GST Weekly Case Laws Newsletter | 14 September to 19 September 2026

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Belhekar & Kale Associates, (2026) taxcode.in 135 GSTAT, the GSTAT Principal Bench considered an application to recall an ex parte order in anti-profiteering proceedings arising from a works contract for modernization of MICT, where the DGAP had reported no contravention of section 171 of the CGST Act.

The Tribunal found lapses on all sides, noting that the Applicant did not keep a functional email address effectively on record, while the DGAP and Registry also failed to use the Applicant’s working address despite having it in their records. It accepted that the final Investigation Report and hearing notices were not effectively served at the functional email address, and that this omission contributed to the Applicant’s absence. At the same time, the Tribunal recorded that the Applicant had received notice and the report on 17.04.2026, yet took no meaningful step before the hearing on 29.04.2026. Applying a liberal construction of “sufficient cause” and relying on G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada & Ors., it held that natural justice required an opportunity to contest the matter on merits.

The Tribunal allowed the application, condoned the 24-day delay, recalled and set aside the ex parte order dated 05.05.2026 in NAPA/237/PB/2025, and restored the proceedings for hearing on merits.

In In re: DH Maintenance Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 151 AARGST, the AAR-West Bengal examined whether electricity recovered from occupiers at actual cost, without mark-up, including HVAC and common-area consumption, could be treated as reimbursement in the capacity of a pure agent and excluded from GST.

The Authority held that electricity supplied with maintenance and management services ordinarily forms part of a composite supply, and that substance prevails over billing form. It nevertheless focused on clause 3.3 of Circular No. 206/18/2023-GST, treating the second sentence as a deeming provision where the same amount as charged by the DISCOM is recovered from lessees or occupants on actual basis. The Authority noted the proposed billing pattern: separate recovery for non-HVAC and HVAC consumption at CESC rates, pro rata recovery of common-area electricity, and a separate CAM charge. Although it discussed the ordinary Rule 33 pure-agent test and observed that the wider service bundle made that test difficult on the facts, it ultimately applied the circular’s deeming fiction to the proposed model.

The application was held maintainable despite the Revenue’s reference to earlier adjudication on the existing billing pattern, and the Authority ruled that the actual-cost recovery of electricity charges, as explained, could be deemed a pure-agent recovery under the CGST Act read with the circular, so GST would not be levied on that excluded part.

In In re: Biman Bangladesh Airlines Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 150 AARGST, the AAR-West Bengal ruled on GST liability for international passenger transportation and the transport of human remains across multiple travel scenarios involving India and foreign destinations.

The Authority treated passenger carriage by air as scheduled air transport service under heading 9964, and human-remains transport as a separate service under heading 9997. It explained that for a “continuous journey,” a short transit stop does not amount to a stopover and does not break continuity; embarkation remains the key point for determining place of supply. Applying sections 12(9) and 13(10) of the IGST Act, it held that where embarkation is outside India, the place of supply is outside India and the GST Acts do not apply. Where embarkation is in Kolkata, the supply is intra-State and subject to CGST and SGST at the prescribed rates, depending on class of travel and the input-tax-credit condition. For human remains, the Authority relied on clause 4 of Schedule III to hold that transportation of the deceased is neither a supply of goods nor services.

The ruling answered that journeys beginning outside India, including those with short transit stops, were not taxable in India; journeys beginning in Kolkata were taxable in Kolkata; and transportation of human remains was excluded from supply and not liable to GST.

In Amit Tyagi v. Tata Play Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 137 GSTAT, the GSTAT Agra Bench heard the Revenue’s appeal against the first appellate order that had set aside a penalty imposed under section 129(3) of the CGST/UPGST Act for an alleged e-way bill discrepancy during transport from Delhi to Lucknow.

The Judicial Member held that an e-way bill is not valid unless Part-B contains correct vehicle details, and that Circular No. 64/38/2018-GST protects only minor errors, not an entirely different vehicle number. Relying on departmental precedents and the fact that correction was made only after interception, the Judicial Member concluded that the violation supported a rebuttable presumption of intent to evade tax, which the taxpayer had not disproved. The Technical Member reached the opposite conclusion, emphasizing that the documents otherwise matched the goods, no discrepancy existed in quantity or description, no finding of mens rea had been recorded, and the wrong vehicle number was a bona fide typographical error that could not, without more, sustain section 129 proceedings.

Because the Members differed, no final decision on the merits was made. The point of difference was referred under section 109(9) of the CGST Act to the Vice President, GSTAT, Uttar Pradesh, for nomination of another Member.

In Tej Farm Services v. Prakash Yadav Joint Commisioner State Taх and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 138 GSTAT, the GSTAT Lucknow Bench considered a second appeal against partial rejection of ITC claimed under CGST and SGST heads for the 2017–18 period, where the appellant said the corresponding credit was reflected in GSTR-2A as IGST and the mismatch was only technical or clerical.

The Tribunal noted the procedural history: a section 73 notice, confirmation of demand by the adjudicating authority, and partial relief in first appeal. It recorded the figures as adjusted by the first appellate authority and found that, while IGST credit of Rs. 63,480.18 had been allowed, reversal of CGST and SGST credit of Rs. 1,77,951.94 each was sustained. The Tribunal held that the appellant placed no fresh material before it and that the precedents cited were not relevant to the facts of the case. On its own assessment, it found no basis to interfere with the appellate authority’s view that the disputed credit under the wrong heads should remain disallowed, along with the consequential interest and penalty.

The appeal was dismissed, and the first appellate order was confirmed, leaving the sustained reversal of CGST and SGST ITC, interest of Rs. 5,23,888.54, and penalty of Rs. 37,212.12 intact.

In Sakhsham Knowledge Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Nitin Bansal Commissioner State Tax Lucknow and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 136 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered whether tax and ITC demands could survive when no proper show cause notice under section 73 had been served on the appellant and the only notice attached to Form GST DRC-01 was addressed to another taxpayer.

The Tribunal held that section 73(1) mandates service of a notice on the person chargeable to tax, while rule 142 makes DRC-01 only a summary of that notice. On the facts, DRC-01 merely tabulated dues and did not disclose the factual basis, reasoning, or statutory violation, and the record also showed that the attached notice related to M/s Sai Kripa Medical Store, not the appellant. The Tribunal further noted that the appellant’s additional GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B material supported its claim that the supply was B2B, and the departmental representative did not contradict that assertion. It also found that the adjudication and appellate authorities had not meaningfully examined the IGST demand or complied with the verification steps indicated in Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST for the GSTR-2A/GSTR-3B mismatch issue.

The appeal was allowed. The Tribunal held that the absence of a valid section 73 show cause notice rendered the proceedings void ab initio, and it set aside the entire adjudication and appellate action, including the demands of IGST, CGST, SGST, interest and penalty.

In Conduent Business Services India LLP v. Commissioner of Central Tax Bengaluru East and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 139 GSTAT, the Tribunal examined whether section 74 penalties could be imposed on audit issues relating to ITC mismatch and transitional credit when the tax and interest had already been paid before the show cause notice.

The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s objection of institutional bias, holding that a Commissioner’s review under section 107(2) was only an executive step and did not bind the appellate authority on merits. On the substance, it held that section 74 is reserved for cases involving fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression with intent to evade tax, and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Tata Steel required foundational facts in the notice and independent satisfaction by the officer. The Tribunal found that the order-in-original itself recorded that all relevant records were available on the departmental portal and did not establish deliberate suppression. It also held that audit detection under section 65 does not by itself trigger section 74, and that pre-show cause notice payment of agreed tax and interest brought the matter within the statutory scheme of section 73(5) and 73(8), supported by the Karnataka High Court’s decision in Adecco Flexion.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal, set aside the appellate order, and held that the credit reversed and interest paid on Issues 1 and 3 were payments under section 73(5) of the CGST Act. The section 74 penalties imposed on those issues were held unsustainable.

In I-NXT v. Sandeep Banga Commissioner Bengaluru Zone & Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 140 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered whether a section 74 penalty could be sustained where the entire tax and interest were paid before the show cause notice after an anti-evasion verification revealed a mismatch between GSTR-3B and GSTR-2A.

The Tribunal held that section 74 requires more than a mismatch or post-verification payment: the department must establish fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax. Referring to Tata Steel, it stated that the foundational facts for invoking extended limitation must appear in the notice and that a mechanical recital of statutory words is not enough. It also relied on the understanding of section 73(5) and 73(6), as discussed in Rays Power Infra, to hold that where tax and interest are paid after liability is pointed out but before notice, the matter falls within the section 73 framework if no intent to evade is shown. The Tribunal further held that “suppression” under Explanation 2 to section 74 requires deliberate non-disclosure, which was not established here, and that third-party default causing the mismatch could not be attributed to the appellant to sustain suppression.

The Tribunal set aside the appellate order and held that the case was one of ITC mismatch attracting section 73, not section 74. The penalty under section 74 was declared invalid and unjustified.

In Wonder Enterprises v. State of U.P. and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1536 HC, the High Court considered whether an adjudicating authority could, after noticing that an earlier ex parte order had ignored the assessee’s replies, pass another ex parte order under section 161 of the U.P. GST Act.

The Court held that section 161 permits rectification of an error apparent on the face of the record, including a suo motu correction, and that the omission to consider the petitioner’s replies could fall within that jurisdiction. However, once the authority itself recognised that the replies dated 13.07.2021 and 18.07.2021 had not been considered in the original order, it could not proceed to decide the matter on merits without hearing the petitioner. The Court explained that this was a fundamental defect going to the root of the adjudication and that the proper course was recall of the original order followed by a fresh hearing. It rejected the State’s submission that the second order was harmless merely because part of the demand had been reduced.

The Court set aside the order dated 05.02.2025 and remitted the matter to the adjudicating authority for fresh decision after affording opportunity of hearing. The writ petition was allowed, with no order as to costs.

In Priya Medical Stores v. State of U.P. and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1533 HC, the High Court examined whether the appellate authority could reject a GST appeal as time-barred without dealing with the specific grounds advanced in support of condonation of delay.

The Court noted that the petitioner had pleaded in the appeal that it learned of the original tax order only later through GST sources, promptly consulted counsel, filed a writ petition, and then pursued the statutory appeal after that petition was disposed of. The appellate authority, however, rejected the appeal by applying the limitation provisions under section 107 and treating the filing as beyond the permissible period, but the Court found that none of the petitioner’s delay grounds had been considered. It characterised the rejection order as having been passed in a cyclostyle manner and held that, since the right of appeal is statutory, the authority was obliged to address the explanation for delay rather than ignore it.

The writ petition was partly allowed. The Court set aside the appellate order dated 17.04.2026, restored the condonation application and appeal to their original number, imposed costs of Rs. 5,000, and directed the appellate authority to decide the delay application within two months from production of a certified copy of the judgment.

In KSE Electricals Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Additional Commissioner Kolkata South CGST & CX Commissionerate and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1501 HC, the Calcutta High Court considered a writ challenge to a show cause notice under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 and consequential orders, all premised on an alleged contravention of Rule 96(10) of the CGST/WBGST Rules, 2017 after that rule had been unconditionally omitted from 8 October 2024 without any saving clause.

The Court accepted the petitioners’ reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in M/s Goodluck India Limited and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., read with Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India, and noted that omission of a provision without a saving clause ordinarily brings the provision to an end in law. It recorded that the Supreme Court had held proceedings under an omitted rule can continue only where the statute provides for continuance or contains a legal fiction preserving them. The Court also took judicial notice of the later Office Memorandum issued by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes, which instructed field formations not to pursue proceedings based on the omitted Rule 96(10).

Holding that the impugned proceedings were founded solely on the omitted rule, the Court quashed the show cause notice dated 25 July 2024 and the consequential orders dated 4 February 2025. The writ petition was disposed of accordingly.

In Garg Enterprises v. Additional Commissioner and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1500 HC, the Calcutta High Court dismissed a writ petition challenging an order passed under Section 74 of the CGST/WBGST Act, 2017 for the period January 2020 to November 2023. The petitioner attacked the pre-show cause and show cause process, alleged vagueness, clubbing of periods, an invalid hearing procedure, and urged that the defects were jurisdictional.

The Court treated most objections as disputed questions of fact not fit for writ determination. It noted that the summary notices identified the demand and the relevant periods, that the detailed show cause was on record, and that the allegations involved serious issues of smuggling of cement from Bhutan and concealed GST liability. It also recorded that the officer who heard the matter was a proper officer and that the same proper officer passed the order. The Court further emphasized that an earlier writ against the same notices had been withdrawn, with liberty only to respond and be heard, and that no liberty had been reserved to reapproach the High Court by bypassing the statutory adjudicatory route.

Finding no basis to interfere under writ jurisdiction, the Court held that the petitioner should pursue the available statutory remedy, including the appellate process. The writ petition was dismissed, while leaving it open to the petitioner to challenge the Section 74 order before the appropriate forum in accordance with law.

In SRD Groups and Anr. v. State of Assam and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1504 HC, the Gauhati High Court considered a challenge to cancellation of GST registration under Section 29 of the CGST Act, 2017. The petitioners said they could not seek revocation within the prescribed period under Section 30 of the Assam GST Act, 2017, and complained that they had not been properly heard before cancellation.

The Court noted that the cancellation followed a notice dated 10 August 2022 issued for non-submission of returns under Section 39, a default not denied in the writ petition. It observed that the issue was no longer res integra and relied on its earlier decision in Motaleb Bhuyan v. The State of Assam and Ors. The Court did not undertake a separate factual reassessment of each grievance, but proceeded on the footing that similar restorative directions could be issued as in the earlier case.

The Court quashed the cancellation order dated 6 April 2024 and directed the petitioners to file the pending returns within 30 days. It further directed that the limitation period under Sections 73(10) and 74(10) would be computed from the date of the judgment, except for financial year 2025-26, and held the petitioners liable to pay arrears, including tax, penalty, interest and late fees. The writ petition was disposed of on those terms.

In Narayanan Manikantan & Co. v. State Tax Officer and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1508 HC, the Kerala High Court examined rejection of a refund claim under Section 54 of the GST Act in relation to Kerala Flood Cess. The petitioner had initially paid the cess along with GSTR 3B instead of through Form KFC-A, later remitted the amount in the correct account, and then sought refund.

The Court followed its earlier ruling in Pushpagiri Medical Society v. State of Kerala and Others and held that the two-year limitation under Section 54 must be computed from the date on which the cess was actually remitted in the correct account, not from the date of the mistaken payment with GSTR 3B. On the facts before it, the Court noted that the relevant remittance had been made on 27 June 2025 and that the refund application was filed on 30 July 2025, making it timely.

Accordingly, the Court quashed the order rejecting the refund as time-barred and directed the competent authority to reconsider the application as one filed within limitation, pass appropriate orders within one month, and release the refund immediately upon sanction. The writ petition was disposed of on that basis.

In Javed Akhtar v. Union of India, (2026) taxcode.in 1530 HC, the Allahabad High Court dealt with a bail application arising from a prosecution under Sections 132(1)(c) and 132(1)(i) of the CGST Act, 2017. The allegation was that the applicant had fraudulently availed input tax credit on invoices issued by non-existent firms. The applicant had been in jail since 29 January 2026, investigation was complete, and the Court noted that complaint had been filed. It also recorded that proceedings under Sections 73 and 74 had not been initiated.

The Court considered the applicant’s criminal antecedents but found no material showing tampering with evidence, intimidation of witnesses, or prior evasion of the process of law. Referring to decisions including Ash Mohammad, Prabhakar Tewari, Sanjay Chandra, Ratnambar Kaushik, Vineet Jain, Atul Mehra, and Manish Sisodia, the Court reiterated that bail is the rule and jail the exception, that pre-trial detention is not punitive, and that prolonged custody is a relevant consideration where the offence is triable by a Magistrate and the maximum punishment is five years. It also observed that documentary evidence predominated and that trial was unlikely to conclude soon.

Finding no exceptional circumstances warranting continued detention, the Court allowed the bail application. Release was ordered on furnishing a personal bond and two sureties of Rs. 50,000 each, subject to conditions against tampering, witness intimidation, reoffending, and travel abroad without permission, with liberty to seek cancellation for breach.

In Hanchang India Pvt. Ltd. v. State Tax Officer, (2026) taxcode.in 1527 HC, the Madras High Court considered a challenge to proceedings issued in Form GST DRC-07 under Section 74 of the GST Act.

The Court found that only a summary notice in DRC-01 had been issued and that no detailed show cause notice setting out the reasons for the proposed action was served. It held that Section 74 requires a proper notice before assessment, that the notice must inform the assessee of the alleged discrepancies so an effective reply can be filed, and that due process and natural justice are not satisfied by a mere summary. The Court also held that the order under Section 74(9) had to be a speaking order, since reasons are essential for transparency and for meaningful appellate review. Reliance was placed on ORYX Fisheries and Kranti Associates for the importance of a fair notice and recorded reasons.

The impugned order dated 21.03.2022 was set aside and the matter was remanded. The respondent was directed to issue a detailed show cause notice in DRC-01 and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. No costs were awarded and the connected petitions were closed.

In In re: Revathi Enterprises (Prop. Rama Naik Harjayanaik Dileep Kumar), (2026) taxcode.in 157 AARGST, the Karnataka Authority for Advance Ruling addressed an application concerning whether diesel supplied free of cost by a service recipient should be included in the value of GTA service.

The Authority did not examine the merits because the statutory fee requirement under Section 97(1) of the CGST/KGST Act read with Rule 104 had not been complied with. It noted that the prescribed fee of Rs. 5,000 each under the CGST Act and the KGST Act was mandatory, that the applicant had not remitted the balance amount despite repeated communications and a fixed hearing date, and that no response or appearance was made. On that basis, the Authority held the application to be not maintainable and therefore outside consideration on merits.

The application for advance ruling was rejected as not maintainable for non-compliance with the mandatory fee requirement under Section 97(1) read with Rule 104. The Authority confined itself to maintainability and left the question on inclusion of diesel in GTA value unanswered.

In In re: Natikeri Amritha Krishnam, (2026) taxcode.in 158 AARGST, the Karnataka Authority for Advance Ruling considered an application filed by an unregistered person seeking a ruling on GST implications of proposed sale of developed plots.

The Authority held that the application could not be entertained because the prescribed fee under Section 97(1) of the CGST/KGST Act read with Rule 104 had not been fully paid. It recorded that repeated opportunities were given to rectify the defect, including communications calling for the balance fee and opportunities of personal hearing, but the applicant neither appeared nor complied. The Authority also noted that the application did not clearly state the category of question under Section 97(2), which added to the defect in maintainability.

The application was rejected as not maintainable, and the Authority did not go into the substantive question on whether the proposed transaction was taxable or the rate applicable. The ruling turned entirely on non-payment of the full statutory fee and the defective presentation of the application.

In In re: Karnataka State Agriculture Marketing Board, (2026) taxcode.in 159 AARGST, the Karnataka Authority for Advance Ruling received an application on whether maintenance and operation of a corpus fund for Shramik welfare by KSAMB, and contributions collected from APMCs, attracted GST.

The Authority did not enter the merits. It held that the application was defective because the prescribed fee under Section 97(1) read with Rule 104 had not been paid in full, despite repeated opportunities to cure the defect and despite attempts to secure a hearing response. It also found that the applicant had not indicated in Form GST ARA-01 the category of question sought to be ruled upon under Section 97(2), and had not supplied an interpretation of law. These defects were treated as fundamental to maintainability.

The application was rejected as not maintainable for non-compliance with the mandatory fee requirement, and because the statutory category of issue was not specified. The Authority therefore gave no ruling on whether the corpus-fund arrangement or APMC contributions constituted a taxable supply.

In In re: Symphony Polymers Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 141 AARGST, the Tamil Nadu Authority for Advance Ruling considered the classification and GST rate applicable to compostable bags and packing materials manufactured by the applicant.

The Authority held that the products were made from PLA and PBAT, which placed them in Chapter 39 as plastic articles, specifically under heading 3923 2990. It accepted that the goods were certified as compostable under IS/ISO 17088 and that the applicant had CPCB certification for compostable carry bags, but it drew a distinction between compostable plastics and biodegradable plastics for the purpose of Entry 319 in Notification No. 9/2025-CT(R). The Authority relied on the relevant Plastic Waste Management Rules and standards to hold that the concessional 5% rate depended on the goods being biodegradable and conforming to the applicable biodegradable standard, which the applicant had not shown.

The ruling declared that the applicant’s compostable bags and packing materials are classifiable under Chapter 39, heading 3923 2990, but do not fall within Entry 319 for paper sacks/bags and bio-degradable bags. As a result, the supplies did not attract the concessional 5% GST rate under that entry.

In In re: Amit Vinodkumar Kanjiya (Akplast Packaging), (2026) taxcode.in 136 AARGST, the Gujarat AAR considered the correct HSN and GST rate for plastic twine (sutli) manufactured from polypropylene/polyethylene granules for agricultural and industrial packing.

The Authority accepted that the product was made by extrusion, slitting, stretching and twisting, but held that these processes did not convert the goods into textile material. Relying on Chapter Notes, HSN Notes and the Raj Packwell line of reasoning, it found that Chapter 56 applies only to textile and textile articles, whereas the applicant’s goods remained plastic products. It also rejected Heading 3923 because plastic twine is not among the packing or conveyance articles typically covered there.

The Authority classified the product under residuary Heading 3926, specifically sub-heading 39269099, as an article of plastics not elsewhere specified. It accordingly held that GST is payable at 18% under Entry 127 of Schedule II to Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate), and answered both reference questions against the applicant.

In Tiger Steels v. Commissioner of State Tax, (2026) taxcode.in 143 GSTAT, the Ernakulam Bench of the GSTAT considered an appeal arising from detention of sponge iron on the ground that the e-way bill had expired.

The Tribunal focused on section 129(3) of the CGST/KGST Act, which requires the proper officer to pass the penalty order within seven days from service of notice. It noted that the notice had been issued on 28-06-2019, but the order under section 129(3) was passed only on 26-07-2019, well beyond the statutory period. On the plain language of the provision, the Tribunal treated the time limit as mandatory.

The Tribunal held that the delay amounted to a blatant statutory violation, rendering the original order void ab initio and a nullity. As nothing survived after that finding, the appellate order upholding the original order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.

In Heramb Enterprises v. C Pushpalatha Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 142 GSTAT, the Bengaluru Bench of the GSTAT examined a revisional order that reversed an appellate reduction of penalty under section 129.

The Tribunal first addressed limitation under section 108(2)(b) and held that the COVID-19 exclusion ordered in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation applied even to departmental proceedings. On that basis, it concluded that the revisional order was within time. On merits, it found that at the time of interception the goods were being unloaded at a destination not covered by the available invoice and e-way bill, and that no supporting documents existed for that movement. The Tribunal rejected the technical-glitch explanation for want of evidence.

Holding that the post-interception generation of an e-way bill was an afterthought and that the absence of proper documents showed an intention to evade tax, the Tribunal upheld the revisional authority’s order and confirmed the penalty under section 129(1). The appeal was dismissed.

In Commissioner CGST & CX v. Santosh Fragrance, (2026) taxcode.in 141 GSTAT, the Kolkata Bench of the GSTAT considered the revenue’s challenge to a refund sanctioned for unutilised input tax credit arising from an inverted tax structure.

The Tribunal held that the refund had to be tested under section 54(3)(ii) of the CGST Act and found it undisputed that the taxpayer had paid GST at 12% to 18% on distinct input goods such as perfumes, fragrances, chemicals and packaging materials, while the output supply of Agarbati attracted GST at 5%. It therefore concluded that the accumulation of ITC was due to the rate of tax on inputs being higher than the rate on output supplies. The Tribunal also read VKC Footsteps as recognising that refund is confined to the statutory categories in section 54(3).

The revenue’s reliance on CBIC circulars was rejected as a bar to the claim because the circular-based restriction concerned cases where input and output were the same goods, which was not the position here. Treating the circulars as non-binding on the Tribunal, it upheld the concurrent findings below and dismissed the revenue’s appeal.

In GMG Electric v. Commissioner of State Tax, (2026) taxcode.in 144 GSTAT, the Ernakulam Bench of the GSTAT dealt with detention of goods after interception showed that the relevant e-way bills had expired.

The Tribunal examined section 129(3) and held that the proper officer must pass the order for payment of penalty within seven days from service of notice. It recorded that notice under section 129(3) had been issued on 16-08-2021, but the confirming order was passed only on 04-11-2022, a delay of 445 days. Applying the statutory language strictly, it found the delay incompatible with the mandatory timeline.

The Tribunal held that the order was void ab initio and a nullity in law, leaving nothing to sustain the appellate order. It therefore set aside the Order-in-Appeal and allowed the appeal with consequential relief.

In Raghvendra Vikram Singh v. Technomat Composheet P. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 147 GSTAT, the GSTAT Ghaziabad Bench considered a State Tax Department appeal at the admission stage against a first appellate order relating to IGST and penalty arising from alleged e-way bill non-compliance. The Tribunal treated maintainability as the threshold issue and examined the appeal in light of Section 120 of the UPGST Act and the departmental circular prescribing a Rs. 20,00,000 monetary limit for departmental appeals before GSTAT, subject to exceptions.

The Tribunal held that admission is not a formality and that the right of appeal is statutory, to be exercised only within the conditions prescribed by law. Applying the circular’s methodology, it found that the dispute concerned only a penalty of Rs. 88,074, far below the threshold. It further held that the Revenue bore the burden of showing that the case fell within a recognised exception, and that a bare assertion of Commissioner’s approval was not enough. Administrative authorisation to file an appeal did not itself satisfy the maintainability requirements.

The Tribunal found no material showing that any recognised exception applied, including any ultra vires challenge, recurring interpretive issue, adverse strictures, or a reasoned exercise of the Commissioner’s residual discretion. Holding that the litigation policy bound the Department and that merits could not be used to create maintainability, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal at the threshold and expressly declined to examine the underlying tax dispute on merits.

In Vipin Upadhyay v. M Chill Industries, (2026) taxcode.in 148 GSTAT, the GSTAT Ghaziabad Bench addressed a State Tax Department appeal against an appellate order that had set aside a penalty of Rs. 1,90,080 imposed under IGST for the period 01.09.2025 to 30.09.2025. The Tribunal, before entering the merits, considered whether the Department’s appeal was maintainable under Section 120 of the UPGST Act and the applicable circular fixing a Rs. 20,00,000 monetary limit for departmental appeals.

The Tribunal reiterated that admission requires prior satisfaction of legal maintainability and that a statutory right of appeal remains subject to the prescribed conditions for its exercise. Applying the circular’s computation methodology, it found the disputed amount to be Rs. 1,90,080, well below the threshold. It held that once the amount is below the limit, the Department must specifically plead and establish a recognised exception, and a mere statement that the Commissioner approved the appeal cannot substitute for proof of compliance with the exception framework.

Finding no material to show that any exception applied, and no record of a specific, reasoned exercise of the Commissioner’s residual power in the particular case, the Tribunal held that the appeal was not maintainable. It dismissed the departmental appeal at the threshold, expressly stating that it had not examined or adjudicated the merits of the underlying tax controversy.

In Sri Vinayaka Electricals v. Commercial Tax Officer and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1512 HC, the Karnataka High Court considered writ petitions challenging State and Central GST show cause notices, adjudication orders and garnishee notices for the financial years 2019-20 and 2021-22. The petitioner also relied on an exemption claim under Notification No. 12/2017 for supplies connected with street lights, and complained of lack of effective participation, denial of personal hearing, and parallel proceedings by Central and State authorities for the same subject matter.

The Court extracted Section 6 of the CGST Act and held that Section 6(2)(b) clearly bars initiation of Central proceedings once State GST proceedings have already been initiated on the same subject matter. As the State authorities had earlier commenced proceedings, the Central show cause notice and the resulting Central adjudication order could not stand. The Court also noted the petitioner’s assertion that it had been unable to respond fully in the State proceedings and that relevant documents could be produced to support the exemption claim.

The Court quashed the Central notice and adjudication order. As to the State proceedings, it quashed the adjudication orders and garnishee notices but granted liberty to file replies to the State show cause notices by 30.09.2026, subject to deposit of 10% of the tax demand. The Court left all questions open and confined its ruling on the State matters to affording a fresh opportunity on terms.

In Prabhas Kumar v. Radico, (2026) taxcode.in 149 GSTAT, the GSTAT Ghaziabad Bench examined a State Tax Department appeal at the admission stage against an order allowing the assessee’s appeal under Section 74 of the UPGST Act. The dispute concerned IGST of Rs. 6,29,505, interest of Rs. 7,51,000 and penalty of Rs. 6,29,505, and the Tribunal first considered whether the departmental appeal satisfied the maintainability requirements under the monetary-limit framework governing GSTAT appeals.

The Tribunal held that admission is not a procedural formality and that the Department’s right of appeal must be exercised within the statutory and administrative conditions prescribed by law. Applying the circular methodology, it treated the tax component of Rs. 6,29,505 as the relevant amount for threshold purposes, since the dispute involved tax along with interest and penalty, and found that this amount was well below Rs. 20,00,000. It reiterated that the burden then shifted to the Revenue to show a specific exception and that a generic reference to Commissioner’s approval was insufficient.

Finding no material to show any ultra vires ruling, recurring legal issue, adverse strictures, or reasoned exercise of the Commissioner’s residual discretion, the Tribunal held that the appeal was not maintainable. It dismissed the appeal at the threshold, expressly declining to examine the merits of the underlying tax dispute.

In Arvind Kumar Pathak v. Munna Steel, (2026) taxcode.in 150 GSTAT, the GSTAT Ghaziabad Bench considered a State Tax Department appeal arising from proceedings under Section 74 concerning alleged excess input tax credit for the period 01.12.2020 to 31.12.2020. The first appellate authority had allowed the assessee’s appeal and set aside the proper officer’s order, and the Tribunal was called upon at admission to decide whether the Department’s challenge was maintainable under the monetary-limit policy governing departmental appeals.

The Tribunal held that maintainability must be decided before any merits review. Referring to Section 120 of the UPGST Act and the departmental circulars, it found that the relevant disputed tax amount was IGST of Rs. 1,89,000, which was below the Rs. 20,00,000 threshold. It reiterated that the Revenue had to specifically establish an applicable exception, and that permission from the Commissioner, without a recorded and case-specific basis bringing the matter within an exception, did not satisfy the legal requirement.

As no material showed an ultra vires finding, recurring interpretive issue, adverse strictures, or a reasoned exercise of residual discretion, the Tribunal held that the appeal could not be admitted. It dismissed the departmental appeal at the threshold and made clear that it had not adjudicated the merits of the tax dispute.

In Devendra Singh v. Adroit Technical Services Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 151 GSTAT, the GSTAT Ghaziabad Bench considered whether a departmental appeal against partial relief granted in respect of a demand of Rs. 1,98,806/- was maintainable in light of the prescribed Rs. 20,00,000 monetary limit for State tax appeals.

The Tribunal held that admission is not a formality and that maintainability must be tested first. It read Section 120 of the UPGST Act with the governing circulars and found that the appeal amount was well below the threshold. The Tribunal emphasised that once the amount in dispute falls below the limit, the Revenue must specifically plead and establish the relevant exception, including any reasoned Commissioner’s opinion where the residual power is invoked. A bare statement that the appeal was filed with approval was held insufficient, and the Tribunal rejected the argument that a statutory right of appeal overrides the conditions regulating its exercise.

Finding no material to show that any recognised exception applied, and no specific, recorded exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion in the particular case, the Tribunal refused to admit the appeal. It held that the monetary-limit policy bound the Department and that merits could not be examined in the absence of maintainability. The appeal was dismissed at the threshold, with no adjudication on the underlying tax dispute.

In Geetha v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1528 HC, the Madras High Court examined confiscation orders concerning 996 grams of 24-carat gold ornaments seized from three family members after they arrived from Dubai and passed through the Green Channel without declaration.

The Court held that Section 125 of the Customs Act distinguishes prohibited goods from other goods, and that the critical question was whether non-compliance with the import conditions converted restricted gold into prohibited goods. Referring to authorities including Sk. Mohd. Omer and Om Prakash Bhatia, it held that restrictions may amount to prohibition and that breach of the notified conditions governing import of gold could have that effect. The Court found that the petitioners had not complied with the applicable notification conditions and, even if the items were treated as jewellery, the Baggage Rules did not assist them because the quantity and residency requirements were not satisfied.

On that footing, the Court held that redemption of the confiscated gold was not available as a matter of right and lay within the authorities’ discretion under Section 125. Finding that the authorities had applied their minds and that the orders were neither perverse nor arbitrary, the Court declined interference under Article 226. The writ petitions were disposed of without costs.

In Crossfields Synergy Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1515 HC, the Karnataka High Court dealt with a Section 73 adjudication arising from a mismatch between Form GSTR-2A and Form GSTR-3B, where the disputed transactions were later reflected in Form GSTR-9.

The Court held that reconciliation is contemplated by the GST law and rules, and relied on the reasoning of the Calcutta High Court to note that an error in filing GSTR-3B can be capable of rectification through the annual return mechanism. It accepted that Circular No. 183 may not cover the precise factual situation, but still informs the adjudicatory approach because it recognises reconciliation. The Court found that, since the transactions omitted from GSTR-3B were included in GSTR-9, the adjudicating authority had to examine that reconciliation and give the petitioner an opportunity to support it with documents before confirming demand.

The Court therefore declined to quash the show cause notices, but held that the adjudication order and the bank recovery communication could not stand in their existing form. It quashed those two communications, restored the proceedings for fresh consideration of the GSTR-9 reconciliation, and directed the petitioner to appear before the authority with supporting material.

In Jai Enterprises v. Dr. Anupama Goyal Commissioner/Assistant Commissioner and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 146 GSTAT, the GSTAT Lucknow Bench considered a detention and penalty order under Section 129(3) based on the department’s inference that invoices and e-way bills had been used twice for transport of the same goods.

The Tribunal held that the record did not establish any discrepancy in quantity, value, description or ownership of the goods, and that the goods were accompanied by valid tax documents. It found that the department’s case rested mainly on toll plaza movement data and photographs, but no independent and cogent evidence showed that the same goods had already been delivered or that the e-way bill had in fact been re-used. The Tribunal also noted that the appellant had offered an explanation that the vehicle had earlier carried cotton cut pieces, which the department had not properly verified. It relied on authorities stating that suspicion and presumption cannot replace proof, and that intention to evade tax cannot be inferred automatically.

Concluding that the allegation of re-transportation was unsupported by legal proof, the Tribunal set aside the appellate order and allowed the appeal. It directed refund of any amount deposited pursuant to the impugned proceedings in accordance with law.

In Lachmandas & Company v. Commissioner of Kerala State GST Thiruvananthapuram, (2026) taxcode.in 145 GSTAT, the GSTAT Ernakulam Bench considered detention proceedings involving cigarettes intercepted in transit with an e-way bill that did not match the vehicle, value, or route, followed by a penalty order passed long after the statutory notice.

The Tribunal held that Section 129(3) requires the proper officer to issue notice within seven days of detention and to pass the order within seven days of service of that notice. Reading the provision as mandatory, and relying on several High Court authorities, it concluded that the absence of an express consequence does not make the timeline directory. On the facts, the Tribunal also accepted that the movement was a stock transfer between the appellant’s own registered godowns during Covid restrictions, that the transport was supported by delivery challans, and that no tax evasion was established. It found no mens rea to evade tax merely because the second vehicle’s e-way bill had not been generated in the circumstances described.

The Tribunal held that the MOV-09 order, passed 230 days after the notice, was illegal and without jurisdiction. It set aside the order-in-appeal, allowed the appeals with consequential relief, and directed immediate release of the bank guarantee to the appellants.

In Android Motors Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1511 HC, the Karnataka High Court considered a refund rejection under Section 54(1) of the CGST Act on the ground that the application was filed beyond the two-year period and that the statute did not provide for condonation of delay.

Relying on Division Bench principles, the Court reiterated that the two-year period under Section 54 is mandatory, but held that in an appropriate case a belated claimant may still seek relief under Article 226. It noted that writ review should ordinarily be confined to condonation of delay and not extend to deciding refund entitlement itself, unless entitlement is undisputed. The petitioner’s explanation was that TRAN-1 credit had been reversed twice in error under Annexures C and D, that these aspects had not been considered in the rejection, and that the error came to light only when a Chartered Accountant examined the papers later.

The Court accepted that these circumstances constituted just cause to condone the delay. It set aside the impugned order, restored the refund proceedings for reconsideration by the first respondent, and granted liberty to the petitioner to file a detailed response with copies of Annexures C and D by 21.09.2026. The merits of refund entitlement were left open for the authority to decide on remand.

In Nutech Constructions v. Assistant Commissioner and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1509 HC, the Kerala High Court reviewed a challenge to Ext.P3, which the appellant said had been issued mechanically without verification of accounts and without the foundational facts required to invoke Section 74 of the GST Act.

The Court accepted the respondents’ submission that Ext.P3 itself recorded the factual basis for invoking Section 74, including alleged excess availment of input tax credit over GSTR-2A, failure to disclose the basis for availment, non-response to audit communications, and other circumstances that led the authority to conclude that there had been suppression of material facts. It held that these were factual matters underpinning the proceedings and that, sitting in writ jurisdiction under Article 226, it could not examine the merits of those findings. The Court also held that the appellant’s grievances, including the plea for remand to the Assessing Authority, could be effectively pursued in the statutory appeal.

The writ appeal was dismissed. The Court rejected the argument that the need to remit 10% of the demanded tax for the appeal justified bypassing the alternate remedy, stating that a writ petition cannot ordinarily be used merely to avoid a statutory pre-deposit condition. The appellant was left to pursue the appellate remedy against Ext.P3.

In Navinder Singh Sahdev v. Directorate General of GST Intelligence, (2026) taxcode.in 1521 HC, the Punjab and Haryana High Court considered regular bail for petitioners arrested in a GST evasion case involving alleged large-scale suppression of receipts from online gaming services through a network of sham and dummy entities.

The Court noted the prosecution’s allegations of a multi-layered scheme, routing through payment gateways and bank accounts, and an estimated revenue loss of about Rs. 156 crores. It then relied on Supreme Court guidance that, in prosecutions under Section 132(1) of the CGST Act, bail should ordinarily follow unless extraordinary circumstances exist. The Court observed that the investigation had concluded, the petitioners had already spent about four months and two days in custody, the alleged offences were punishable with imprisonment up to five years and triable by a Magistrate, and the evidence was largely documentary with official witnesses. On that basis, it found the risk of tampering or witness influence to be negligible and held that continued detention would serve no useful purpose.

Both bail petitions were allowed without expressing any view on the merits. The petitioners were ordered to be released on regular bail on furnishing adequate bonds, subject to detailed conditions including non-tampering with evidence, surrender of passports, restrictions on travel and residence change, non-influence of witnesses, and undertakings to appear before the trial court. The Court also made clear that any breach could lead to cancellation of bail.