admitted or verified, and held that GST law does not require toll plaza receipts or movement from the supplier’s registered place as a condition for refund. It also found that the respondent had produced e-way bills, bilty copies, shipping bills, EGM details, transporter’s certificate, and bank statements, and had satisfied Section 16(2).

The Tribunal further held that the respondent could not be denied refund because of any irregularity by second-line suppliers, particularly when the immediate supplier had valid registration. Additional grounds and material raised for the first time before the Tribunal were held inadmissible under the relevant procedural rules. The Revenue appeals were dismissed.

In Raghuvansh Agro Farms Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors., (2025) taxcode.in 1435 HC, the Allahabad High Court considered a challenge to orders arising from Section 74 proceedings under the SGST Act, including the assessment order dated 31.5.2023 and the appellate order dated 10.1.2025.

The Court held that Section 74 can be invoked only when the notice and adjudication expressly record, on evidence, fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts leading to wrongful availment or excess claim of input tax credit. On the record before it, neither the show cause notice nor the assessment order contained such foundational findings, and the proceedings were therefore without jurisdiction. The Court also accepted the petitioner’s objection that the State GST authorities had not shown any material justifying their jurisdiction despite the petitioner’s assertion that it fell under Central GST. On the merits, the Court found that the petitioner’s purchases and sales were reflected in books of account and in GSTR-1, GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B, with payment through banking channels and supporting tax invoices, e-way bills and bilties. It rejected the Revenue’s attempt to infer circular trading merely from the absence of toll plaza receipts, noting no statutory requirement for such proof. It further held that proceedings based on purchases from M/s Sibri Traders could not survive after proceedings against that supplier had already been set aside.

The writ petition was allowed. The impugned orders were quashed, the Court held the adverse inference and jurisdictional basis unsustainable, and it directed refund of any amount deposited by the petitioner in accordance with law within one month of production of a certified copy of the order.

In Naveen Kumar v. State of Haryana and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1363 HC, the Punjab and Haryana High Court heard the petitioner’s first bail petition under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 in a case involving offences under the IPC and the Haryana GST Act.

The Court noted the petitioner’s custody of more than one year and two months, clean antecedents, completion of investigation, absence of any remaining recovery, and no material suggesting tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. It also noted a question mark over the police jurisdiction to lodge the FIR, the petitioner’s argument that the allegations were covered by GST law, and the fact that the offence was triable by a Judicial Magistrate. Relying on the principles that bail is the rule and jail the exception, and that prolonged undertrial incarceration may implicate the right to speedy trial under Article 21, the Court treated these factors cumulatively as favouring release. The State’s emphasis on the seriousness of allegations and possible severe punishment was recorded, but the Court did not consider it sufficient to outweigh the other relevant considerations at the bail stage.

The petition was allowed. The petitioner was ordered to be released on regular bail on furnishing personal and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court, subject to conditions against inducement or threat to witnesses, maintenance of a current address, and restriction on leaving India without prior permission.

In Om Prakash v. Islam Trading Co., (2026) taxcode.in 93 GSTAT, the GST Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, considered the Department’s appeal against the First Appellate Authority’s order setting aside tax and penalty imposed under Section 129(3) of the UPGST Act.

The Tribunal found it undisputed that the goods were intercepted while being transported without an E-Way Bill, even though accompanied by a tax invoice and other documents. It held that Rule 138(1) makes prior generation and carrying of the E-Way Bill mandatory for movement of goods above the prescribed value threshold, and that the E-Way Bill is an integral part of the statutory monitoring mechanism. The Tribunal rejected the First Appellate Authority’s view that subsequent production of the E-Way Bill cured the defect, holding that the earlier authority had erred in interfering with the Section 129 proceedings. It also held that the precedents relied upon below were not similar on facts. On intention to evade tax, the Tribunal accepted the Department’s case that non-generation of the E-Way Bill facilitates manipulation of records and, with the transport route shown between Baheri, Bareilly and Kichha, Uttarakhand, the intention to evade tax was “crystal clear.”

The departmental appeal was allowed. The Tribunal restored the order dated 09.03.2018 imposing tax and penalty under Section 129(3) and quashed the order of the First Appellate Authority.

In Sri Parameshwara Bricks v. State Tax Officer Peddapalli Circle and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 94 GSTAT, the GST Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, examined demands raised after audit comparison of e-way bill turnover with turnover declared in FORM GST CMP-08 by composition dealers engaged in brick manufacture.

The Tribunal held that the appellants had admittedly crossed the ₹1.50 crore aggregate turnover threshold during the relevant financial years and therefore ceased, by operation of Section 10(3), to be eligible for the composition scheme from the date of crossing. It accepted that tax thereafter became payable under the regular scheme, with Rule 6(2) requiring payment under Section 9(1) from the date of cessation. However, the Tribunal further held that because composition dealers cannot collect GST separately, the declared invoice values had to be treated as inclusive of tax. Applying Rule 35, it ruled that the differential liability must be computed on a cum-tax basis, not on the full invoice value as if tax were extra. It also observed that the Department had already accounted for certain typographical errors in e-way bills and found no reason to disturb the factual figures adopted below. The question of input tax credit after cessation was expressly left open.

The appeals were disposed of with partial relief. The First Appellate Authority’s order was upheld subject to modification requiring recomputation of tax, interest and penalty on supplies made after lapse of the composition option by applying the Rule 35 cum-tax formula.

In Vijayan Sahadevan (Deceased) v. Commissioner of Kerala State GST Thiruvananthapuram, (2026) taxcode.in 96 GSTAT, the GST Appellate Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram Bench, dealt with denial of input tax credit for belatedly filed GSTR-3B returns and the effect of the proprietor’s later मृत्यु, with the appeal pursued by the son as legal heir.

The Tribunal held that, after the death of the sole proprietor and discontinuance of the business, the matter fell within Section 93(1)(b), so any recovery could be pursued only against the deceased’s estate and only after appropriate action against the legal representative. It found that no notice had been issued to the legal heir and no inquiry had been made into the existence or extent of the estate, making the order-in-appeal unsustainable on that ground alone. On the merits, the Tribunal further held that retrospective Section 16(5), inserted by the Finance Act, 2024 with effect from 1.7.2017, protected the appellant’s ITC claim for FY 2017-18 because the relevant returns had been filed well before 30.11.2021. The respondent’s position that the newly inserted provision could be considered in pending appeals was recorded, but the Tribunal treated the provision as squarely applicable on the available record.

The impugned order-in-appeal was set aside and the appeals were allowed with consequential relief. The Tribunal held both that the statutory procedure following the proprietor’s death had not been followed and that the denied ITC was no longer sustainable in light of Section 16(5).

In Santhome Latex Enterprises v. Commissioner of CGST Thiruvananthapuram, (2026) taxcode.in 95 GSTAT, the Tribunal examined whether proceedings under Section 74 of the CGST Act could be sustained on the basis that the appellant had taken allegedly ineligible input tax credit and had not replied to audit communications.

The Tribunal held that the show cause notice rested on vague assertions that excess or ineligible credit amounted to suppression, but it did not set out evidence showing fraud, willful misstatement, or a deliberate attempt to evade tax. It accepted the adjudicating authority’s finding that the appellant had filed GSTR-3B, GSTR-9C and related reconciliation statements, uploaded supporting material on the GST portal, and disclosed invoice-wise reconciliation. On that basis, the Tribunal concluded that mere availment of self-assessed credit, or a failure to reply to an audit enquiry or final audit report, did not by itself establish suppression under Section 74. It also held that the appellate authority introduced a new basis—non-furnishing of information when called for—that was absent from the notice, contrary to natural justice, and had not addressed the adjudicating authority’s factual findings.

The Tribunal answered both framed questions in the negative, set aside the Order-in-Appeal, and allowed the appeals with consequential relief. It held that Section 74 could not be invoked merely because the Department alleged ineligible ITC or non-response to audit correspondence, absent evidence of willful suppression or intent to evade tax.

In SRO India v. State of Punjab and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1368 HC, the High Court considered a challenge to a show cause notice dated 02.02.2025 on the footing that it had been prepared using an artificial intelligence tool rather than by independent application of mind by the competent authority.

The petitioner relied on the material uploaded with the notice, which contained AI-based prompts and suggested improvements such as adding case-law references, strengthening reasoning, drafting rebuttal language, and enhancing verification findings. The State explained that the AI references appearing at the end of the notice had been inadvertently uploaded, but the Court was not persuaded by that submission. It held that the statute required the competent authority to examine the facts and apply its own mind before issuing a notice, and that the use of an AI tool for preparation and issuance of the notice was not shown to have statutory sanction. On that basis, the Court concluded that the notice was founded primarily on an impermissible AI-generated process and could not stand.

The writ petition was allowed. The show cause notice and consequential proceedings were quashed, though liberty was reserved to the authority to proceed afresh in accordance with law after independently examining the facts of the case.

In TVS Motor Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise Chennai-III, (2026) taxcode.in 53 SC, the Supreme Court considered whether referral charges received by an automobile dealer from banks and an insurance company were taxable as Business Auxiliary Service and whether suppression justified the extended limitation period and penalties.

The Court held that the agreements with HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank and Oriental Insurance Company showed that the appellant was promoting and marketing the services of those institutions and acting as a link in their business activity. On that basis, the referral charges were held to fall within Section 65(105)(zzb) of the Finance Act, 1994. At the same time, the Court noted that the appellant had deposited the tax amounts before the show cause notice dated 02.04.2008 was issued. It accepted that there had been confusion over taxability, and while the Department relied on suppression, the Court observed that the liability had already been satisfied before notice. The Court therefore treated the pre-notice payment as material to the penalty question.

The appeal was partly allowed. The taxability finding was upheld, but the penalty under Section 78 was directed to be set aside, and the Tribunal’s earlier setting aside of the Section 76 penalty remained undisturbed.