GST Weekly Case Laws Newsletter | 21 September to 26 September 2026

In Nand Kishore Garg v. Assistant Commissioner Central Goods and Services Tax, (2026) taxcode.in 1520 HC, the Uttarakhand High Court considered rejection of a rectification application filed within time under Section 161 of the CGST Act, 2017 and Notification No. 22/2024-CT dated 08.10.2024.

The Court held that the application had been filed well within time and that the competent authority could not refuse to examine it on merits merely because more than three months had passed. Clause 4 of the Notification was read as directory, requiring an endeavour to decide within three months, not as a provision that made the authority functus officio after expiry of that period.

The impugned order dated 30.06.2026 was quashed. The matter was remitted to the Assistant Commissioner, CGST Division, Rudrapur, with a direction to decide the rectification application on merits within three months.

In Sandeep Kumar and Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2026) taxcode.in 1522 HC, the Punjab and Haryana High Court dealt with a request for anticipatory bail in an FIR alleging cheating, forgery, use of non-existent firms, and evasion of tax collected from the complainant.

The Court noted allegations that the petitioners, acting as brokers, induced purchases through fabricated invoices and accounts of fictitious firms, causing the complainant wrongful loss and tax liability. It held that the allegations were grave and serious, prima facie showing complicity, and that the case was at a nascent stage. The Court also accepted the State’s submission that custodial interrogation was necessary to uncover the manner of the offences and the connection of the petitioners with the relevant firms.

Petitioner No.1 was found not entitled to pre-arrest bail and the petition was dismissed as to him. The petition became infructuous qua petitioner No.2 after his arrest during pendency. The Court clarified that its observations would not affect the merits of the trial.

In Jitendra Kumar Assistant Commissioner v. Gatimaan Brickfield; Jitendra Kumar Assistant Commissioner V. Kisan Ent Bhatta; Jitendra Kumar Assistant Commissioner v. Shri Shiv Sakti EIT Bhatta; Jitendra Kumar v. R.V Brick Field, (2026) taxcode.in 167 GSTAT, the Agra Bench of the GSTAT examined four revenue appeals arising from brick-field inspections where unrecorded bricks and coal were allegedly found.

The Tribunal held that where excess or unaccounted goods are found during survey, the proper course under Section 35(6) is determination of tax by applying Sections 73 or 74, not initiation of confiscation proceedings under Section 130. Relying on cited Allahabad High Court rulings, it concluded that the first appellate authority had rightly quashed the Section 130 proceedings and set aside the penalty and fine. The Tribunal also rejected the revenue’s attempt to preserve only the fine component after not challenging the setting aside of the underlying Section 130 action.

All four appeals were dismissed as meritless. The orders of the first appellate authority were left undisturbed, and no interim application remained pending.

In Boilla Venkataramana Reddy v. Shivenari Canteen Services, (2026) taxcode.in 163 GSTAT, the Hyderabad Bench of the GSTAT considered whether food supplied under agreement to MGM Hospital for in-patients was part of a composite healthcare supply or separately taxable.

The Tribunal held that the respondent, as an outsourced caterer, made only one supply: food under contract. Because there was no plurality of taxable supplies in its hands, Section 2(30) composite supply did not apply to it. The CBIC circular on food for in-patients was held to apply to the healthcare provider’s own supply, not to the contractor. The Tribunal found no material to justify invocation of Section 74 and no mala fide intention, so the notice was treated as one under Section 73(1). It further directed recomputation on a cum-tax basis under Rule 35, since no tax had been separately collected in invoices.

The First Appellate Authority’s order was set aside. The respondent was held liable to GST on the disputed food supply, but the proper officer was directed to redetermine tax, interest and penalty under Section 73(1), with cum-tax benefit and invoice verification.

In Hero Wiretex Ltd. v. Commissioner of CGST and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 164 GSTAT, the Hyderabad Bench of the GSTAT addressed a Registry objection that the appellants had not made the pre-deposit required for a penalty-only appeal.

The Tribunal held that the lis had commenced with the show-cause notice dated 24.12.2021, and that the parties’ rights and obligations were governed by the law then in force. Relying on the principle that the right of appeal is a vested substantive right, and on the Delhi High Court’s ruling in Gaurav Jain, it concluded that the proviso to Section 112(8), inserted with effect from 01.10.2025, could not retrospectively impose a new 10% pre-deposit requirement on proceedings begun earlier.

The Registry’s objection was set aside for admission purposes, the appeal was admitted, and the jurisdictional challenge to DGGI was left open for final hearing.

In Skantha Maatha Metals v. Sm Saraswathi, (2026) taxcode.in 165 GSTAT, the GSTAT Coimbatore Bench considered whether the appeal involved a question of law under Section 109(8) of the CGST Act, 2017 so as to require hearing by a Division Bench rather than a Single Member.

The Tribunal held that “question of law” in Section 109(8) is wide and covers issues requiring interpretation of statute, legal principles or precedent. It noted the appellant’s grounds that proceedings under Section 74 could not stand without allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression, and that the appellate order was allegedly time-barred under Section 107(13). The Bench found these to be matters requiring statutory interpretation, and therefore not merely factual disputes.

Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected the State’s objection, held that a question of law was involved, and directed that the appeal be heard by one Judicial Member and one Technical Member. The Registry was directed to list the matter for hearing on merits before the Division Bench.

In Sri Kumaran Steels v. Raja M Mani Assistant Commissioner State Taxes, (2026) taxcode.in 166 GSTAT, the GSTAT Coimbatore Bench examined whether the appeal involved any question of law under Section 109(8) of the CGST Act, 2017 for deciding the correct bench composition.

The Tribunal held that Section 109(8) refers to “any question of law”, not a “substantial question of law”, and that the test is whether interpretation of legal principles, statute or precedent is required. Applying that standard, it held that the issue whether a summary in Form GST DRC-01 under Rule 142(1) can substitute the independent notice required under Section 74(1) necessarily raises a question of law. The Tribunal also rejected the respondent’s reliance on authorities dealing with substantial questions of law as inapposite.

The Tribunal concluded that the appeal did involve a question of law and must therefore be heard by a Division Bench comprising one Judicial Member and one Technical Member. The matter was directed to be listed for hearing on merits before that Bench.

In Suresh Kumar Pal v. Sweta Singh, (2026) taxcode.in 154 GSTAT, the GSTAT Ghaziabad Bench considered whether a departmental appeal involving penalty of Rs. 61,445 could be admitted despite the prescribed monetary limit of Rs. 20,00,000.

The Tribunal held that admission is not a formality and that maintainability must be examined first. It found that the circular-based litigation policy fixing the monetary limit remained operative, that the relevant amount in dispute was only the penalty component, and that the Revenue had not established any recognised exception. A bare statement that the appeal was filed with the Commissioner’s approval was held insufficient to override the threshold, and the Bench emphasised that the record must disclose a specific, reasoned exercise of the residual discretion if relied upon.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal at the threshold for non-compliance with the monetary-limit regime, declined to examine merits, and left the impugned order untouched on substance.

In Ajit Kumar Minz v. B.L. Agro Industries Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 161 GSTAT, the GSTAT Lucknow Bench considered departmental appeals against orders allowing refund claims for unutilised input tax credit under the inverted duty structure.

The Tribunal held that refund applications filed after 05.07.2022 were to be examined under the substituted Rule 89(5) formula, even if the credit had accumulated earlier. It relied on authorities treating the amendment as curative or clarificatory, and noted the Gujarat High Court’s view in Ascent Meditech Ltd., together with the dismissal of the Department’s SLP. It also held that supplementary refund claims were not barred merely because earlier claims for the same periods had been filed, and that procedural or portal-related difficulties could not defeat a substantive refund claim.

Finding no sufficient reason to differ from the First Appellate Authority, the Tribunal upheld the refund allowance and rejected all five departmental appeals.

In Ajit Kumar Minz v. B.L. Agro Industries Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 156 GSTAT, the GSTAT Lucknow Bench dealt with departmental appeals concerning refund claims for unutilised input tax credit accumulated under the inverted duty structure.

The Tribunal held that refund claims filed after 05.07.2022 fell to be considered under the amended Rule 89(5) formula, relying on decisions treating the amendment as curative and clarificatory and on the dismissal of the Department’s SLP in Ascent Meditech Ltd. It further held that supplementary refund claims were maintainable, that a circular could not override the statutory position, and that the restriction under Notification No. 09/2022-Central Tax (Rate) did not displace entitlement in the manner urged by the Department. The Bench also accepted that the claims were within limitation and that the challenged entries did not justify rejection.

The First Appellate Authority’s order allowing the refund claims was upheld, and all five departmental appeals were rejected.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Devi 70mm, (2026) taxcode.in 171 GSTAT, the Tribunal examined whether the respondent theatre passed on the benefit of GST reduction on cinema tickets priced at Rs. 100 or less from 18% to 12% with effect from 01.01.2019.

The Tribunal held that Section 171 required the benefit of the tax cut to be passed on by commensurate reduction in prices. It rejected the respondent’s reliance on reduced tax payment, absence of ITC benefit, and commercial factors such as movie age, weekends, holidays, and demand. Those considerations were held irrelevant to the limited anti-profiteering inquiry. The Tribunal also noted that the respondent did not effectively dispute the DGAP’s methodology or computation and had only reduced certain ticket prices from 11.03.2019, not from 01.01.2019.

The DGAP report was accepted. The Tribunal found contravention of Section 171, directed deposit of Rs. 81,722 inclusive of GST with 18% interest, allocated equally to the Central Consumer Welfare Fund and the Telangana State Consumer Welfare Fund, and ordered that no penalty be levied.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Shreeji Infra, (2026) taxcode.in 170 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered alleged profiteering in a residential project that commenced entirely in the GST regime and had no pre-GST sales or credit history.

The Tribunal held that Section 171 addresses passing on actual benefit from tax reduction or ITC by commensurate price reduction, not treatment of alleged excess GST collection as “savings.” Because the project began after GST and no pre-GST base price or credit position was available for comparison, the DGAP’s attempt to treat a 4% GST differential as profiteering was rejected. The Tribunal also accepted the respondent’s position that the disputed issue regarding ineligible ITC in certain flats was outside the anti-profiteering inquiry.

The DGAP report was rejected. The Tribunal directed communication of the judgment to the concerned tax authorities, and ordered the jurisdictional Principal Chief Commissioner to refund the excessive GST amount to the applicant in accordance with law.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Maruti Developers, (2026) taxcode.in 169 GSTAT, the Tribunal dealt with revised anti-profiteering computation in a residential project where post-GST input tax credit was higher than the pre-GST position.

The Tribunal accepted the DGAP’s revised calculation after excluding unutilised ITC of Rs. 5,26,200 that had later been reversed. It held that Section 171 required the benefit of additional ITC to be passed on by commensurate reduction in price, accepted the flat-wise reconciliation furnished by the respondent, and directed that the amount determined be passed on with 18% interest. The Tribunal also noted that the respondent accepted the revised computation and undertook to pass on the benefit to homebuyers.

The amount payable was fixed at Rs. 2,34,671 plus GST of Rs. 28,161, aggregating to Rs. 2,62,832, with interest. No penalty under Section 171(3A) was imposed because that provision was not in force during the investigation period.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Alankar Cinema, (2026) taxcode.in 168 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered whether a single-screen theatre had passed on the GST reduction on cinema tickets from 18% to 12% with effect from 01.01.2019.

The Tribunal held that Section 171 required the respondent to pass on the benefit by reducing the final cum-tax ticket price. It rejected the defence based on Government orders, licensing arrangements, and High Court orders, holding that those materials did not prevent a price reduction and at best fixed a maximum ceiling. It also rejected the respondent’s reliance on electricity, maintenance, and security charges, and on the absence of invoices, because the inquiry turned only on whether the tax benefit was passed on. The Tribunal noted that the respondent had maintained the same ticket prices while increasing the base price, and had not rebutted the DGAP’s methodology.

The DGAP reports were accepted. The Tribunal found contravention of Section 171, directed deposit of Rs. 10,19,280 with interest at 18%, split equally between the Central Consumer Welfare Fund and the Telangana State Consumer Welfare Fund, and held that no penalty was leviable.

In Reliable Paints v. Pankaj Kumar Kharwar Assistant Commisioner, (2026) taxcode.in 173 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered whether penalty under Section 129 was justified where a second e-way bill was generated after expiry of the original one.

The Tribunal held that Rule 138 did not permit a fresh e-way bill on the same invoice after expiry; only extension within the prescribed time was contemplated. Examining the transport timeline and surrounding circumstances, it found the appellant’s breakdown story unproved, noted the absence of reliable evidence such as the driver’s statement or repair records, and treated the later e-way bill as impossible without altering the invoice number. Applying a preponderance-of-probabilities standard, the Tribunal drew adverse inferences from the lack of supporting evidence and held that the circumstances indicated fraud and deception.

The appeal was dismissed, the penalty orders were affirmed, and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.

In Manoranjan Dash v. Commissionerate of CT GST, (2026) taxcode.in 172 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered an interim application seeking recall or modification of its earlier order admitting an appeal without insisting on any further pre-deposit under Section 112(8)(b) of the CGST Act.

The applicant argued that it had been heard ex parte on a contentious question affecting its rights and that Section 112(8)(b) required an additional deposit “in addition to” the amount paid under Section 107(6). The Tribunal examined Sections 107(6) and 112(8), noted that both provisions refer to a specified portion of the tax in dispute, and held that the pre-deposit already made is part of the disputed tax itself rather than a separate liability. It distinguished the authorities cited by the applicant and accepted the reasoning in M/s Ashirwad Food Industries, treating the post-assessment reduction in demand as material to whether any further deposit was workable or necessary.

The Tribunal held that, because the appellant had already deposited Rs 1,13,448 against the original demand and the Appellate Authority had reduced the disputed tax to Rs 1,02,012, no further pre-deposit was warranted. The interim application was disposed of, with no order as to costs, and the earlier admission order was left undisturbed.

In Ozone Pharmaceutical Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1502 HC, the Court examined an order sanctioning refund of Rs. 88,54,980/- but appropriating that amount against an alleged recoverable demand and directing the petitioner to pay the balance.

The Court held that the petitioner’s entitlement to the refund had already attained finality through the CESTAT order and could not be reopened. However, the separate recovery figure derived from earlier refund arrangements, including interest, had not been independently crystallised by notice and hearing. The Court noted that the impugned order itself computed interest and additional charges, but that a mere computation could not amount to a crystallised demand. The undertaking and bond given pursuant to the Supreme Court’s interim order did not dispense with the requirement of lawful adjudication before recovery.

The writ petition was partly allowed. The refund sanction was upheld, but the appropriation and demand for the balance were set aside. The respondents were directed to determine the recoverable amount in accordance with law after issuing notice, furnishing the detailed basis, and granting an opportunity of reply and personal hearing.

In HD Associates v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1503 HC, the Court dealt with petitions seeking anticipatory bail in connection with GST investigation proceedings after summons were issued under Section 70 of the CGST Act.

The petitioners argued that the investigation was unjustified and that they feared arrest, while the Department said the matter involved alleged ineligible input tax credit and ongoing inquiry. Relying on Union of India v. Sunil Biyani, the Court held that a summons under Section 70 does not itself make a person an accused and that an order under Section 69 authorising arrest is the sine qua non for maintaining a pre-arrest bail application. The Court also noted that the existence of an investigation, searches, or apprehension of future arrest cannot substitute for the statutory requirement of a communicated Section 69 order.

As no order under Section 69 had been passed and communicated, the petitions were held premature and dismissed. The Court left all merits open and clarified that appropriate remedies would remain available if a Section 69 order were later issued.

In Naroda Enviro Projects Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1518 HC, the Court considered a section 74 show-cause notice issued after the petitioners had long claimed exemption for environmental treatment activities.

The Court noted that petitioner No. 1 held registration under section 12AA of the Income-tax Act and had already been held by the Court in earlier tax litigation to be engaged in charitable activity by way of preservation of environment. Reading that position with Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), the Court held that services by an entity registered under section 12AA and undertaking charitable activities within clause 2(r)(iv) were entitled to nil-rate treatment. It rejected the Revenue’s reliance on Notification No. 11/2017 and Heading 9994 for the facts presented, and held that section 74 requires deliberate fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression.

The Court found no such element on the record and held that the impugned notice had been issued in ignorance of the earlier binding decision. The notice was quashed and set aside, and rule was made absolute.

In Prayank Gupta v. Union of India and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1523 HC, the Court decided two connected anticipatory-bail petitions arising from GST summons and an ongoing investigation concerning alleged input tax credit irregularities.

The petitioners said they were innocent and feared arrest, while the Department pointed to repeated summons, searches, and a continuing inquiry into a large-scale ITC issue. The Court held that, in light of Union of India v. Sunil Biyani, a Section 70 summons does not by itself create a basis for anticipatory bail: an order under Section 69 authorising arrest must first exist and be communicated. Because no such order was shown, the apprehension of arrest remained contingent and the applications were treated as premature.

Both petitions were dismissed as premature, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the allegations or the investigation. The Court left all questions open for consideration at the appropriate stage if a Section 69 order were later made.

In GKEM International Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. Commissioner of Customs ICD PPG and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1498 HC, the petitioners challenged an Order-in-Original dated 29.11.2024 on the ground that the show cause notice had become time-barred under Sections 28(9) and 28(9A) of the Customs Act, 1962.

The Court held that the challenge was confined to limitation, but rejected the plea. It distinguished Vos Technologies and held that Section 28(9A)(b) applied because adjudication had been deferred due to the pendency of earlier writ proceedings and the interim protection operating in them. The petitioners themselves had sought deferment and had alerted the department to the very circumstance relied upon. The Call Book entry was treated as only an administrative manifestation of that circumstance, not the source of the statutory exclusion. The Court also held that the communication requirement under Section 28(9A) stood substantially satisfied because the petitioners were fully aware of the reason for non-determination.

The Court computed limitation from 08.12.2023, when the earlier writ petition was dismissed and the impediment ceased, so the 29.11.2024 order fell within the one-year period under Section 28(9)(b). Independently, the Court declined writ relief because an appeal was available and the petitioners had not answered the merits after seeking deferment. The writ petition was dismissed, with liberty to pursue the statutory appeal.

In Neelkanth Entrepreneurs Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1537 HC, the petitioner sought quashing of a show cause notice dated 09.07.2026 issued under Section 74A(1) of the CGST Act proposing denial of input tax credit.

The Court held that Section 61 scrutiny and Rule 99 are not a mandatory precondition for every Section 74A notice. Section 61 is a pre-adjudicatory scrutiny mechanism confined to return examination, but fraud-based proceedings under Section 74A may also arise from independent verification, audit, inspection, or other credible material. Because the department had not initiated Section 61 scrutiny at all, and had instead proceeded on alleged independent verification showing that eighteen subcontractors were bogus or non-existent, Rule 99 was held inapplicable. The Court also held that the notice disclosed sufficient ingredients for invocation of Section 74A(5)(ii), and that disputed questions about the genuineness of the suppliers and supporting documents required factual adjudication.

The Court declined to interfere at the show cause stage, noted that the petitioner had not filed a reply, and held that the writ petition did not fall within any exception to the rule against interference with notices. The petition was dismissed, but the petitioner was given four weeks to file a detailed reply and the adjudicating authority was directed to decide it on merits, uninfluenced by the writ observations.

In Kapil Raj Anand v. GST Officer Ward 109 Delhi, (2026) taxcode.in 1547 HC, the petitioner sought implementation of a portal order dated 13.04.2024 which stated that proceedings under Section 73 for FY 2018-19 had been dropped.

The Court held that the portal order could not be read in isolation from the annexure expressly incorporated into it. Read together, the documents showed an internal contradiction: the portal recital suggested closure, but the annexure rejected the petitioner’s case on one issue, quantified tax, interest and penalty, and referred to recovery. The Court rejected the argument that the annexure was unenforceable for want of a separate signature, holding that it had been adopted as part of the digitally signed order. It further held that the later corrigendum was a valid rectification under Section 161 because it corrected an apparent inconsistency between the portal recital and the annexure, rather than creating a fresh demand. The third proviso to Section 161 was held inapplicable because the rectification did not worsen the petitioner’s position.

The Court dismissed the writ petition, but directed supply of certified copies, upload of the relevant DRC summaries, and kept recovery in abeyance to enable a statutory appeal under Section 107. The merits of the surviving demand and any remaining limitation issue were left open for the appellate authority.

In Bharat Luxindo Agrifeeds Pvt. Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner Of Customs (Gr.IB), (2026) taxcode.in 1554 HC, the petitioner challenged an order-in-original dated 13.02.2025 that rejected its claim for Nil IGST on imported Rice Bran and demanded differential duty with interest.

The Court held that the ingredients of Section 28(4) were not made out. The petitioner had disclosed the description, classification and notification claim in the Bill of Entry, which had been accepted by the proper officer. The dispute was only that the department later took a different view on classification and the applicable IGST rate. That disagreement, without material showing collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, could not justify use of the extended five-year limitation. The Court also held that mere invocation of the expression “wilful misstatement” in the notice or order was insufficient unless supported by facts and evidence.

The Court rejected the alternative-remedy objection, holding that a writ court may interfere where the statutory conditions for assuming jurisdiction are absent. The impugned order was set aside, though the department was left free to proceed under Section 28 within lawful limits.

In N.D. Jewellers v. Principal Commissioner of Customs and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1556 HC, the petitioner challenged a communication dated 04.08.2022 freezing its bank account.

The Court held that Section 110(5) of the Customs Act permits provisional attachment for six months, extendable once for a further six months by a recorded and communicated order. On the facts, even assuming valid extension, the maximum period of twelve months had expired. The Court rejected the respondents’ contention that a subsequent show cause notice under Section 124 or pending adjudication could justify continuation of the freeze beyond that statutory limit. It relied on the principle that a statutory attachment cannot be continued by administrative action after expiry of the period authorised by law.

The writ petition was allowed. The impugned communication was held to have ceased by efflux of time, and the respondents were directed to defreeze the petitioner’s bullion account forthwith. The Court left the respondents free to take any other action permitted by law.

In Glen Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Deputy Director Directorate General of Gst Intelligence and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1540 HC, the Calcutta High Court considered a challenge to proceedings said to rest on alleged contravention of Rule 96(10) of the CGST/WBGST Rules, 2017 after that rule had been omitted unconditionally with effect from 8 October 2024.

The Court noted the petitioners’ reliance on Goodluck India and Kolhapur Canesugar Works, and also recorded the CBIC Office Memorandum dated 24.08.2026 directing field formations not to initiate or pursue proceedings based on the omitted rule. It accepted that the respondents’ stand was that they had acted under the law prevailing when the notice was issued. The Court took judicial notice of the Supreme Court’s position that, absent a saving clause or equivalent legal fiction, an omitted provision ceases to exist in law and cannot sustain pending or fresh proceedings.

Holding that the Section 74 notice dated 09.01.2024 and the consequential orders dated 30.01.2025 were founded solely on the omitted Rule 96(10), the Court quashed and set them aside. The writ petition was disposed of accordingly.

In Khodal Infra Buildsquare LLP v. Kamal Singh Meena and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1569 HC, the Gujarat High Court examined a second show cause notice under Section 29(2)(e) of the CGST Act and the resulting cancellation of GST registration, after an earlier notice on the same allegations had already been dropped.

The Court found that both notices rested on the same premise and similar DGGI letters, and that the first round had ended in an order dropping cancellation proceedings. It held that the second notice and order suffered from non-application of mind. The Court also found a separate defect: the cancellation order referred to alleged fraudulent availment and passing of ineligible input tax credit, although the petitioner had not been called upon in the notice to answer that case.

The impugned notice dated 06.04.2026 and order dated 17.04.2026 were quashed, though liberty was reserved to issue a fresh notice and proceed in accordance with law after hearing the petitioner. The Court left all merits open and directed the petitioner to cooperate.

In Partha Tribedi v. Vivek Ranjan Assistant Commissioner, (2026) taxcode.in 174 GSTAT, the GSTAT Kolkata Bench addressed whether tax, interest and penalty could be sustained where no statutory show cause notice had been served before determination under Section 74.

The Tribunal recorded that no show cause notice had been issued, and held that Section 74(1) requires notice as the foundation for an effective representation before adjudication under Section 74(9). It further held that Form GST DRC-01 and DRC-02 cannot substitute the notice mandated by the Act. Referring to precedent and the departmental circular on adjudication procedure, the Tribunal reiterated that the notice is the basic document that gives the taxpayer the opportunity to answer the case against him.

Finding the entire proceedings vitiated by the absence of notice, the Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the first appellate authority. It directed supply of certified copies free of cost.

In Goutam Engineering Concern v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1539 HC, the Calcutta High Court considered whether GST could be withheld on payment for electrical maintenance services that had been performed in 2015, before the GST regime commenced.

The Court held that the service was rendered and completed long before 01.07.2017 and that post-facto approval on 26.02.2018 did not alter the date of supply or bring the transaction within GST. It relied on the transition provision in Section 142(11)(b) and the State Government memorandum dated 16.08.2017, noting that the later submission of bills on 22.02.2019 did not change taxability. The pendency of a civil suit was not treated as a bar, as no restraining order had been passed.

The Court directed release of Rs. 19,91,148 with interest at 8% per annum from 22.02.2019 until payment, after deduction of any tax properly applicable under the pre-GST regime. Payment was ordered within four weeks.

In Spectrum Corporation v. Commercial Tax Officer, (2026) taxcode.in 1560 HC, the Madras High Court examined whether an unsigned detailed adjudication order could be sustained under the GST enactments.

The Court held that Section 160(1) preserves proceedings only when they are in substance and effect in conformity with the Act, and that Rule 26(3) specifically requires electronic notices and orders to bear the prescribed signature or verification. On the admitted facts, the detailed order had neither a physical nor a digital signature. The Court reasoned that a signature fixes authorship and accountability, and that an unsigned order cannot be treated as compliant merely because the accompanying DRC-07 was digitally signed.

The impugned order dated 13.12.2025 was set aside, with liberty to issue a fresh order in accordance with law after giving the petitioner a reasonable opportunity. The writ petition was disposed of and no costs were awarded.

In Inzi Controls India Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner (ST) Appeals and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1555 HC, the Madras High Court was asked to interfere with appellate orders that had upheld classification of air and oil filters under Chapter 87 rather than Chapter 84, while also considering the petitioner’s reliance on the HSN notes, cited judgments, and a CBIC instruction.

The Court did not decide the classification dispute on merits. It held that alternative remedy is a relevant consideration under Article 226, but not an absolute bar, and confined itself to whether the appellate decision-making process was flawed. The Court noted that the petitioner had specifically relied on the HSN Note to Chapter 87/Section XVII, the exclusion in Note 2(e), the HSN Explanatory Note to Heading 8421, and authorities including Uni Products and Instruction No. 1/2022-Cus. The impugned orders, however, framed the issue mainly as a choice between a textual entry under Heading 8421 and the sole or principal use test, without addressing the petitioner’s core triple-test contention.

Finding that the petitioner’s principal argument and the cited judgments and instruction had not been considered, the Court held that there was a flaw in the decision-making process. It set aside the appellate orders and remanded the matters for reconsideration after giving the petitioner a reasonable opportunity, with fresh orders to be passed within six months.

In Dhruv Jewellers v. Principal Commissioner of Customs and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1558 HC, the Madras High Court considered whether a bank account frozen under Section 110(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 could remain attached beyond the maximum period permitted by that provision.

The Court held that Section 110(5) allows provisional attachment for up to six months, extendable by a further six months by a reasoned written order communicated before expiry, and that the total period cannot exceed twelve months. It found that the petitioner’s account, frozen on 04.08.2022, had already crossed that outer limit. The respondents’ submission that a show cause notice under Section 124 had been issued did not assist them, because a later notice cannot enlarge the statutory period for attachment. The Court also held that pendency of adjudication proceedings does not justify continuation beyond the statute. It noted the relevance of the principle stated in Kesari Nandan Mobile.

The writ petition was allowed. The Court directed that the freezing communication be treated as having ceased to operate by efflux of time and ordered immediate defreezing of the petitioner’s bank account, while leaving the respondents free to take other action permissible in law.

In Commercial Tax Officer v. Mahadevappa Madappa and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1563 HC, the Karnataka High Court examined whether a learned Single Judge could dispose of a GST-related writ petition by following earlier directions in Chandrashekaraiah and issuing similar reimbursement and revision orders.

The Court noted that the earlier common order in Chandrashekaraiah had dealt with multiple petitions concerning claims for differential tax arising after the shift from the VAT regime to GST, but those contracts involved different parties and varied terms. It held that the present case could not be decided by blanket directions without examining the specific contractual conditions. The Court further held that no directions could be issued to tax authorities contrary to the relevant statutes, and found that the impugned order had mechanically followed the earlier decision without regard to the facts of the present matter.

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order dated 20.03.2025 was set aside, and the delay in filing the appeal was condoned. The respondent’s counsel stated that the appeal need not be contested.

In Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd. v. Pushpendra Kumar Meena Commissioner (State GST), (2026) taxcode.in 176 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered an appeal against confirmation of tax, interest and penalty arising from alleged discrepancies in the appellant’s returns and turnover disclosure.

The Tribunal accepted, as a matter of principle, that Entry 27 of Notification No. 12/2017 exempts consideration represented by way of interest or discount in respect of extending deposits, loans or advances, except credit card interest. But it held that the appellant still had to prove that the disputed amount actually represented exempt interest income of another State that had been wrongly disclosed as Chhattisgarh turnover. The appellant failed to furnish supporting documentary evidence, and the Chartered Accountant’s certificate and consolidated audit material were found insufficient. The Tribunal also drew an adverse inference from non-production of evidence and held that the procedural objections would not alter the result.

The appeal was rejected and the appellate order confirming the assessment was left undisturbed.

In Future Infomedia Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1571 HC, the Gujarat High Court dealt with a writ petition challenging dismissal of a GST appeal for non-payment of the mandatory pre-deposit under Section 107(6) of the CGST Act.

The petitioner abandoned its refund prayer and sought only adjustment of amounts already recovered from its Electronic Credit Ledger toward the statutory pre-deposit, relying on an earlier decision of the same Court. The Court noted that the amount recovered exceeded the required 10% pre-deposit and accepted the request in the peculiar facts of the case. It observed that the dispute over adjustment arose after recovery, and the petitioner had confined the relief to restoration of the appeal rather than refund. The Court also clarified that the order should not be treated as a precedent.

The impugned appellate order was quashed and set aside. The appeal was directed to be restored within two weeks, with the pre-deposit to be adjusted from the amount already recovered, and the appellate authority was asked to decide the appeal on merits while leaving all contentions open.

In Cent Bank Home Finance Ltd. v. Commissioner State Tax and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 177 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered an appeal against dismissal of the first appeal and an assessment order raising GST demand on amounts said to relate to a housing loan account write-off.

The Tribunal held that a notification issued under Section 11 of the GST Act has the force of law, and that a pure question of law may be raised at any stage. On that basis, it rejected the objection that the appellant could not rely on Notification No. 12/2017 for the first time before the Tribunal. It further held that services by way of extending loans and advances are exempt under Entry 27, and that recovery of a loan amount falls within that exemption. It also held that the respondent’s filing was, in substance, a reply rather than a true cross-objection.

At the same time, the Tribunal found that the appellant still had to prove by cogent documentary evidence that the disputed amount actually related to a written-off housing loan account and was recovered during the relevant period. As relevant bank records were on the appellate record but had not been properly considered, the order in appeal was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration after production of the certified documents.

In Bitchem Asphalt Technologies Ltd. v. Prakash Yadav Joint Commissioner (IT) State Tax, (2026) taxcode.in 175 GSTAT, the Tribunal examined detention and penalty proceedings arising from movement of goods through Uttar Pradesh by a route longer than the shorter alternative said to be available.

The Tribunal found that the vehicle was carrying valid documents and that the State had not shown any actual intended destination in Uttar Pradesh to support an inference of diversion. It accepted the appellant’s explanation that the shorter route passed through hilly terrain and that the longer route was chosen for safety in moving a heavily loaded commercial vehicle. The Tribunal also noted that the GST law does not require declaration or adherence to a particular route, unlike the earlier VAT regime. On that footing, it held that mere adoption of a longer route could not, without more, justify a suspicion of tax evasion.

Holding that no mala fide intention to evade tax was established, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, quashed both orders, and directed refund of the penalty amount deposited under protest, with each party to bear its own costs.

In Saraswati Printers v. Directorate General of GST Intelligence Dzu and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1544 HC, the Court dealt with a writ challenge to a DGGI show-cause notice and, later, the Order-in-Original passed during the pendency of the petition.

The petitioner argued that Section 6(2)(b) barred the Central proceedings because State GST authorities had already initiated and adjudicated proceedings on the same subject matter. The Court, however, held that the question whether the two sets of proceedings concerned the “same subject matter” depended on a factual comparison of their scope, liabilities, and underlying material. Since an Order-in-Original had already been passed, the statutory appeal under Section 107 was available and was the proper forum to examine that objection, along with issues such as overlap, jurisdiction, and the effect of departmental guidelines.

The Court therefore declined to decide the merits in writ jurisdiction, dismissed the petition, and relegated the petitioner to the appellate remedy with liberty to raise all contentions before the competent authority.

In Shri Krishna Industries v. Commissioner of Central Goods and Services Tax and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1545 HC, the Court considered whether Central proceedings under Section 74 were barred because State GST proceedings under Section 73 had already dealt with ITC claimed from M.R. Enterprises.

The Court explained that Section 6(2)(b) turns on whether the two proceedings concern the same liability or contravention, not merely the same assessee, period, or broad factual background. It found that the State proceedings and the later Central proceedings were not shown to be identical: the Central action rested on investigation-based allegations of fraudulent availment of ITC on invoices without actual supply of goods, while the petitioner’s reliance on the State proceedings did not establish that the very same contravention had already been adjudicated. The Court also held that objections about the reply, supply of documents, genuineness of transactions, and the use of Section 74 were matters for the appellate authority.

Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed, the Section 6(2)(b) bar was held unproven on the material placed, and the petitioner was left to pursue the statutory appeal under Section 107 with all grounds kept open.

In Rishiraj Singh Rathore v. Commissioner of CGST Delhi West Commissionerate and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1551 HC, the Court examined writ petitions by directors challenging a common order imposing penalty under Section 122(1A) of the CGST Act.

The petitioners said the show-cause notice was not served on them individually and that they were effectively denied a personal hearing. The Court noted, however, that the notice named them as noticees and that the real controversy was whether service and hearing were actually afforded, which required scrutiny of the record. It held that these were factual issues suitable for the appellate authority, not for first-instance adjudication in writ jurisdiction. The Court also rejected the argument that the appeal was futile because the appellate authority lacked power to remand, holding that absence of remand power does not prevent the authority from deciding the appeal on merits.

The writ petitions were disposed of by relegating the petitioners to the statutory appeal under Section 107, with liberty to seek exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and without any expression on the merits.

In Surya Business Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Assam and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1546 HC, the Gauhati High Court considered whether a show cause notice under section 73(1) of the CGST/AGST Acts, issued on 29-11-2024 for FY 2020-2021, was barred by limitation under section 73(2).

The Court accepted that “month” means a calendar month and that the commencing date is ordinarily excluded under section 9 of the General Clauses Act. Reading sections 73 and 75 together, it held that the notice merely initiates the adjudicatory process, while section 73(2) regulates the minimum interval before the order under section 73(10). The Court rejected a rigid backward corresponding-date computation and held that the relevant inquiry was whether three calendar months remained available before 28-02-2025.

It held that, after excluding the date of notice, the period left December, January and February available before the terminal date, so section 73(2) was satisfied. The writ appeal was dismissed on the limitation point, though the Court interfered with the ex parte order under section 73(9) to permit the appellant to file a reply and have the proceedings completed afresh within the time fixed.

In Jupiter Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of State Tax and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 182 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered whether service tax paid under the Finance Act, 1994 on flat-booking advances later cancelled after GST commenced could be claimed as input tax credit under the CGST/SGST Acts.

The Tribunal noted that the tax in question was paid before 01-07-2017 and, even if refundable after cancellation of bookings during the GST regime, it was not “input tax” within sections 2(62) and 2(63) of the CGST Act. It held that the claimant could not create a self-adjustment mechanism in its electronic credit ledger and that the proper course was the transitional refund process under section 142(5), which requires such claims to be dealt with under the existing law.

The Tribunal upheld the first appellate order, sustained the demand, penalty and interest, and dismissed the second appeal, holding that the refunded service tax could not be taken as GST ITC or used to offset GST liability.

In Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise v. Kothari Processors Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 183 GSTAT, the Tribunal examined a refund claim under section 54(3)(ii) read with Rule 89(5) for accumulated ITC under the inverted tax structure.

The Revenue argued that the first appellate authority had wrongly ignored three outward supply invoices allegedly taxed at 18% and had therefore computed the refund on an understated adjusted turnover. The Tribunal noted that the Revenue produced no supporting documents for those invoices and that the appellate order itself did not address such supplies. It held that the correct refund could not be ascertained without resolving the factual dispute over the rate-wise turnover figures relevant to the Rule 89(5) formula.

The matter was remanded to the first appellate authority to determine the correct inverted supply value, adjusted turnover and admissible refund after considering the Revenue’s documents, if any, and after giving both sides an opportunity of hearing. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

In Principal Commissioner of CGST & CX v. Shivam Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 181 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered whether refund of accumulated Compensation Cess credit on zero-rated exports could be reduced by a reversal entered during the refund period but linked to earlier tax periods.

The Tribunal read section 54(3) with Rule 89(4) and held that “Net ITC” means input tax credit actually availed during the relevant refund period. On the facts, the reversal of Rs. 2,24,87,235/- was found to relate to earlier periods and to be a post-refund accounting adjustment, not ITC availed in the refund period. The Tribunal also held that paragraph 43(c) of the CBIC circular could not override or expand Rule 89(4).

Finding no infirmity in the appellate order and no legal basis for the Revenue’s challenge, the Tribunal upheld the refund sanction of Rs. 43,72,608/- and dismissed the appeal.

In Pramod Chandan Surin v. Shivam Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 179 GSTAT, the Tribunal dealt with a Revenue appeal against refund of accumulated Compensation Cess credit arising from zero-rated exports for July 2022 to March 2023.

The Tribunal held that Rule 89(4)(B) requires Net ITC to be computed on ITC actually availed during the relevant period. It accepted the finding that the respondent had availed Rs. 2,19,41,356/- of cess credit in the period, reversed Rs. 8,52,706/-, and that the separate reversal of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- related to earlier tax periods. That earlier-period reversal could not, therefore, reduce Net ITC for the refund claim. The Tribunal also held that the circular relied on by the Revenue could not override the rule.

The refund sanction was upheld, the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed, and the Tribunal held that the sanction of Rs. 35,84,057/- was in accordance with section 54(3) and Rule 89(4).

In Pramod Chandan Surin v. Shivam Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 180 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered the Revenue’s challenge to refund of unutilized Compensation Cess credit claimed on zero-rated exports under Section 54(3) of the CGST Act read with Rule 89(4).

The Tribunal held that “Net ITC” under Rule 89(4) is confined to input tax credit actually availed during the relevant refund period. A reversal reflected in GSTR-3B during that period does not automatically reduce Net ITC if the underlying credit belonged to an earlier period and had not formed part of the credit availed for the refund period. It further held that paragraph 43(c) of the CBIC Circular could not be read to add words to Rule 89(4) or to override the statutory formula.

The Tribunal accepted the factual findings of the lower authorities that the relevant period’s ITC was properly identified and that the reversal relied on by the Revenue related to earlier periods. Finding no infirmity in the refund computation, it upheld the First Appellate Authority’s order and dismissed the Revenue’s appeal.

In Akаta Singh v. Om Marketing, (2026) taxcode.in 178 GSTAT, the Tribunal examined whether penalty under Section 129 of the CGST/UPGST Act could survive on the basis of alleged reuse of e-way bills and a claimed discrepancy in dispatch particulars.

The Tribunal found that the goods were supported by invoices, valid e-way bills and transport documents, that the quantities and descriptions matched on physical verification, and that the Revenue had produced no independent evidence of earlier movement, unloading, return, or second transportation of the same consignment. It held that the driver’s statement and the mere extension of e-way bills were insufficient, by themselves, to prove reuse. The omission to mention the GSTIN of the dispatch premises was treated as a technical lapse that did not establish a fictitious or unaccounted transaction.

Applying the principle that Section 129 requires cogent material showing intent to evade tax, the Tribunal upheld the appellate order setting aside the penalty and dismissed the departmental appeal.