GST Weekly Case Laws Newsletter | 07 September to 12 September 2026

In Zigma Machinery & Equipment Solutions v. Assistant Commissioner Coimbatore – I Division, (2026) taxcode.in 1446 HC, the Madras High Court considered a challenge to blocking of the petitioner’s electronic credit ledger, which had been ordered after an assessment dispute and before an interim stay in a connected writ petition. The petitioner argued that the later interim order, which kept recovery proceedings in abeyance, displaced the earlier blocking order and that blocking, especially negative blocking, lay outside Section 79 of the GST enactment.

The Court accepted the respondent’s submission that the interim order only paused recovery proceedings and did not unsettle the earlier blocking. It held that the order merely prevented debit of amounts lying in the electronic credit ledger for recovery while the stay operated. Examining Section 79(1), the Court emphasized the breadth of the recovery machinery and noted the multiple modes available to the proper officer, including deduction from money or goods under control, garnishee recovery, distraint and sale of assets, and assistance of the Collector and Magistrate. On that basis, the Court concluded that blocking of the credit ledger, including negative blocking, fell within the wide recovery powers under Section 79(1). It also distinguished Rule 86A as a provisional, pre-determination measure, whereas Section 79 operates after liability is determined.

The writ petition was disposed of without costs. The Court held that the interim order in the earlier matter did not invalidate the blocking order, save for the limited restraint against debiting ledger amounts for recovery while recovery proceedings remained in abeyance. It further rejected the argument that negative blocking was impermissible under Section 79, and upheld the respondent’s action as a post-determination recovery measure.

In Pareek Corporation v. Commissioner of Customs (Chennai II) Imports Custom House and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1447 HC, the Madras High Court dealt with a request for provisional release under Section 110A of the Customs Act in respect of 111 units of secondhand specialised digital print and copying machines. The petitioner said the issue was already covered by an earlier common order concerning similar goods, and sought release on execution of a bond and payment of applicable GST on enhanced value. The respondents relied on an amendment to a customs exemption notification, contending that it affected the petitioner’s claim.

The Court focused on the timing of the import documentation. It recorded that the Bill of Lading was dated 21.05.2026, while the amendment relied upon by the respondents came into force only on 15.06.2026. Applying the settled principle that a statutory notification operates prospectively unless retrospective operation is expressly provided, the Court held that the amendment could not govern an import covered by a Bill of Lading issued before its commencement. As a result, the respondents could not refuse to consider provisional release by relying on that later amendment. The Court also noted that the earlier common order on similar goods had already considered the issue and that no distinguishing feature had been shown to justify departure.

The writ petition was disposed of with directions to consider the petitioner’s request for provisional release under Section 110A within four weeks and, upon compliance with the conditions imposed, to release the goods within two weeks thereafter. The release was expressly made subject to the outcome of adjudication proceedings, which were to be decided independently on their own merits and without influence from the Court’s observations.

In Harish Wadhwani v. Directorate General of Goods and Service Tax Intelligence, (2026) taxcode.in 1466 HC, the Chhattisgarh High Court considered the applicant’s first bail application under Section 483 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 in a prosecution under Section 132(1)(c) of the CGST Act. The prosecution alleged fraudulent availment and utilisation of input tax credit of Rs. 6,92,97,453/- through invoices issued by 12 non-existent or fake firms, and alleged non-cooperation with summons issued during investigation. The applicant denied the allegations, relied on the compoundable and fiscal nature of the Act, and pointed to his custody since 15.6.2026 and absence of criminal antecedents.

The Court heard counsel and perused the case diary before deciding the application. It noted that the complaint had already been filed against the applicant, that he had no criminal antecedents as asserted in the bail application, and that he had remained in jail since 15.6.2026. The Court also considered that conclusion of the trial was likely to take time. While the order records the prosecution allegations, its reasoning for release turned on these practical bail considerations rather than on any conclusive finding on the merits of the tax investigation. The Court did not record a detailed examination of the merits of the Section 132 accusation in the operative reasoning.

The application was allowed. The Court directed release on a personal bond of Rs. 1,00,000/- with one solvent surety to the satisfaction of the concerned Court, and ordered that the bail arrangement remain in force until disposal of the case. The decision thus granted regular bail, subject to the stated conditions.

In Leben Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1465 HC, the Bombay High Court addressed a challenge to the levy, collection and retention of interest on IGST-related repayments made on imports under the Advance Authorisation Scheme. The petitioner sought a declaration that, for the period before 16 August 2024, interest charged on IGST paid on imports under Section 3(7) read with the unamended Section 3(12) of the Customs Tariff Act was without authority of law and contrary to Article 265. It also sought refund of the interest paid after recalling and reassessing bills of entry in the wake of an exemption issue under Rule 96(10).

The Court relied on its earlier rulings in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. and A. R. Sulphonates Pvt. Ltd., which had held that there was no provision in the Customs Tariff Act during the relevant period authorising levy of interest on belated payment of additional duties of customs. It then placed reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Goodluck India Ltd., which held that Rule 96(10) is deemed to have been omitted since inception. On that footing, the Court concluded that the petitioner was under no legal obligation to repay the additional duties of customs in March/April 2022. If the repayment itself was not legally required, the Court reasoned, no question arose of levying interest on that repayment.

The writ petition was allowed. The Court directed the proper authorities to process the petitioner’s refund application and to refund the interest amount expeditiously. No order as to costs was made. The decision thus treated the interest levy as unsupported by law and ordered refund of the amounts described in the petition.

In SPL Steel Processors Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Revenue Directorate of Commercial Taxes and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1463 HC, the Calcutta High Court examined a challenge to the blocking of the petitioner’s Electronic Credit Ledger under Rule 86A of the CGST/WBGST Rules, 2017. The impugned order dated 15.06.2026 blocked Rs. 4,43,53,116/- on the allegation that the supplier was non-existent. The petitioner contended that its purchases were genuine and documented, that the action was arbitrary and without reasons to believe, and that no pre-decisional hearing had been granted despite a request. The State maintained that the matter was premature and that the blocking was justified by revenue protection concerns.

The Court found, after hearing both sides and perusing the record, that there was prima facie no infirmity in the blocking order. It noted that Rule 86A permits blocking where the Commissioner has reasons to believe that credit has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible, and it recorded material suggesting that the suppliers were non-existent at declared premises and their registrations had been cancelled. At the same time, the Court considered that the petitioner should be afforded a further opportunity to establish its case. Referring to the principles of audi alteram partem and the approach noticed in K-9 Enterprises, it directed a post-decisional hearing so that the petitioner could support its claim with documents for the relevant financial years and tax period.

The writ petition was disposed of without setting aside the blocking order. The petitioner was directed to file a detailed representation and supporting documents within two weeks, and respondent No. 2 was directed to grant personal hearing and pass a reasoned and speaking order within three weeks thereafter, with communication of the decision within one week. The entire exercise was ordered to be completed by 15.10.2026, and the authority was directed to decide independently and without being influenced by the Court’s observations.

In Cart Infralog Ltd. and Anr. v. Additional Commissioner HQ Anti-Evasion Unit and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1462 HC, the writ petition challenged a Section 74 CGST notice and a later order in original alleging ineligible and excess input tax credit, with the principal demand said to exceed Rs. 2.37 crores and total exposure about Rs. 6.3 crores.

The Court found a prima facie case for interference. It noted that the petitioners had produced invoices, e-way bills, transport receipts, proof of receipt of goods, bank statements, GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B, and correspondence showing proceedings against a defaulting supplier. On the merits, the Court held that the notice did not dispute possession of tax invoices or receipt of goods or services, so the conditions under Section 16(2)(a) and 16(2)(b) were satisfied. The only live issue was Section 16(2)(c), and mere non-reflection in GSTR-2A could not automatically defeat credit to a bona fide purchaser. Relying on Suncraft Energy, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Court also held that the Department could not recover first from the recipient when proceedings had already been initiated against the supplier, and no collusion was alleged.

The Court further held that Section 74 had been invoked mechanically to overcome the limitation applicable under Section 73(10) for the 2018-19 period, without material particulars showing fraud, willful misstatement, or suppression. It also held that the impugned order was non-speaking and violated natural justice, so the writ was maintainable despite the alternative appeal. The order in original and recovery notice were quashed, the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication after hearing, and the petitioners were directed to deposit Rs. 10 lakhs under protest as a condition for the benefit of remand.

In Gita Rani Pan v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1461 HC, the petitioner challenged a Section 74 CGST order in original raising a tax demand with interest and penalty for the period July 2017 to September 2021, on the ground that the underlying show cause notice had been issued in the name of her deceased husband.

The Court held that issuance of a notice in the name of a dead person is a nullity, non-est and void ab initio. It read Section 93(1)(b) as making the legal representative liable only to the extent of the deceased’s estate, but only after a proper show cause notice is issued to the legal representative and an opportunity of response is given. The Court distinguished the charging aspect of Section 93 from the machinery provisions in Sections 73 and 74, holding that the department had confused liability with procedure. It rejected the attempt to proceed against the legal heirs through a notice addressed to the deceased and relied on the principle that determination cannot be made against a non-existing person.

The show cause notice dated 08.03.2022, the order in original dated 21.01.2025, and the recovery notice were quashed. The Court directed the department to issue a fresh notice in the names of the legal heirs, receive their replies, grant personal hearing, and pass a reasoned and speaking order within the stipulated time. The writ petition was disposed of without going into the merits of the tax demand.

In BA Continuum India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1460 HC, the petitioner challenged an appellate order that had confirmed the original refund rejection after dismissing the appeal for non-attendance and non-compliance.

The Court examined Section 107(11) and Section 107(12) of the CGST Act and held that the Appellate Authority is required to determine the appeal on merits by passing a written order stating the points for determination, the decision thereon, and reasons. Relying on the authorities cited before it, the Court accepted that dismissal in default or for non-prosecution is not contemplated under Section 107. The Court also held that the impugned order was not a reasoned order, and therefore did not satisfy the statutory standard of adjudication. The petitioner’s absence did not justify disposal without merits.

The writ petition was allowed, the appellate order was quashed, and the appeal was remanded to the Appellate Authority for fresh consideration on merits in accordance with law. The petitioner undertook to appear on the date fixed by the Court, and all contentions on merits were kept open.

In Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1459 HC, the petitioner challenged an order in original denying concessional customs duty under Serial No. 512 of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs on imports of Battery Management Systems and Cell Supervisory Circuits for use in lithium-ion battery pack manufacturing.

The Court held that the central controversy was whether the imported goods were PCBAs, because PCBAs were excluded from the exemption entry. It noted that the petitioner had relied on a detailed technical report from VJTI, based on physical inspection and component-level analysis, which concluded that the products could not themselves be understood as PCBAs used in battery pack manufacture. The Court drew support from the authorities on technical adjudication and held that, where classification depends on specialised scientific or engineering questions, the adjudicator cannot simply substitute its own perception for expert material. The impugned order had brushed aside the VJTI report as irrelevant without a reasoned technical rebuttal or counter-expert opinion.

The Court entertained the writ despite the alternate appeal, quashed the order in original, and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication on the show cause notice. It held that, in the facts before it, a counter-expert opinion should have been obtained before the exemption claim was rejected on the footing that the goods were PCBAs.

In Assam Rifles Group Insurance Scheme v. Additional Director General (Adjudication) Directorate General of GST Intelligence and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1457 HC, the petitioner challenged an order in original confirming service tax demand, interest and penalties, together with the underlying notice, after a delay of about 8.5 years from the show cause notice.

The Court focused on Section 73(4B) of the Finance Act, 1994. It held that where the extended period is invoked, the authority is required, as far as possible, to complete adjudication within one year from the notice, and unexplained inordinate delay cannot be treated as acceptable merely because the provision uses qualified language. The Court found that the respondents had not shown any justified cause for keeping the proceedings pending for years, and rejected the explanation that the delay resulted from the petitioner’s requests or incomplete documents. It also noted that repeated adjournments were limited by Section 33A, and that the long lapse undermined the statutory discipline of timely adjudication.

The Court held that the impugned order was arbitrary, violated Section 73(4B)(b), and offended Article 14. On that ground alone, it quashed the order in original and allowed the writ petition, without entering upon the other substantive challenges or the alternate-remedy objection.

In IBM India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1458 HC, the petitioner challenged rejection of its refund claim for the pre-deposit paid at the first appellate stage under the GST regime. The refund was sought only to the extent the First Appellate Authority had dropped 64% of the original demand, and the department had not appealed against that relief.

The Court held that the authority erred in treating the entire appellate proceedings as lacking finality merely because the petitioner intended to challenge the adverse portion of the appellate order before the Tribunal. To the extent demand of Rs.31,45,84,219/- had been set aside, the proceedings had attained finality, and the petitioner had become entitled to proportionate refund of the corresponding 10% pre-deposit. The Court also observed that a pre-deposit is in the nature of a statutory security, not duty, and referred to the principle that it must be returned when the appeal succeeds wholly or partly.

The writ petition was allowed. The impugned refund rejection was quashed, and refund of Rs.3,14,58,422/- was directed to be processed and paid within six weeks. The petitioner did not press its claim for interest.

In Baba Traders v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1456 HC, the petitioner challenged the refusal to correct the effective date of cancellation of its GST registration. It said that while voluntarily applying for cancellation under section 29 read with Rule 20, it had mistakenly entered 01.07.2017 instead of 01.05.2021, even though returns had been filed up to April 2021 and no tax was due.

The Court found that the factual assertions were uncontroverted and that the appellate authority had not recorded any finding of mala fides. It held that the rejection was hyper-technical and arbitrary, and that the absence of a portal mechanism could not justify leaving the petitioner remediless for a bona fide clerical error. The Court also accepted the petitioner’s concern that refusal of correction could create unwarranted complications, including ITC issues for buyers and unnecessary litigation.

The writ petition was allowed. Both the appellate order and the cancellation order were set aside. The petitioner was permitted to file an application for correction of the effective date within one week, and the competent authority was directed to decide it within three weeks.

In Anjani Kumar Singh v. Addnl. Commissioner (CCO) of CGST and Central Excise and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1454 HC, the petitioner assailed an adjudication order imposing service tax, interest, and penalties. He claimed that his transportation and handling contract with the Food Corporation of India fell within Entry 40 of Notification No. 04/2014 and that his written submissions and documents had not been properly considered.

The Court, however, noted that the adjudicating authority had examined the defence and found that the petitioner had not produced the relevant work order or agreement for the period in question. Without that material, the payments shown in Form 26AS and allied records could not be correlated with the exempt services claimed. The Court also emphasized that the burden of proving exemption lies on the assessee and that the petitioner had not filed the relevant tender document either before the authority or before the Court, nor had he filed a rejoinder to the counter affidavit of the Food Corporation of India.

Holding that no interference was warranted in writ jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the petition. Liberty was left open to the petitioner to pursue any statutory remedy available in law, and any limitation issue was to be considered by the appropriate forum keeping in mind the period spent before the High Court.

In Super Enterprises v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1453 HC, the petitioner challenged dismissal of its appeal on limitation and also assailed the ex parte cancellation of its GST registration. It said that illness prevented timely filing of returns for six months, and that the show-cause notice fixed a hearing date before the reply period expired.

The Court read Section 75(4) of the BGST Act and held that a hearing date must be fixed when an adverse decision is contemplated, not as a mere formality. It also noted that the petitioner had subsequently filed the pending GSTR-3B and GSTR-1 returns and paid the tax, late fee, and penalty. Referring to its earlier view in M/s Galaxy Heights, the Court observed that permanent cancellation may amount to civil death for livelihood, and that revocation deserved consideration on merits.

The appellate order was set aside. The petitioner was granted liberty to apply for revocation of cancellation within three weeks, and the competent authority was directed to decide that application on merits within two months, without rejecting it on limitation alone.

In Ind Tech Lifts v. Deputy State Tax Officer – I Porur Assessment Circle, (2026) taxcode.in 1451 HC, the petitioner declared IGST liability in GSTR-1 but, while filing GSTR-3B for October 2019, inadvertently paid the tax under the CGST and SGST heads. The writ petition challenged the consequential tax and interest order.

The Court noted that Section 77 addresses cases where tax is paid under the mistaken belief that a supply is intra-State when it is later held to be inter-State, and that the statute contemplates refund and no interest in such situations. Although the present case was not expressly covered, the Court held that the same principle applied where the taxpayer had already discharged the full liability within time but made a clerical error in the tax head. It rejected the revenue’s position that the petitioner must pay again and later seek refund.

The petition was disposed of with directions permitting the petitioner to seek appropriation of Rs.8,90,892/- paid under CGST and SGST towards IGST liability, and to file a refund application if needed procedurally. The respondents were directed to appropriate the amount within 30 days, and a separate refund request regarding an earlier 25% deposit was also left open for consideration.

In Asian Copiers v. Commissioner of Customs (Chennai Ii) Imports and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1448 HC, the petitioner sought provisional release under Section 110A of the Customs Act of 227 units of secondhand digital multifunction print and copying machines, contending that the issue was already covered by the Court’s earlier common order directing consideration of similar requests.

The Court noted the respondents’ reliance on a 10.03.2026 amendment to the relevant notification, which they said came into force on 15.06.2026 and should be applied by reference to the bill of lading date under Section 15 of the Customs Act. The Court held that the bill of lading here was dated 29.05.2026, before the amendment’s commencement, and reiterated the settled principle that a notification operates prospectively unless retrospective effect is expressly provided. On that basis, the later amendment could not govern the import or be used to refuse consideration of provisional release. The Court also found no distinguishing feature warranting departure from its earlier common order on similar goods.

The writ petition was disposed of with directions to the respondents to consider the petitioner’s request for provisional release under Section 110A within four weeks and, upon compliance with any conditions imposed, to release the goods within two weeks thereafter. The provisional release was made subject to the outcome of adjudication proceedings, which were to be decided independently and uninfluenced by the Court’s observations.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Bengal Emami Housing Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 120 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered a profiteering complaint concerning the housing project “Swan Court” and the DGAP’s revised quantification of benefit allegedly not passed on under Section 171 of the CGST Act.

The Tribunal accepted that GST created an additional input tax credit benefit that had to be passed on to homebuyers, but it held that the LIG and MIG flats stood on a materially different footing because their prices were fixed by a West Bengal Housing Department notification limiting recovery to direct costs and leaving no discretion to load overheads or indirect tax elements into the sale price. It rejected the mechanical application of AMB Cinemas, found that profiteering in the project could not be attributed to LIG and MIG units, and confined any anti-profiteering computation to HIG units alone. It also accepted the DGAP’s clarification that the 14 disputed units had been accounted for, and held that excess benefit paid to some buyers could not be offset against shortfalls due to others.

The Tribunal determined profiteering of ₹70,58,488 inclusive of GST for the HIG category and directed its pass-through with interest at 18% per annum from the relevant collection dates until refund. It further held that penalty under Section 171(3A) was attracted, subject to statutory waiver if the amount was deposited within thirty days of the order.

In Commissioner of CGST Delhi (South) v. Bureau of Energy Efficiency, (2026) taxcode.in 61 SC, the Supreme Court heard a civil appeal arising from an order of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal.

The appellant’s counsel fairly stated that the decision relied upon by the Tribunal in passing the impugned order had not been challenged and had attained finality. The Court recorded that position and treated it as decisive, since there was no surviving basis to disturb the Tribunal’s order when the underlying precedent remained unassailed. The order contains no further substantive reasoning on the merits.

The Court condoned delay in filing, dismissed the civil appeal, and directed that any pending applications stood disposed of.

In National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner Central Goods and Services Tax, (2026) taxcode.in 58 SC, the Supreme Court considered a petition for special leave to appeal against an impugned judgment and order of the High Court.

No submissions from either side are recorded in the order. The Court simply stated that it was not inclined to interfere with the High Court’s judgment and order. The order does not set out any independent analysis of facts or law and reflects a threshold refusal to exercise appellate interference.

Accordingly, the special leave petition was dismissed and any pending application(s) stood disposed of.

In In re: Feel Good Hospitality Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 149 AARGST, the Authority for Advance Ruling examined whether a restaurant business proposing to expand into hotel and accommodation booking could treat the hotel cost as reimbursable pure-agent expenditure and pay GST only on its facilitation fee.

The Authority accepted that the applicant’s proposed activity could fit the broad concept of an “agent” under section 2(5), but held that Rule 33 required strict satisfaction of the pure-agent conditions. It found no contractual agreement authorising the applicant to incur hotel-booking expenditure on the customer’s behalf in the course of supply, noted that the third-party invoice would be issued in the applicant’s name rather than the end customer’s name, and concluded that the applicant would thereby receive and hold the supply for its own interest. On that footing, clauses (a), (b), and (c) of the Explanation to Rule 33 were not met, and the claimed exclusion from value failed.

The Authority ruled that Rule 33 was inapplicable, classified the service under SAC 998552 as reservation services for accommodation, and held that GST was chargeable at 9% CGST plus 9% SGST under serial No. 23(iii) of Notification No. 11/2017 on the entire consideration received from the customer.

In Atanu Mondal for the Commissioner CGST & CX v. S.S. Udyog, (2026) taxcode.in 121 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered the Revenue’s challenge to an appellate order that had reduced the confirmed demand and directed re-credit of excess tax to the taxpayer’s electronic credit ledger.

The Tribunal noted that the taxpayer had never claimed a refund before the adjudicating authority or the first appellate authority, and that Chapter XI, including Section 54, governs refund claims within the prescribed period. It examined Rule 86(4A), Rule 92(1A) and Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST, observing that the statutory scheme recognises refund and consequential re-credit where a refund claim is made in accordance with law. However, it found that the first appellate authority had allowed re-credit without recording any reason and had also reduced the tax liability without explaining how the figure of Rs. 8,72,691 under IGST and Rs. 11,000 as cess was reached. The Tribunal therefore treated both the re-credit direction and the recomputation as inadequately reasoned.

The impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded to the first appellate authority to re-examine entitlement to re-credit in accordance with the law and the relevant CBIC circulars, to work out a fresh computation from the self-assessed and auto-generated returns, to consider the audit reports already on record, and to pass a speaking order after hearing both sides within six months.

In Aarem Insights Pvt. Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of State Tax (Appeals)-VII and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1495 HC, the Court dealt with a challenge to an MVAT appellate order passed after approval of a resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

The Court held that once the NCLT approved the resolution plan on a clean slate basis under Section 31 of the IBC, all claims not forming part of the plan stood extinguished and were binding on all stakeholders, including the tax department. Relying on Ghanashyam Mishra, Essar Steel, Ruchi Soya and its own earlier decisions, the Court concluded that no pending or fresh proceedings for the pre-approval period could survive. It also held that the statutory pre-deposit paid for the MVAT appeal formed part of the overall demand that had been settled and could not be retained over and above the amount allocated under the approved plan.

The writ petition was allowed, the appellate order and all consequential proceedings were set aside, and respondent No. 2 was directed to refund Rs. 31,99,174 along with applicable interest. The Court further held that the tax authority lacked jurisdiction to continue the appeal in the face of the binding resolution plan.

In CG Tollway Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1491 HC, the Court examined whether a BOT toll concession with NHAI attracted GST as a taxable supply of works contract services.

The Court held that the petitioner’s obligations to design, finance, construct, operate and maintain the highway, when read with the concession agreement, were exchanged for valuable consideration in the form of toll collection rights, site licence rights, right of way and related entitlements. On that basis, the arrangement satisfied the statutory definitions of “supply”, “consideration” and “works contract” under the CGST framework. It rejected the argument that no service was rendered to NHAI, and it treated the concession as a barter-like reciprocal arrangement. The Court also rejected the plea of double taxation, noting that the sub-contractor’s EPC contract with the petitioner was distinct from the petitioner’s separate contract with NHAI.

The Court further held that the exemption for access to a road or bridge on payment of toll under Entry 23 of Notification No. 12/2017 did not cover the petitioner’s construction services, and that the clarificatory circular of 17.06.2021 supported the revenue’s position. Finding no illegality in the original and appellate orders, the Court dismissed the writ petition.

In Metal Trade Incorporation v. State Tax Officer and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1488 HC, the Court considered a challenge to the continued blocking of the petitioner’s input tax credit under Rule 86A of the TNGST Rules, 2017.

The Court held that Rule 86A(3) expressly limits the restriction to one year from the date on which it is imposed, after which it ceases to have effect automatically. Since the petitioner’s credit had been blocked on 27.01.2023, continuation of the blockage beyond the one-year period was impermissible. The Court also observed that the impugned departmental communication was only an internal communication and could not by itself sustain continued denial of debit from the credit ledger. It emphasised that if tax recovery is warranted, the proper course is to complete assessment and proceed under Section 79, rather than maintain an indefinite blockade.

The Court directed the fourth respondent to forthwith unblock the petitioner’s input tax credit, while leaving the respondents free to complete any pending assessment proceedings and, if necessary, to initiate recovery in accordance with law.

In Vinod Kumar v. State of H.P. and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1467 HC, the Court considered a petition seeking quashing of an FIR alleging cheating, criminal breach of trust and conspiracy in connection with scrap supply arrangements and GST-related documents.

The Court reviewed the law governing quashing and held that, while criminal proceedings may be quashed where allegations do not disclose an offence or amount to an abuse of process, the power must be exercised sparingly. On the admitted facts, the petitioner had acted as an agent for supply of MS scrap, had arranged supplies through named firms, and had furnished KYC, GST and related documents to support the transactions. The Court accepted the State’s case that investigation had revealed bogus and untraceable firms, fabricated GST invoices, e-way bills and other documents, and wrongful ITC claims causing substantial loss. It held that the indemnity and remedial clauses in the agreements did not bar criminal prosecution, because civil and criminal liabilities may coexist where fraud and deception are alleged.

Finding a prima facie case under Sections 420, 406 and 120-B IPC, corresponding to Sections 318(4), 316(2) read with Section 61(2) of the BNS, the Court declined to quash the FIR and allowed the criminal proceedings to continue. It held that Vandana Jain was distinguishable on its facts.

In G.B. Ashwath v. Deputy Commissioner Coorg District and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1468 HC, the petitioner challenged deduction of Rs.9,72,443.59 as 18% GST from compensation awarded for acquisition of land and buildings for highway widening, and sought refund with interest.

The Court held that immovable property, including buildings attached to land, cannot be treated as goods, and that compulsory acquisition by the State is an exercise of eminent domain, not a supply of goods or services within Article 366(12A). It rejected the respondents’ attempt to justify deduction by reference to works contract or structure valuation, noting that no statutory provision was identified that authorised GST on acquisition compensation. The Court also referred to earlier judicial observations that tax cannot be deducted from compensation-related amounts where the amount forms part of the compensation itself.

The writ petition was allowed. The award notice was quashed insofar as it deducted GST, the deducted amount was directed to be refunded with interest at 15% per annum from the date of the award till payment, the interest burden was to be recovered personally from respondent No.2, and costs of Rs.50,000 were awarded to the petitioner.

In S Nagaraju v. Deputy Commissioner Mandya and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1469 HC, the petitioner sought reimbursement of Rs.9,35,640.61 deducted as GST from compensation awarded for acquisition of land and buildings for highway widening, together with interest.

The Court reiterated that buildings and other fixtures attached to land are immovable property, while GST is a levy on supply of goods or services. On that footing, it held that compulsory acquisition is not a sale, nor any provision of service by the landowner, but an expropriation under statutory power. The respondents’ submission that GST applied to works contract or structure valuation was rejected because they did not identify any provision treating acquisition compensation as a taxable supply. The Court again referred to prior authorities indicating that amounts forming part of compensation are not to be subjected to deductions of this kind.

The Court quashed the award notice insofar as GST had been deducted, ordered refund of the deducted sum with interest at 15% per annum from the date of the award till payment, directed personal recovery of the interest liability from respondent No.2, and awarded costs of Rs.50,000 to the petitioner.

In Wipro Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner Sholinganallur Division, (2026) taxcode.in 1443 HC, the petitioner, a Special Economic Zone unit, challenged rejection of refund claims after exporting services on payment of integrated tax using credit distributed by its Head Office as Input Service Distributor.

The Court held that the petitioner fell within Section 16(3)(b) of the IGST Act because it had made zero-rated supplies by exporting services and had paid tax using available credit. It found that Section 54 of the GST law covered the refund claim, and that the proviso to Rule 89(1) did not defeat the application where the input services were received centrally, credit was distributed under Section 20, and the supplier could not itself seek refund. The Court also held that the declaration under Rule 89(2)(f) was inapplicable because the supplies were not made directly to the SEZ unit. The Court relied on its earlier order and a Gujarat High Court decision supporting refund in similar circumstances.

The impugned refund rejection orders were set aside, and the respondent was directed to process the refund claims within three months from receipt of the order. The writ petitions were disposed of and the connected miscellaneous petitions were closed without costs.

In Blink Fix Pvt. Ltd. v. Global India Services and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1437 HC, the petitioner sought appointment of a sole arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, claiming reimbursement of GST-related sums allegedly collected by the respondent under a Letter of Engagement.

The Court held that, at the Section 11 stage, its enquiry was confined to the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement, which was admitted. It distinguished between sovereign tax disputes, which remain with the GST authorities, and inter se contractual disputes over which party should ultimately bear an indirect tax burden or reimburse sums passed between the parties. On that basis, the Court treated the petitioner’s claim as a pure money claim arising from the contract, not a dispute determining the State’s taxing power. The respondent’s reliance on precedent was distinguished on the facts, and the Court held that manifest non-arbitrability was not made out.

The Court appointed Mr. Justice (Retd.) J.R. Midha as sole arbitrator, reserved jurisdictional and arbitrability objections for decision by the tribunal under Section 16, directed compliance with Section 12 disclosures, and ordered equal sharing of fees and costs. The connected interim petition was directed to be treated as a Section 17 petition before the arbitrator.

In Commissioner of CGST & CE v. K A Traders, (2026) taxcode.in 122 GSTAT, the Revenue challenged a rectification order by the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) that had partly deleted the demand and, for the balance, directed the adjudicating authority to verify documents and delete the demand if found in order.

The Tribunal held that Section 107 of the CGST/KGST Act permits the Appellate Authority only to confirm, modify or annul the appealed order after making any necessary further inquiry, and expressly bars remand to the original authority. It found that the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) had not finally decided the balance demand, but had instead given the adjudicating authority a second chance by referring the matter back for verification. The Tribunal treated this as beyond jurisdiction and contrary to the statutory mandate, and it relied on several High Court decisions taking the same view. The taxpayer’s monetary-limit objection was not examined because the order was found void on jurisdictional grounds.

The rectification order was set aside to the extent of the remaining demand of Rs.4,23,345/-, and the matter was remanded to the appellate authority itself for fresh adjudication after verification at its own level and in observance of natural justice.

In Commissioner of CGST & CE v. Peechattu Glass World, (2026) taxcode.in 123 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered a first appellate order that partly deleted IGST demand but, for the balance, sent the matter back to the original adjudicating authority to verify documents, reassess figures, and decide whether the demand should stand.

The Tribunal held that Section 107(11) of the CGST/KGST Act permits the Appellate Authority to make further inquiry if necessary and then confirm, modify, or annul the decision appealed against, but expressly prohibits referring the case back to the adjudicating authority. It noted that the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) could have called for records, examined the taxpayer’s additional documents, and decided the dispute itself, but instead issued conditional directions to the very authority whose order was under challenge. The appellate order also failed to set out proper points for determination and reasons as required by Section 107(12).

The Tribunal set aside the impugned order to the extent it remanded the matter, held that the remand was void, illegal, and beyond jurisdiction, and rejected the Revenue’s monetary-limit objection in view of that jurisdictional defect. The matter was sent back to the appellate authority to undertake verification at its own level and pass a fresh reasoned order after following natural justice.

In Ferrous Infra Solutions v. Commissioner SGST Uttar Pradesh and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 124 GSTAT, the Tribunal examined detention and penalty proceedings arising from interception of TMT bars transported in a vehicle different from the one mentioned in the e-way bill and accompanying documents.

The Tribunal found that the invoice issued by the appellant was accompanied by an e-way bill showing one vehicle number, while the goods were actually found in another vehicle. It held that no valid e-way bill corresponding to the actual vehicle was produced, and that the vehicle-number mismatch was compounded by a weight discrepancy when the goods were measured against the gross weight and unladen weight of the vehicle actually intercepted. The appellant’s explanation that the original vehicle had broken down and the goods were transferred to another vehicle was rejected because no satisfactory contemporaneous evidence proved the breakdown or the transfer. The Tribunal also noted that Part-B of the e-way bill had not been correctly updated.

The Tribunal concluded that the documentary trail did not correspond with the actual movement of goods at the time of interception and that the discrepancy could not be treated as a mere technical lapse. It upheld the orders below, sustained the penalty under Section 129, and dismissed the appeal.

In Augustan Textile Colours (Unit of Augustan Knitwear Pvt. Ltd.) v. Commissioner of State Tax, (2026) taxcode.in 130 GSTAT, the Tribunal dealt with a refund claim under section 54(3) based on inverted duty structure, where part of the refund was denied on the basis that certain ITC was ineligible.

The Tribunal held that the show cause notice was vague because it merely stated a consolidated figure for wrong ITC without invoice-wise details, the nature of ineligibility, or a clear basis for rejection. It also found the original order non-speaking for the same reason. More importantly, it held that the First Appellate Authority had travelled beyond the notice by sustaining rejection on a new ground, namely that some items were not used in furtherance of business, a case not set out in the notice. On the substantive issue, the Tribunal held that eligibility of ITC cannot be re-adjudicated in refund proceedings unless the credit has first been questioned and determined under sections 73 or 74.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the denial of refund of Rs. 7,07,173/-, holding that the refund proceedings had been vitiated both procedurally and substantively. It also relied on the departmental circular requiring separate proceedings where refund rejection is based on alleged ineligible ITC.

In Commissioner of CGST & CE v. Surya Business Combines, (2026) taxcode.in 129 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered a Revenue appeal challenging the first appellate authority’s partial relief from an interest demand arising from late filing and late payment of tax.

The Tribunal applied CBIC Circular No. 207/1/2024-GST, which fixed a Rs. 20 lakh monetary limit for departmental appeals before GSTAT and specifically provided that, where the dispute relates only to interest, the disputed interest amount alone is to be considered. On that basis, it treated the relevant figure as the disputed interest of Rs. 7,35,714/-, not the original larger demand. It also examined the exclusion clauses in the Circular and found that the case did not fall within any exception permitting the appeal to be filed despite the low amount in dispute.

The Tribunal held that the appeal was below the prescribed monetary threshold and therefore not maintainable. It dismissed the Revenue’s appeals as barred by the National Litigation Policy circular.

In Venshiv Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. N. J. Kumaresh Principal Commissioner of Central Tax and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 132 GSTAT, the Tribunal addressed an admission-stage objection that the appellant had not made the statutory pre-deposit required for the appeal.

The appellant sought to treat Rs. 83,43,942/-, which had been paid during investigation and appropriated in the adjudication order, as the required pre-deposit. The Tribunal examined the chronology and found that the amount represented belated payment of self-assessed tax through GSTR-3B, that the appellant had not disputed the amount in earlier replies or before the first appellate authority, and that its own case had consistently been that the tax was paid voluntarily while contesting only penalty. The Tribunal held that a payment made towards admitted self-assessed liability does not become a statutory pre-deposit merely because it was later appropriated in the order-in-original. It also distinguished the Supreme Court decision relied on by the appellant, noting the absence of any protest in this case.

The Tribunal held that compliance with Sections 107(6) and 112(8) was mandatory before the appeal could be admitted. It refused to treat the earlier payment as a substitute for pre-deposit, granted time to make the required deposits, and directed the Registry to scrutinise proof of payment before listing the matter for admission.