GST Weekly Case Laws Newsletter | 28 September to 03 October 2026

In Anand Enterprises v. Ruby Singh Additional Commissioner Grade-II Appeals State Tax and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 189 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered a second appeal against concurrent orders upholding penalty after interception of goods transported with an expired e-way bill that named a different vehicle.

The Tribunal held that the explanation offered by the appellant did not fit the record: the e-way bill had expired before interception, no reply was filed to the show-cause notice, and the vehicle number in Part B was entirely different from the vehicle actually found carrying the goods. It held that section 68 and rule 138 required valid documentation for movement of goods, and that the circular dealing with minor one- or two-digit clerical mistakes could not extend to substitution of a completely different vehicle. It also treated the authorities relied on by the appellant as distinguishable on facts. The Tribunal further relied on the statutory scheme and on prior Allahabad High Court rulings to hold that an incomplete or incorrect e-way bill can support penalty, and that intent to evade tax may be inferred from surrounding circumstances when not rebutted.

The second appeal was dismissed. The Tribunal found no legal or factual error in the concurrent findings of the lower authorities, held that the appellant had failed to rebut the presumption of intent to evade tax, and left the penalty order undisturbed.

In Neeraj Shukla v. Jay Steels, (2026) taxcode.in 188 GSTAT, the Tribunal heard the Revenue’s second appeal against the order setting aside detention, penalty, and related proceedings for transport of goods without an e-way bill on 24.11.2017.

The Tribunal examined the chronology of Rule 138 and noted that, although the rule had been substituted in August 2017, its mandatory nationwide operation was later brought into force only from 01.04.2018. On that basis, it held that generation and carrying of an e-way bill was not a legally mandatory requirement for the interstate movement in question on the date of interception. It further found that the goods matched the invoice and transport documents, there were no discrepancies in quantity, weight, or description, and the vehicle was on its designated route. The Tribunal also noted that the Department had not alleged an intention to evade tax when initiating proceedings.

The Revenue’s appeal was dismissed. The Tribunal upheld the first appellate authority’s decision, held that detention and penalty under section 129 were unsustainable on the facts and law, and left the release and setting aside of the demand intact.

In Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner State Tax Chhatisgarh, (2026) taxcode.in 187 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered whether interest could be recovered on a refund of accumulated input tax credit that had earlier been sanctioned and later repaid under Section 73 proceedings.

The Tribunal held that a monetary refund under Section 54(3), once actually paid in cash, may fall within the expression “tax erroneously refunded” if it exceeds what Section 54 read with Rule 89(5) permits. It rejected the argument that Section 73 is unavailable unless the refund order is first reversed by departmental appeal or revision, holding instead that Section 73 is an independent demand-and-recovery provision and that neither Section 107(2) nor Section 108 makes it conditional on prior challenge to the refund order. The Tribunal also held that Sections 73 and 50, read together, provide statutory authority for interest on an erroneous refund. It treated VKC Footsteps as confirming the validity of the substituted refund formula and held that the appellant had not produced any alternative computation showing a surviving principal entitlement. The objections based on retrospectivity, Rule 88B, and absence of hearing were rejected on the record and procedural history.

The appeal was dismissed. The Tribunal affirmed the order sustaining interest of Rs. 44,51,491 on the erroneous refund of Rs. 90,35,671 and left the recovery order undisturbed.

In Cheema Trading Company v. Commissioner State GST Commissioner, (2026) taxcode.in 186 GSTAT, the Tribunal dealt with three connected second appeals arising from search-based Section 74 proceedings and orders confirming tax, interest, and penalty.

The Tribunal held that the first appellate authority had not passed a reasoned or speaking order. It found that seven specific grounds of appeal, together with around 70 cited decisions, had not been examined at all, and that the appellate orders merely reproduced a brief conclusion confirming the original orders. Treating recording of reasons as a core aspect of natural justice, the Tribunal held that such disposal amounted to failure to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It then considered the proper course at the second appellate stage and concluded that remand was preferable to deciding the matter for the first time on merits, because a fresh first appellate or adjudicatory decision would preserve appellate rights and better serve judicial efficiency. However, because the appellants had also raised foundational objections to the original proceedings, including lack of effective hearing, disputed notices, and the identification of relied-upon documents, the Tribunal held that remand should go to the original adjudicating authorities rather than only to the first appellate authority.

The appeals were allowed by way of remand. The Tribunal set aside both the Orders-in-Appeal and the corresponding Orders-in-Original, directed fresh adjudication after disclosure of relied-upon documents and a proper personal hearing, and required reasoned orders to be passed in accordance with law.

In Cheema Bricks & Traders v. Commissioner Commissioner State GST, (2026) taxcode.in 185 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered three second appeals arising from search-based Section 74 demands confirmed by the first appellate authority.

The Tribunal held that the appellate authority’s orders were not reasoned or speaking orders. It found that the appellants’ seven substantive grounds, including objections based on natural justice, sufficiency of notice, evidentiary basis, transportation issues, absence of suppression, and interest and penalty, had not been considered at all, despite reliance on numerous judicial authorities. The Tribunal reiterated that recording reasons is an essential component of quasi-judicial decision-making and that a perfunctory affirmance cannot sustain appellate jurisdiction. It further held that remand was the appropriate course because deciding the dispute for the first time at the second appellate stage would prejudice the statutory right of further appeal. Since the appellants had also challenged the original adjudication on foundational procedural grounds, including personal hearing, the contents of the notices, and access to relied-upon documents, and because the original orders were ex parte, the Tribunal directed remand to the original adjudicating authorities rather than merely to the first appellate authority.

The three appeals were allowed by way of remand. The Tribunal set aside the Orders-in-Appeal and the corresponding Orders-in-Original, and directed fresh adjudication after disclosure of relied-upon documents, an effective personal hearing, and reasoned determination on the record.

In Cheema Local Carrier and Construction v. Commissioner State GST Commissioner, (2026) taxcode.in 184 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered three second appeals arising from common search-based proceedings under Sections 67 and 74 of the CGST and Chhattisgarh GST Acts, in which the first appellate authority had dismissed the appeals and confirmed the original demands.

The Tribunal held that a reasoned order is an essential component of natural justice and found that the first appellate authority had not dealt with any of the grounds urged, including alleged violation of natural justice, defects in the show cause notices, challenge to the evidentiary foundation, and objections to penalty and interest. It noted that the same conclusion had been reproduced in all three appeals without independent consideration, despite numerous citations relied upon by the appellants. The Tribunal also considered that the appellants had complained of inadequate access to relied-upon documents and of want of an effective personal hearing. Applying the principle that appellate jurisdiction must be exercised by conscious consideration of the issues raised, it concluded that the appellate orders were not speaking orders and had failed to adjudicate the merits.

The Tribunal allowed the appeals by remanding the matters, but not merely to the first appellate authority. Because the appellants had also challenged the original adjudication process itself, including the alleged denial of an effective hearing and disputes over the show cause notice and documents, the Tribunal remitted the cases to the original adjudicating authorities for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. It directed that the relied-upon documents be identified and made available, that reasonable time and a personal hearing be provided, and that fresh reasoned orders be passed. The impugned appellate and original orders were set aside.

In State Tax Officer (IB) II v. Emerald Jewel Industry India Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 1602 HC, the Court dealt with a writ challenge to an appellate order under Section 129 of the CGST and SGST Acts after the GST Appellate Tribunal had been constituted.

The Court noted that a statutory remedy under Section 112 was available against the First Appellate Authority’s order and that the Tribunal was now in place. Although the respondent referred to later decisions supporting the view taken by the appellate authority on IGST-related detention, the Court proceeded on the narrower ground that an efficacious statutory second appeal had become available. It therefore considered it appropriate to require the petitioner to pursue that remedy rather than continue in writ jurisdiction.

The writ petition was disposed of by permitting the petitioner to file a second appeal under Section 112. The Court directed that if the appeal was presented within six weeks from the date of judgment, it would be treated as within time, and it further directed that the appeal be decided on merits.

In Chirayil Granite Industries v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1603 HC, the petitioner challenged a show cause notice under Section 74 of the CGST Act proposing GST on royalty paid in mining transactions under the reverse charge mechanism, relying on an earlier judgment said to support its position.

The Court treated the impugned communication as only a show cause notice and declined to interfere at that stage. It observed that the petitioner’s contentions, including those based on the earlier judgment, had not yet been examined by the statutory adjudicating authority. On that footing, the Court considered it unnecessary to exercise writ jurisdiction before adjudication.

The petition was dismissed, but without prejudice to the petitioner’s right to raise all objections before the adjudicating authority, including the reliance placed on the earlier judgment. The Court expressly left those issues open for decision in the statutory proceedings.

In Prius Technologies v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1600 HC, the petitioner challenged a seizure memo and sought immediate release of an imported consignment of multifunctional devices, with the matter still at the stage of seizure and provisional release.

The Court noted that it had already considered similar writ petitions and had earlier directed release of seized goods on conditions, a course that had been left undisturbed by the Supreme Court while preserving the authority’s right to proceed with adjudication. Following that approach, the Court held that the present case, which stood on an identical footing, could be disposed of at the admission stage by granting conditional release. It also recorded that adjudication had to remain independent and uninfluenced by the release order.

The writ petition was allowed. The respondents were directed to process provisional release subject to payment of enhanced duty, quantification by Customs within one week, furnishing of a bank guarantee for 10 per cent of the total price, and compliance with the further directions on demurrage and transaction details. The Court clarified that the adjudicating authority was free to proceed in accordance with law.

In Shree Karni Electrovision v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1584 HC, the petitioner challenged a Section 74 order and also sought a declaration that Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act and the corresponding RGST provision were ultra vires, or alternatively required reading down, because the purchaser could not ensure payment of tax by the supplier.

The Court held that Section 16(2)(c) creates a mandatory pre-condition for input tax credit: the tax charged on the supply must actually be paid to the Government, subject to Section 41. It said a purchaser should not avail ITC without ascertaining whether the supplier has discharged the tax liability, and that recovery is permissible where credit is taken despite non-payment by the supplier. The Court considered and relied on the reasoning of the Gujarat High Court in Maruti Enterprise, which had upheld the provision and rejected a reading-down exercise. It further held that the supplier’s insolvency proceedings, and the principles in Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P.) Ltd., did not remove the statutory condition under Section 16(2)(c).

The Court found no ground to interfere with the impugned order dated 24.11.2022 and dismissed the writ petition. It reaffirmed that actual payment of tax by the supplier remains a necessary condition for entitlement to ITC under the Act.

In Kor Chems v. Assistant Commissioner CGST and Central Excise and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1570 HC, the Gujarat High Court considered whether GST charged on the acquisition of leasehold rights in an industrial plot at Ankleshwar could support input tax credit, reversal demands, interest and penalty.

The Court recorded that the petitioner had acquired leasehold rights from M/s. Myspace Infracon, the supplier issued a tax invoice charging GST, and the petitioner availed and later reversed ITC under a bona fide belief. Relying on its earlier decision in Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry and on Special Civil Application No. 18068 of 2025, the Court held that assignment or transfer of leasehold rights in GIDC land and building was not a taxable supply under sections 7 and 9. Once the underlying transaction was outside the charging provisions, the GST collected had no legal basis. The Court further held that section 17(5)(d) could not apply because it concerns construction-related inward supplies and the petitioner had undertaken no construction activity. On that reasoning, invocation of section 74(1) on allegations of blocked credit, suppression or fraud was also unsustainable.

The writ petition was allowed. The order-in-original, DRC-07, rectification order, order-in-appeal and Form GST APL-04 were quashed, and the respondents were directed to refund the tax of Rs. 29,25,000/- and interest of Rs. 4,44,280/- paid through DRC-03. Rule was made absolute, with no order as to costs.

In Star Raison Landmarks v. Chief Commissioner State Tax Commercial Taxes Department and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1567 HC, the Rajasthan High Court examined whether an unsigned show cause notice, adjudication order and recovery action under the GST regime could stand in law.

The Court held that Rule 26(3) of the CGST Rules is mandatory and requires notices and orders to be authenticated electronically through a digital signature certificate, through e-signature, or by another notified mode. It rejected the respondents’ submission that upload on the portal, officer login through digital-signature access, or generation of ARN/reference number amounted to sufficient authentication. The Court distinguished authorities where the document was in fact digitally signed and only the display of the signature was disputed, explaining that total absence of a signature is fundamentally different from a display defect. It also held that the defect was jurisdictional and not a curable irregularity under section 160, because the impugned documents lacked legal existence from the outset.

The writ petition was allowed. The show cause notice dated 23.09.2023, the Order-in-Original dated 19.12.2023, the Section 79 recovery notice and the bank attachment were quashed. The Court left it open to the authority to proceed afresh in accordance with law, but directed that any fresh notice or order must bear the required signature and be properly served.

In Sanskriti Exim Pvt. Ltd. v. Directorate General of GST Intelligence Dzu and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1550 HC, the Delhi High Court dealt with a challenge to a DGGI show cause notice and ensuing Order-in-Original alleging wrongful availment and utilisation of ITC and fraudulent IGST refunds.

The petitioner argued that DGGI proceedings were barred by section 6(2)(b) because State GST authorities had already initiated proceedings on ITC issues, and that a consolidated notice spanning multiple financial years was impermissible. The Court, however, held that the writ petition was not fit for Article 226 intervention after adjudication had culminated in an Order-in-Original, because an efficacious appeal lay under section 107. On section 6(2)(b), the Court emphasised that the statutory bar applies only where the proceedings concern the same subject matter, which is not established merely because both sets of proceedings involve ITC or overlapping periods. It found material differences between the State proceedings and the DGGI proceedings, including the nature of the allegations, the statutory provisions invoked, and the factual basis of the demands. The Court also held that a notice covering more than one financial year is not, by that fact alone, without jurisdiction.

The writ petition was dismissed, with liberty to raise all permissible grounds before the appellate authority. The Court directed that any statutory appeal be decided on its own merits and uninfluenced by its observations.

In Puneet Batra v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1543 HC, the Delhi High Court considered a challenge by an Advocate to a search under section 67(2) of the CGST Act at the premises of Bass Legal LLP, including his cabin, and to the seizure of his CPU and other material.

The Court held that the search authorisation covered the premises of Bass Legal and that the petitioner’s cabin formed part of those premises. It found sufficient recorded reasons to believe for authorising the search and rejected the contention that the petitioner’s status as an advocate, by itself, rendered the search unlawful. The Court drew a distinction between the legality of search and the separate question whether particular communications or documents are protected by advocate-client privilege. It held that privilege under section 132 of the BSA protects the client’s confidential communications and does not give an absolute shield where prima facie material suggests that the advocate may have acted beyond the role of legal adviser and may himself be involved in the conduct under investigation. The Court also rejected objections based on sealed-cover production, the absence of a show cause notice, alleged changes in the respondents’ stance, and alleged non-compliance with departmental instructions, observing that administrative directions cannot override statutory power under section 67.

The writ petition was dismissed. The Court sustained the search, preserved safeguards for examination of the cloned data, and directed that unrelated third-party client data not be accessed. It reiterated that its ruling was confined to the peculiar facts and did not dilute advocate-client privilege generally.

In Nxtify Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1553 HC, the Patna High Court examined provisional attachment and debit-freeze measures imposed on the petitioner’s bank accounts under section 110(5) of the Customs Act.

The Court reiterated, drawing on Radha Krishan Industries and other authorities, that provisional attachment is a drastic power requiring strict compliance with statutory preconditions, including pendency of proceedings, a written order, formation of opinion, tangible material and prior approval of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. It found that certain October 2025 debit-freeze directions and related provisional attachment orders had been issued without the requisite Commissioner approval, and that the respondents had not shown the necessary written reasons or approval for those actions. Those orders, and their extensions, were therefore held illegal. By contrast, the Court found that the provisional attachment orders dated 07.01.2026 and 20.11.2025 were in writing and disclosed reasons forming the basis of the officer’s opinion, and therefore did not call for interference. The Court also held that extensions of attachment required a pre-decisional hearing and reasons; an extension passed without either was invalid. It further criticised the attempt to issue a fresh order during pendency of the writ petition, describing it as inconsistent with judicial discipline, though that order was not pressed.

The writ application was allowed in part. The unattached, unapproved provisional attachment orders and their extensions were quashed, and the extension orders were set aside, while the later reasoned attachment orders were left undisturbed. The department was left free to proceed in accordance with the statute.

In P B Agro LLP v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1549 HC, the Delhi High Court considered a writ petition seeking to quash a show cause notice issued by FDA, Mumbai in relation to advertising of the petitioner’s VIMAL elaichi product.

The Court held that the impugned notice was independently issued by the Assistant Commissioner (Food), FDA, Greater Mumbai Division, under the Government of Maharashtra, and there was no material showing any direction from FSSAI in Delhi. The petitioner’s Delhi office, its management of advertisements from Delhi, and the presence of Ministry, FSSAI or CCPA in Delhi were held insufficient to create territorial jurisdiction. The notice was addressed only to three brand ambassadors resident in Mumbai, none of whom had challenged it, and the petitioner itself had not been served. Applying settled principles on cause of action, the Court treated the Delhi connections as incidental and remote, not material facts giving rise to the lis.

The petition was dismissed as non-maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. The Court also held that, even assuming a slender nexus with Delhi, Maharashtra was the more appropriate forum on forum conveniens grounds, because the operative action, alleged violations, and affected noticees were all located there.

In Welspring Universal v. Additional Commissioner of Central GST, (2026) taxcode.in 1548 HC, the Delhi High Court examined whether a demand-cum-show cause notice and the consequential order confirming recovery of refunded CENVAT credit could survive after CESTAT had later decided the refund dispute in the petitioner’s favour.

The Court traced the sequence of proceedings and found that the Commissioner (Appeals) had earlier set aside the refund order, but that order was itself set aside by CESTAT in Final Order dated 01.08.2024, which expressly held that the petitioner was entitled to refund of Rs.76,72,000/- under Rule 5 and that the claim was not barred by limitation. The Additional Commissioner nevertheless proceeded on the premise that the Commissioner (Appeals)’s order remained operative. The Court held that this was legally untenable: an adjudicating authority cannot disregard a subsequent binding appellate order, especially after it was brought to notice before the impugned order was passed.

The writ petition was allowed. The Court set aside both the demand-cum-show cause notice dated 10.12.2019 and the order-in-original dated 24.03.2025, and directed refund of the pre-deposit of Rs.7,67,200/- with applicable interest in accordance with law.

In Dharma Productions Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1542 HC, the Bombay High Court considered whether the petitioner’s licensing of copyright in cinematographic films, for the period before 1 October 2021, fell under the 12% entry for original films or the 18% entry for information technology software.

The Court held that the matter was a pure question of law and entertained the writ despite the availability of an appellate remedy, because the impugned orders reflected a jurisdictional error in classification. Heading 9973 deliberately contained separate entries for licensing of rights in goods other than IT software and for licensing in respect of IT software, and the explanatory notes separately covered original films. The impugned orders, however, did not engage with the statutory definition of information technology software or explain how a cinematographic film could satisfy it. The Court also rejected reliance on the mode of delivery, stating that physical or electronic transfer of content could not change the essential character of the supply. It further held that the later GST circulars regularised the relevant pre-1 October 2021 period on an as-is-where-is basis and supported the petitioner’s classification.

The writ petitions were allowed. The Court held that the respondents had wrongly treated film copyright licensing as software licensing, had relied on an undisclosed statement, and had failed to give reasoned findings. The impugned orders were quashed, with no order as to costs.

In Bhagya Kalita v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1541 HC, the Gauhati High Court considered a show cause notice issued under Section 74(1) of the CGST Act in relation to GST on price-adjustment receipts arising from a pre-GST highway contract.

The Court held that Section 74(1) is triggered only where tax short-payment is attributable to fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax, and those jurisdictional facts must be supported by material in the notice itself. On the pleadings, the petitioner had disclosed the price-adjustment receipts in its audited balance sheet, income-tax filings, GST return, and declaration before GST authorities. The Court found that this disclosure negatived suppression and that the record did not show deliberate non-disclosure or a positive act of evasion. It also noted that the notice was issued while relevant information was still being gathered and appeared driven by an approaching limitation period.

The writ petition was allowed and the show cause notice dated 04.08.2024 was quashed. The Court held that penalty, surcharge, and interest founded on that notice were not leviable, and that the revenue had assumed jurisdiction without satisfying the statutory preconditions for Section 74(1).

In Microsoft Corporation (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1499 HC, the Bombay High Court examined whether interest under Section 30(2) of the MVAT Act could be levied on a dealer who had lawfully filed six-monthly returns and paid tax within the prescribed dates.

The Court held that the petitioner was entitled under Rule 17(4) read with Rule 41 to file six-monthly returns for FY 2013-2014 because its prior year tax liability was below the statutory threshold. The impugned appellate orders themselves acknowledged that the petitioner was legally entitled to file such returns, yet imposed interest on the theory that the petitioner had unjustly enriched itself by deferring remittance of tax collected from customers. The Court rejected that reasoning as unsupported by the statute or the record, holding that tax administration cannot add notions of legislative intent or dubious tax planning where the Act and Rules clearly prescribe the filing period and due date. It further held that, once the petitioner acted within the legal timeline, there was no default attracting Section 30(2), and the statutory framework did not contain any separate concept of unjust enrichment for return periodicity.

Confined to the interest demand, the writ petition was held maintainable and was allowed. The levy of interest under Section 30(2) of the MVAT Act and the corresponding CST interest was set aside.

In Saroj Kumar Pandey v. State of Telangana, (2026) taxcode.in 1568 HC, the Telangana High Court considered a petition under Section 482 BNSS seeking anticipatory bail in a case alleging fraudulent availment and utilisation of input tax credit of about Rs.98.47 crores under the CGST/TGST Acts.

The Court held that the seriousness of the alleged economic offence, though relevant, did not by itself justify arrest. It stressed the distinction between the power to arrest and the necessity to arrest, relied on Supreme Court guidance that custodial interrogation must be shown to be indispensable, and noted that substantial documentary and electronic material had already been seized. The petitioner’s cooperation with summons, the Department’s custody of records, the parity claimed with the co-accused who had already been granted bail, and the deposit made through DRC-03 were treated as material circumstances, while the alleged need to trace the financial trail was not supported by concrete, specific necessity at that stage.

The Court granted anticipatory bail subject to strict conditions, including surrender, execution of bond and sureties, regular appearance before the Investigating Officer, and non-tampering obligations. It clarified that the protection would not prevent lawful action under Sections 69 and 132 if later material justified it, and that its observations were confined to the bail application.

In IVRCL DRN Infra JV v. Commissioner of Central Tax Bengaluru South, (2026) taxcode.in 1477 HC, the Karnataka High Court dealt with two writ petitions challenging service tax demands raised on works-contract and goods-supply transactions on the basis of Form 26AS and allied records.

The Court held that the value of goods transferred in a works contract is outside the scope of service tax under the statutory scheme reflected in Sections 65B(44), 66E and Rule 2A, and reiterated the mutual exclusivity principle recognised in BSNL. It found, on the facts, that the petitioners had either paid sales tax on the goods component or service tax on the service component, and that the authorities had wrongly attempted to tax the goods element. For the irrigation project, the Court also held that the work fell within the exemption in Notification No. 25/2012-ST, reading the notification purposively in light of Article 243W and the project’s economic and social development character.

On limitation, the Court held that the extended period under Section 73 could not be invoked because the dispute was interpretational and the ingredients of fraud, wilful suppression or intent to evade were absent. It therefore set aside both impugned orders and quashed the show cause notice in the second matter.

In Rohit Garg v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1494 HC, the Delhi High Court considered a batch of writ petitions challenging Section 122 proceedings, related Orders-in-Original, the competence of the issuing officers, evidentiary reliance, and the effect of the amended pre-deposit requirement under Section 107(6).

The Court held that the substituted proviso to Section 107(6), effective from 01.10.2025, did not apply to appeals arising from show cause notices issued earlier, so earlier proceedings would continue under the pre-deposit regime then in force. On the jurisdictional challenge, the Court examined the scheme of “proper officer” and the effect of Notifications Nos. 02/2017 and 14/2017, but declined to treat the alleged defect as a patent absence of jurisdiction. It also left open the broader question whether Section 122(1) applies to persons who are not taxable persons, noting that the issue was pending before the Supreme Court.

Finding that the petitions raised disputed factual and legal issues that could be effectively examined in appeal under Section 107, the Court declined writ interference and relegated the petitioners to the statutory remedy. It expressly left all substantive questions open for the appellate authority and directed that appeals from pre-01.10.2025 notices be governed by the earlier Section 107(6) position.

In Santosh Jaiswal for the Commissioner of CGST & C.EX. v. Teesta Agro Industries Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 203 GSTAT, the GSTAT Kolkata Bench heard the Revenue’s appeal against a refund sanctioned to the taxpayer for accumulated input tax credit claimed on an inverted duty structure.

The Tribunal held that the taxpayer purchased loose sulphur in bulk, used packing materials taxed at 18%, and supplied the product in customized packets taxable at 5%. On those facts, the higher tax incidence on inputs caused accumulation of credit within Section 54(3)(ii). The Tribunal relied on its earlier decision in Tea Linker and on the cited High Court rulings to hold that CBIC circulars cannot curtail a statutory refund entitlement, even where the Revenue contended that the input and output goods were the same.

Accordingly, it upheld the First Appellate Authority’s order, rejected the Revenue’s challenge, and directed refund of the sanctioned amount within three months. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Mangalbela Real Estates Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 199 GSTAT, the GSTAT Principal Bench examined a re-investigation in a real-estate anti-profiteering matter after the Delhi High Court in Reckitt Benckiser had criticised the earlier methodology.

The Tribunal held that the remand for re-investigation was valid because it sought to bring pending matters into conformity with binding judicial precedent, not to conduct an impermissible suo motu review. It rejected the arguments that the DGAP had become functus officio or that a fresh reference under Rule 128 was required, holding that Rule 133(4) permitted remand. It also held that the time limit under Rule 129(6) was directory, not mandatory, and that the delay was not fatal, particularly where the respondent had delayed producing documents. The natural justice challenge also failed because notice, opportunity to submit material, and a hearing on the objections were afforded.

On merits, the Tribunal found that the respondent did not dispute the DGAP’s computation or produce evidence that the benefit of additional input tax credit had been passed on to homebuyers. It therefore held that Section 171(1) was contravened, ordered payment of Rs.31,20,542 to 66 eligible homebuyers with 18% interest, and declined to impose penalty under Section 171(3A) because the contravention period pre-dated that provision.

In Laldeo Rajak v. Global Health Strategies Emerging Economies Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 210 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered the Department’s appeal against an order allowing refund of accumulated input tax credit on services treated as export of services.

The controversy was whether the respondent’s management and project-support services were governed by Section 13(2) of the IGST Act, as accepted by the Appellate Authority, or by Section 13(5), as urged by the Department. The Tribunal noted that the Department said the respondent had conducted workshops and training programmes in India, while the respondent maintained that it merely assisted foreign entities and that the place of supply was the recipient’s location. After extracting the rival provisions, the Tribunal held that the appeal itself required determination of place of supply, and both sides ultimately accepted that position. It therefore held that the dispute fell within the category reserved by Section 109(5) of the CGST Act for the Principal Bench.

Holding that the State Bench, Delhi, lacked jurisdiction, the Tribunal transferred the appeal to the Principal Bench at New Delhi for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. It directed the Registry to transmit the record and fixed a return date before the Principal Bench.

In V.K. Brothers v. Sharad Kumar Shukla Additional Commissioner Grade-2 (Appeal) State Tax and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 196 GSTAT, the Tribunal examined a challenge to detention and penalty imposed after a road check interception of a vehicle carrying copper scrap.

The Tribunal focused on the statutory scheme under Section 31, Section 129 and Rules 138, 138A and 138B. It held that an invoice and e-way bill must accompany the consignment before movement begins, and that the word “and” in Rule 138A made both carrying requirements mandatory. Since the vehicle was intercepted without documents and the invoice and e-way bill were generated only later, the Tribunal held that the movement was in contravention of the law and that Section 129 was attracted immediately. It treated the e-way bill mechanism as a preventive tool against unrecorded transportation and rejected the plea that later documentation could validate the earlier omission.

The Tribunal found the appellant’s explanations unconvincing, declined to apply the authorities relied on by the appellant on their facts, and relied instead on precedent supporting a presumption of intent to evade tax when goods move without the required documents. It upheld the penalty, affirmed the impugned orders, and dismissed the appeal.

In Anant Decor v. Commissioner of State GST, (2026) taxcode.in 197 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered an appeal against confirmation of IGST demand, interest and penalty arising from alleged excess input tax credit for FY 2018-19.

The Tribunal accepted that, for the relevant period, non-reflection of an invoice in GSTR-2A was not by itself a statutory ground to deny ITC, and that later Section 16(2)(aa) could not be retrospectively imported. It also recognised Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST as applicable in principle to cases where a Rule 46 invoice containing the recipient’s GSTIN was wrongly reported as B2C instead of B2B. However, it held that the claimant still bore the burden under Section 155 to prove eligibility, and that the later supplier certificate, invoices, ledger and movement documents had to establish the asserted reporting error and tax payment. The Tribunal found the evidence insufficient on the cumulative record, particularly because the appellant had not responded to ASMT-10 or DRC-01, had not attended the first appellate hearings, and had not produced contemporaneous verification of the alleged B2C classification.

The Tribunal also held that the three invoices explained only part of the disputed IGST and left a residual amount unsupported, rejected the attempt to offset IGST against CGST/SGST differences without transaction-level reconciliation, and found no basis to interfere with interest, penalty or the refusal to remand. The appeal was dismissed and the confirmed demand was sustained.