GST Weekly | 02-08 August 2026

In Gaurav Jain and Anr. v. Joint Commissioner (Appeals-II) CGST Delhi Zone and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1247 HC, the Delhi High Court addressed whether the substituted proviso to Section 107(6) CGST (effective 01.10.2025), mandating a 10% pre-deposit for appeals against penalty-only orders, applied where adjudication commenced by show cause notice dated 25.06.2025 but the penalty order was passed on 16.12.2025.

The Court held the right of appeal is a substantive “package” (existence, forum, scope, and conditions) that vests on commencement of the lis, not on the date of the order or filing of appeal. Applying Hoosein Kasam Dada, Garikapati Veeraya, and Videocon, it treated the show cause notice proposing quantified personal penalties as the point when the Department asserted liability for statutory adjudication. Subsequent replies/hearing did not shift commencement. The substituted proviso introduced a new, onerous threshold condition for penalty-only appeals; absent express or necessary intendment in the Finance Act, 2025, it could not impair the vested appellate regime attached to proceedings already initiated.

The writ petition was allowed: the 10% penalty pre-deposit was held inapplicable to the petitioners’ appeals (subject to Section 107(6)(a) for any admitted amount). The Appellate Authority was directed to register/entertain appeals without treating non-payment of 10% as a defect; limitation was protected by excluding time spent in writ proceedings, with four weeks granted to file appeals. The Court did not examine constitutional validity, leaving it open. It also affirmed that the Appellate Authority lacks power to waive a statutorily applicable pre-deposit, though waiver was unnecessary on the Court’s temporal interpretation.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Maata Rani Builders and Developers, (2026) taxcode.in 69 GSTAT, the GST Appellate Tribunal (Principal Bench) considered a Section 171 CGST complaint in a real estate project, following DGAP re-investigation and a supplementary verification narrowing the dispute to a balance amount allegedly not passed on to two homebuyers.

The Tribunal reiterated Section 171’s mandatory obligation: the benefit of additional ITC must reach each recipient “by way of commensurate reduction in prices.” It accepted the DGAP Supplementary Report (22.05.2026) as the final investigative outcome, noting DGAP had considered respondent’s additional evidence and revised findings accordingly. For the remaining differential of Rs. 99,435/-, the respondent’s principal defence was that it had provided free additional construction work whose value allegedly exceeded the differential. Relying on Reckitt Benckiser (Delhi High Court), the Tribunal held the statutory mandate cannot be substituted by additional/free material or other commercial arrangements; the interpretation applies across sectors, including real estate.

The Tribunal held the respondent contravened Section 171 by failing to pass on Rs. 99,435/- (plus applicable GST) to the two eligible homebuyers. It directed payment of the balance amount with interest at 18% per annum under Rule 133(3)(b) from the date of collection of the higher amount till payment. It further held penalty under Section 171(3A) was attracted (subject to the proviso waiving penalty if the amount is deposited within 30 days of the order) and directed compliance reporting within three months.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Oxford Realty LLP (Project – Godrej Infinity), (2026) taxcode.in 70 GSTAT, the GST Appellate Tribunal (Principal Bench) adjudicated a remanded Section 171 matter after DGAP re-investigation applying a revised methodology; the net profiteered amount was determined at Rs. 40,99,917 (inclusive of GST) for 128 homebuyers.

Relying on Reckitt Benckiser, the Tribunal rejected exclusion of units booked after 30.06.2018, holding entitlement turns on an ongoing project spanning pre- and post-GST and availing post-GST ITC, not on booking date. It held non-increase of price or generalized per-square-foot comparisons were not proof of commensurate reduction. It refused deposit into the Consumer Welfare Fund, construing Rule 133(3)(c) as residuary: “recipient not identifiable” is a factual conclusion based on records, not the absence of complaint/claim; buyer-wise details (Annexure-9) showed identifiability. It also rejected set-off of alleged excess benefit passed to 1039 customers, holding Section 171 obligations are owed to each distinct recipient and do not permit cross-recipient adjustment or recovery directions against consumers.

The Tribunal upheld inclusion of 12% GST in profiteering, following Reckitt Benckiser that GST on an inflated base price is part of the extra burden borne by buyers. It directed refund of Rs. 40,99,917 to the 128 homebuyers as per Annexure-9 with interest at 18% under Rule 133(3)(b), computed (for certainty) from the date of payment of the last instalment by each buyer until refund. Penalty under Section 171(3A) was declined as the contravention period ended before 01.01.2020. Compliance reporting within three months was ordered.

In Chotu Devi v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1284 HC, the Rajasthan High Court examined GST demands raised against a sole proprietorship’s deceased proprietor, where an order under Section 74 was passed on 31.12.2025 (one day after death on 30.12.2025) and an Order-in-Original followed on 26.03.2026, without issuing notice or granting hearing to the widow/legal heir.

The Court held Section 93 CGST permits recovery of a deceased taxpayer’s liability from the legal representative out of the estate; the petitioner could not claim immunity from liability “if any.” However, Section 93 operates subject to procedural safeguards in Section 75. Section 75(4) requires affording personal hearing where liability is proposed, and Section 75(6) requires a reasoned and speaking order. The Court treated non-compliance with these requirements as vitiating assessment proceedings sought to be enforced against legal representatives. It recorded as conceded that no independent notice was issued to the petitioner prior to the assessment order, and considered the chronology (death, next-day order, and later order-in-original) as fatal to the process.

The writ petition was allowed and both the Section 74 order dated 31.12.2025 and the Order-in-Original dated 26.03.2026 were quashed. Liberty was granted to the respondents to issue notice to the petitioner and proceed afresh, after providing an opportunity of hearing and passing orders in accordance with law. The Court also observed that the impugned order appeared to offend Section 75(6)’s requirement of reasons. Pending applications, including stay, were disposed of.

In Bilasa Institute of Nursing v. Indian Nursing Council Indian Nursing Council and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1235 HC, the Chhattisgarh High Court considered clubbed writ petitions seeking upgradation from the GNM programme to B.Sc. (Nursing), where institutions alleged they met regulatory criteria but were unable to apply because the Indian Nursing Council’s online portal did not provide the necessary upgradation interface.

The Court reviewed the Indian Nursing Council Act, 1947 and the 2020 Upgradation and Minimum Pre-Requisites Regulations, emphasizing INC’s role as the apex standard-setting and inspection body. On the record, the Court found no material indicating unsuitability of the petitioners for upgradation; it noted prior permissions/recognition and the petitioners’ case that their eligibility stood confirmed but the portal failed to display school code/upgradation option. The decisive question was framed narrowly: whether consideration could be denied solely on a “hyper-technical” ground of portal malfunction. Citing principles that procedure is a handmaid of justice and that applicants should not suffer for authority-created digital failures, the Court held the failure to upload was attributable to operational glitches of the INC portal, not to the petitioners.

The petitions were allowed with directions: institutions must submit applications within 10 days of receiving the certified order; INC must, within the next 10 days, enable submission either by opening the portal exclusively for them or accepting manual/physical applications. Authorities must promptly seek clarifications rather than reject for clerical deficiencies, and decide suitability strictly under the Act/Regulations by a reasoned order within 30 days after the submission window. Denial of consideration due to portal glitches was held unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g), subject to continued compliance with substantive norms.

In Vibrant Products and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1223 HC, the Gujarat High Court considered a challenge to Rule 12(4) of the Health Security Se National Security Cess Rules, 2026, invoked to compute monthly cess for pan masala packing machines where additional machines were installed and became operational on 20.03.2026 but cess was levied for the whole month.

The petitioners argued Section 4 and Section 5 of the Cess Act levy cess only on machines installed for production, contending Rule 12(4) wrongly taxes non-existent machines and that abatement under Section 5(7) read with Rule 15 should apply because machines were not operational for the first 19 days. The Court read Sections 4–5 with Schedule II and Rule 12 as an integrated scheme computing cess by reference to production capacity (maximum rated speed, weight per pouch/container, and per-machine monthly amount). It held Rule 12(4) operates for monthly computation by taking the maximum number of machines installed on any day in that month for calculation under Rule 12(1), and is not to be read in isolation or as a pure “installation-date” levy.

The Court held abatement under Section 5(7) applies only where a machine, after installation, remains “inoperative” for a continuous 15 days or more; it cannot be extended by deeming fiction to treat machines installed later in the month as “inoperative” for pre-installation days. Applying principles on vires challenges to subordinate legislation, the Court found Rule 12(4) consistent with the Act and not violative of Articles 14 or 19(1)(g). The writ petition was dismissed; the Court also noted an efficacious appellate remedy under Rule 29 against the adjudication order rejecting abatement.

In M. M. Motors and Anr. v. Senior Joint Commissioner of Revenue Berhampore Circle WBGST and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1232 HC, the Calcutta High Court considered whether a Section 73(9) order digitally signed on 30.04.2024 (last day of extended limitation) but uploaded in Form GST DRC-07 on 01.05.2024 was time-barred under Section 73(10).

The Court analysed Section 73’s structure: “serve” appears in Section 73(1) for the show cause notice, whereas “issue” is used in Sections 73(2), (9) and (10) for notice and order, indicating deliberate separation between issuance and service. It construed Section 169 as governing modes of service/communication (including portal availability as one of several modes), and Rule 142 as prescribing electronic summaries and recovery consequences, not redefining limitation. Accepting the amicus’s staging (making, issuing, communicating), it held “issue” refers to formally making the order out of the authority’s hands (signing/dating and setting in motion), while service is delivery through Section 169 modes. The Court rejected reliance on the Information Technology Act for service concepts, holding GST refers to it for authentication under Rule 26, not for importing service rules.

Since the order was admittedly digitally signed on 30.04.2024, it was issued within limitation; portal upload on 01.05.2024 concerned communication and did not invalidate issuance. The writ petition was dismissed (no costs), with the Court observing that service date may matter for appellate timelines but does not alter issuance within Section 73(10).

In Umagaurav Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1236 HC, the Patna High Court considered a challenge to a Section 73 show cause notice (DRC-01 dated 25.10.2024) and demand order (DRC-07 dated 18.02.2025) primarily on alleged non-communication via the GST portal, raised after bank attachment and recovery actions for FY 2020-21.

The petitioner argued notices/orders were uploaded only under an “Additional Notices and Orders” tab, that the hearing column was marked “NA” (invoking Section 75(4)), and that mere portal uploading was insufficient service under Section 169, resulting in inability to reply or appeal. The Court examined the notice and recorded the discrepancies alleged from portal data: GSTR-1 liability exceeding GSTR-3B payment and ITC claimed in GSTR-3B far exceeding ITC accrued as per GSTR-2A (the order noting ITC approved as per GSTR-2A as Rs. 1,84,419/- versus ITC claimed as Rs. 26,29,268/-). It found the writ pleadings largely avoided merits: the petitioner did not state actual ITC accrual as per GSTR-2A and did not specifically and categorically deny receipt of email alerts, despite the order recording a reminder sent to the registered email.

The Court declined discretionary writ relief, emphasising alternative appellate remedy under Section 107 (offered to the petitioner to pursue). It also relied on the petitioner’s post-attachment conduct: executing an undertaking acknowledging outstanding dues, furnishing three post-dated cheques, obtaining de-attachment (DRC-14), and allowing one cheque to be encashed, without contemporaneous protest or claim of duress. Treating the later plea as an afterthought and the writ as not bona fide, the Court dismissed the petition with costs of Rs. 25,000 payable to the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee.

In Siemens Gamesa Renewable Power Pvt. Ltd. v. Additional Director Directorate General Gst Intelligence (Dggi) and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1239 HC, the petitioner sought writ interference with three show cause notices issued under Section 74 (and DRC-01 summaries) for multiple States, contending that the notices lacked foundational facts for invoking the extended limitation and were barred by prior audit/earlier proceedings and period overlap.

The Court reiterated that “foundational facts” are required to invoke Sections 73/74, but found the impugned notices were issued after a Section 67 investigation and contained detailed factual allegations, legal provisions, and reliance on voluntary statements of the petitioner’s personnel and customers. The notices articulated two quantified heads: alleged short payment due to incorrect valuation and alleged impermissible liability reduction through credit notes. On credit notes, the Court noted the notice’s reliance on Section 34(2) time limits and the prima facie view that late credit notes cannot be used to reduce liability, subject to adjudication. The Court rejected the argument that a prior Section 65 audit or earlier proceedings ousted jurisdiction, emphasizing the distinct scope of a pan-India DGGI investigation and holding that multiple Section 74 proceedings are not barred when based on different factors/issues.

The writ petitions were dismissed. The Court held that the notices disclosed sufficient foundational/jurisdictional facts to invoke Section 74, that disputed questions of fact were not suitable for Article 226 determination at the notice stage, and directed the petitioner to file replies within 30 days, after which the respondent was to pass final orders; in default, orders could be passed on available records.

In Dhariwal Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1244 HC, manufacturers of pan masala challenged the Health Security se National Security Cess Act, 2025, the 2026 Rules, and related notifications, contending that a machine-based cess was constitutionally invalid, arbitrary, and impermissible alongside GST.

The Court upheld legislative competence: the cess was found to be neither GST (Article 246A) nor a surcharge (Article 271), because the taxable event was ownership/possession of installed machines rather than supply. Parliament’s power was traced to Article 246(1) read with Entry 97 (residuary) of List I. However, on Article 14, the Court held the scheme operated on machine capacity and “deemed” production instead of actual production, with the same cess payable irrespective of whether a machine produced 500, 250, or 100 pouches per minute, and noted illustrations where cess could exceed the total MRP value in the table produced, indicating manifest arbitrariness. The uniform slab approach, despite differing machine capacities, was held to lack rational classification. Rule 15(a) was also held arbitrary because abatement was available only after fifteen continuous days of non-operation, disregarding genuine shorter stoppages (breakdowns, labour/material shortages, maintenance) and causing unavoidable liability.

The petitions were allowed in part: Parliament’s competence to legislate a cess was upheld, but the Act’s design “to that extent,” the Rules, and consequential notifications were held unconstitutional for Article 14 violation and stood obliterated. Liberty was reserved to enact a fresh, constitutionally compliant regime.

In Reddy Veeranna Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Appeal I Commissioner Appeal I Commissioner Appeal I Commissioner and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 75 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered admission of an appeal where the Registry raised defects and flagged non-payment of statutory pre-deposit, in a matter arising from penalties imposed for alleged fake invoicing without supply.

The Tribunal reviewed Section 112(8), which generally ties Tribunal pre-deposit to admitted liabilities and a percentage of “tax in dispute,” and the proviso inserted by the Finance Act, 2025 (effective 01.10.2025) specifically requiring 10% pre-deposit of penalty where the order demands penalty without tax. Examining dates (SCN 29.09.2022; OIO 28.08.2023; OIA 12.01.2024), it found the impugned appellate order pre-dated 01.10.2025. It recorded reliance on authorities addressing vested appellate rights and non-retrospectivity of enhanced preconditions, and accepted that the amendment did not express or imply retrospective operation. The Tribunal treated the issue as one of admission-stage requirement and noted that the appellant claimed to have addressed Registry defects.

For admission purposes, the Tribunal held no pre-deposit under Section 112 was required in this penalty-only appeal where all relevant orders preceded 01.10.2025. Notice was issued and the matter listed, with an express caveat that the finding would not prejudice merits and that, if required at final hearing, the appellant would have to comply with any pre-deposit direction.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Bengal Peerless Housing Development Company Ltd. (Other Projects), (2026) taxcode.in 71 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered DGAP’s reinvestigation (after remand) into alleged profiteering under Section 171 in relation to a real-estate developer’s projects, focusing ultimately on “Digangana Housing Complex.”

Following directions that real-estate profiteering methodology must be fact-specific, the DGAP examined projects under the same GST registration and confined analysis to “Digangana Housing Complex,” where construction spanned pre- and post-GST. It excluded units booked after the Final Occupancy Certificate and treated 48 units as relevant. The DGAP verified pre-GST CENVAT credit, transitional credit, post-GST ITC, purchase values, and statutory reversals under Sections 17(2) and 17(3) read with Rule 42. On comparison, it computed eligible credit-to-purchase-value at 10.44% pre-GST and 10.08% post-GST, i.e., a decrease of 0.36%, concluding no additional ITC benefit accrued due to GST implementation and hence no obligation to pass on any benefit. The complainants did not participate despite notice, and the respondent accepted the report’s conclusions.

The Tribunal found no reason to differ from the DGAP’s Final Investigation Report dated 12.03.2026, accepted it, and held that Section 171(1) was not contravened because no additional ITC benefit arose. The anti-profiteering proceedings were disposed of with no further directions.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. MM Construction, (2026) taxcode.in 72 GSTAT, a flat purchaser alleged that the respondent builder failed to pass on post-GST ITC benefits under Section 171 in a Kolkata project; after reinvestigation, the DGAP computed profiteering at Rs. 7,31,160 plus GST @12% (Rs. 87,739), aggregating Rs. 8,18,899.

The respondent did not dispute accrual of additional ITC or the DGAP’s computation, but claimed it had passed on the benefit via free structural upgrades and fittings, supported by invoices and accounts, allegedly exceeding the profiteering amount. The Tribunal held Section 171(1) imposes a statutory obligation to pass on ITC benefit “by way of commensurate reduction in prices,” and relied on the Delhi High Court’s interpretation rejecting substitution of price reduction with other modes (free supplies, discounts, cross-subsidisation). It rejected the argument that real estate warranted a different approach, treating the interpretive holding as tied to Section 171 itself. The Tribunal also held the GST component must be included in the amount to be returned because buyers paid consideration inclusive of GST and excess recovery necessarily included the tax element.

The Tribunal directed the respondent to pass on Rs. 8,18,899 (profiteered base plus GST) to eligible homebuyers with interest at 18% per annum under Rule 133(3)(b) from the date of collection of the higher amount until payment. Penalty under Section 171(3A) was not imposed on the facts, given the timing and completion-related circumstances described in the order.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Prl Developers, (2026) taxcode.in 73 GSTAT, the Tribunal addressed a profiteering complaint relating to a flat in “Piramal Revanta Tower-1,” following DGAP reinvestigation and a further Tribunal-directed recomputation.

The DGAP’s reinvestigation initially computed an additional ITC benefit and a base profiteered amount but also found the respondent had already passed on substantial benefits to 31 eligible pre-GST homebuyers. At hearing, the Tribunal identified that the pre-GST purchase value used by DGAP reflected only input services and omitted the goods component; it directed recalculation under Rule 133(2A). In the revised report, DGAP included pre-GST inputs of Rs. 3,38,48,116, revised pre-GST purchase value to Rs. 22,28,20,724, and recomputed the pre-GST credit-to-purchase ratio at 11.87% (post-GST 16.10%), yielding additional ITC benefit of 4.23% and profiteering of Rs. 87,98,766 inclusive of GST for pre-GST booked units. Crucially, DGAP verified the respondent had passed on Rs. 99,67,875 to the 31 eligible homebuyers, exceeding the recomputed requirement by Rs. 11,68,109, and did not dispute supporting documentation.

The Tribunal held that where the supplier has passed on the full benefit, and in fact more than determined, Section 171(1) stands complied with and no profiteering allegation survives. It accepted the revised report and held no contravention of Section 171 was made out, disposing of the proceedings.

In Director General of Anti-Profiteering (DGAP) v. Anuhar Homes Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 74 GSTAT, a homebuyer alleged profiteering in a Hyderabad residential project by charging GST at 12% without passing on post-GST ITC benefits through commensurate price reduction, in breach of Section 171(1).

After remand for reinvestigation consistent with methodology guidance, the DGAP investigated 01.07.2017 to 08.08.2018 (up to Occupancy Certificate). It found no eligible pre-GST CENVAT/VAT credit (0% ratio) and post-GST ITC giving a 10.63% credit-to-purchase-value ratio, translating to a per-square-foot benefit and a base profiteered amount of Rs. 84,94,491 plus GST of Rs. 10,19,338, totaling Rs. 95,13,829. The respondent argued proceedings were not maintainable after 01.04.2025 due to Notification No. 19/2024-Central Tax (without a saving clause) and sought abeyance due to pending Supreme Court challenges. The Tribunal held the notification only barred acceptance of fresh requests after 01.04.2025 and did not terminate pending matters; it also held that mere pendency before the Supreme Court, absent a stay, did not preclude adjudication. The respondent’s later non-appearance and failure to furnish documents left DGAP’s computation unrebutted.

The Tribunal affirmed profiteering of Rs. 95,13,829 (inclusive of GST) and directed passing on of the amount to eligible homebuyers with 18% interest from the date of collection of the higher amount until return. No penalty was imposed because the contravention period did not extend beyond 01.01.2020; compliance was directed within three months.

In Karam Chand Thapar & Bros (Coal Sales) Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 22 AAARGST, the appellate advance ruling authority examined an appeal arising from a ruling on GST implications of amounts received under arbitral awards/settlement for disputes in relation to hydro power construction contracts executed and completed before GST, with receipts occurring during the GST era.

The appellate authority first addressed maintainability, construing “advance ruling” in Section 95(a) as a decision relating to a supply “being undertaken or proposed to be undertaken.” It held this jurisdictional requirement confines Chapter XVII to prospective or ongoing transactions and is not enlarged by the list of questions in Section 97(2). On facts, the work had concluded before 01.07.2017; awards were rendered in 2023; settlement amounts were received in October 2024; and the applicant had already filed GSTR-3B treating the receipts as non-taxable, indicating a settled tax position rather than a request for advance certainty. The authority further held that deciding whether each head of award was consideration, price revision, damages, reimbursement, or otherwise demanded detailed fact-finding (contract terms, pleadings, award contents, evidence, accounts, returns), which belongs to the jurisdictional proper officer’s adjudicatory domain rather than the advance ruling forum. It also held it could examine admissibility on appeal notwithstanding admission by the lower authority.

The impugned advance ruling was set aside as unsustainable, with a finding that the Section 97 application ought not to have been entertained. The authority expressly left taxability of the arbitral receipts open for independent examination by the proper officer in accordance with law, without being influenced by the advance ruling.

In M. Tex International v. State Tax Officer, (2026) taxcode.in 1255 HC, the petitioner challenged rejection of its application dated 30.06.2025 under Section 128A of the TNGST Act, 2017, which was declined on the ground that no reply had been filed to the show cause notice in Form SPL-03 dated 18.09.2025. The petitioner asserted it was a 100% Export Oriented Unit, not liable to tax, and that the disputed tax (and part interest) had already been recovered, arising from an assessment order dated 30.04.2024 under Section 73.

The Court treated the petitioner’s submissions as attacking the foundation of the demand confirmed under the Section 73 assessment order. It held Section 128A, read with the relevant notification, is intended for situations where tax is payable but was not paid in time, and does not fit a case where the assessee maintains no tax is payable at all. On that premise, invoking Section 128A was held misconceived, and the appropriate course was an appeal under Section 107 against the assessment order.

The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to file a Section 107 appeal against the assessment order within 30 days from receipt of the High Court’s order. As the disputed tax had already been recovered from the Electronic Credit Ledger, further recovery was directed to remain in abeyance pending the appeal, provided it was filed within time. If filed within the granted period, the Appellate Authority was directed to decide on merits without reference to limitation; failing timely filing, the department could proceed under Section 79 as if the writ had been dismissed in limine.

In Hourglass Design Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (ST) and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1256 HC, the petitioner challenged the order dated 20.12.2025 insofar as it confirmed proposals on (i) excess Input Tax Credit and (ii) short payment of tax on taxable supplies. The petitioner maintained the show cause notice addressed only differences on comparing Table 6 of GSTR-9 with ITC availed, and it had replied on 13.09.2025, but the order confirmed excess ITC on a different footing by comparing GSTR-2A with GSTR-3B.

The Court found, on examining the notice, that the proposed comparison was between GSTR-3B and GSTR-9, whereas the impugned order shifted to an auto-populated GSTR-2A comparison and referred to figures apparently inconsistent with the petitioner’s reply; the petitioner had no opportunity to meet this new basis, requiring reconsideration. On alleged short payment, the Court recorded the petitioner’s case that tax was discharged but remitted under the IGST head inadvertently. It held Section 77 of the CGST Act applies where IGST is paid under a mistaken belief that the supply is interstate; on the petitioner’s stated case, that precondition was not met, and the issue also required reconsideration (in line with SYA Homes).

The order was set aside on these two issues and remanded for fresh decision by the first respondent. The petitioner was directed to apply for appropriation of the IGST-head remittance towards CGST/SGST (and, if procedurally necessary, to file a refund application). A fresh order was directed within three months of receiving such application, after reasonable opportunity. Any bank attachment in relation to the impugned order was directed to stand raised; the writ petition was disposed of without costs.

In Svam Power Plants Pvt. Ltd. v. Proper Officer, (2026) taxcode.in 1261 HC, the petitioner questioned whether uploading a notice and the order-in-original in the GST common portal tab “View Additional Notices and Orders” amounts to proper service under Section 169 read with Section 146 of the CGST Act, 2017. The Court noted the controversy had been addressed in its earlier decision in Luxmi Traders, later clarified in The Amar Cooperative LC Society Ltd.

Applying the extracted principles from Luxmi Traders, the Court reiterated that service cannot be treated as sufficient merely because a show cause notice is uploaded on the common portal unless receipt is acknowledged or a reply is filed. It further relied on the consequences spelt out in Luxmi Traders for ex parte adjudication and limitation where communication is only by portal upload. The revenue’s submission that Luxmi Traders was decided without considering the retrospective amendment introduced by Section 115 of the Finance Act, 2022 (amending the Section 146 notification to cover “all functions” under the Rules) was met by the Court’s reliance on the later clarificatory ruling in Amar Cooperative, which had considered that amendment yet declined to depart from Luxmi Traders.

Holding the issue to be squarely covered and no longer res integra, the Court disposed of the writ petition in the same terms as Luxmi Traders (as clarified in Amar Cooperative) and disposed of pending miscellaneous applications. The judgment thus maintained the earlier approach to portal-only uploading as insufficient for proper service in the specified circumstances, notwithstanding the revenue’s reliance on the 2022 amendment.

In Saraswati Wood Products v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1263 HC, the petitioner raised whether uploading a notice and the order-in-original in the GST portal’s “View Additional Notices and Orders” tab constitutes proper service under Section 169 read with Section 146 of the CGST Act, 2017. The Court recorded that the question was already concluded by Luxmi Traders, as later clarified in The Amar Cooperative LC Society Ltd., and reproduced the operative conclusions from Luxmi Traders.

The Court relied on the extracted Luxmi Traders propositions that mere portal uploading does not amount to sufficient service absent acknowledgment or filing of reply, and that portal-only communication has consequences for restoration of proceedings where ex parte adjudication occurred, as well as for limitation to file appeals where orders were uploaded only on the portal. The revenue argued Luxmi Traders had been decided without considering Section 115 of the Finance Act, 2022 and the Fifth Schedule (retrospective amendment to the Section 146 notification to include “all functions” under the CGST Rules, 2017 on the common portal). The Court referred to the Amar Cooperative clarification which had specifically examined this amendment, including arguments that the Rules did not provide for portal uploading as service and that the common portal’s role in the Rules is confined to specified functions.

Finding the present matter squarely covered, the Court disposed of the writ petition in the same terms as Luxmi Traders and Amar Cooperative and disposed of all pending miscellaneous applications. The ruling thus applied the settled position on insufficiency of portal-only uploading for service, notwithstanding reliance on the Finance Act, 2022 amendment.

In Kajal Sarkar v. Additional Commissioner of Revenue State Goods & Service Tax and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1267 HC, the petitioner challenged an ex parte adjudication order dated 27.01.2025 under Section 73(9) of the WBGST/CGST Act, 2017 and an appellate order dated 27.03.2026 dismissing the appeal as time-barred. The petitioner asserted the show cause notice (18.11.2024) and reminder were uploaded in the “Additional Notices and Orders Tab” and not the normal tab, and that it became aware of the ex parte order only upon a recovery-related letter dated 30.01.2026.

The Court recorded it was undisputed that the show cause notice and adjudication order were uploaded in the “Additional Notices and Orders Tab.” It held that it is judicially settled that such uploading in the additional tab cannot be treated as sufficient communication under Section 73. Separately, based on the reminder letter dated 06.01.2025, the Court found the personal hearing had been fixed on a date prior to the last date for filing reply to the show cause notice, which it treated as a violation of natural justice. Given these defects, the Court accepted that sufficient cause existed for delay in approaching the Appellate Authority and found the Appellate Authority failed to appreciate the undisputed mode of uploading.

The Court set aside both the adjudication order and the appellate order. It granted liberty to file a reply to the show cause notice within 14 working days from receipt of a server copy of the High Court’s order, and directed fresh adjudication by the authority within four weeks from submission of the reply, after hearing and by reasoned order. The petitioner was left at liberty to seek refund of any amount already recovered, to be considered in accordance with law; no costs were awarded.

In Mishra Security Services v. State of U.P. and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1268 HC, the petitioner sought quashing of a show cause notice dated 17.03.2025 and assessment order dated 04.06.2025 and restraint against coercive action. The Court noted the petitioner had filed a reply to the notice and was granted an opportunity of hearing, and that the writ was filed almost a year after the notice and order. The statutory appeal period under Section 107 had expired; an earlier writ filed in January 2026 on the same cause of action had been withdrawn with liberty to file afresh with better particulars.

The Court held no case of denial of natural justice was made out, since reply and hearing were afforded, and the petitioner failed to substantiate jurisdictional error or violation of principles of natural justice. It emphasized the statutory limitation scheme for appeals under Section 107 (three months plus a maximum condonable one month) and relied on Singh Enterprises and Hongo India for the proposition that where a statute prescribes a maximum condonable period, delay cannot be condoned beyond it and Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded. The Court treated the writ as an attempt to bypass limitation and as an appeal in the guise of writ proceedings, including the petitioner’s Section 74-related submissions.

Declining to exercise Article 226 jurisdiction to undermine the statutory appellate and limitation framework, the Court dismissed the writ petition without costs. It clarified that, if the petitioner files an appeal, the writ order and observations would not affect the appellate forum’s decision.

In Royal Petro and Chemicals v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1289 HC, the petitioner sought a direction to entertain and decide an appeal against an Order-in-Original dated 09.12.2025 (FY 2018-19) raising a GST demand of Rs. 61,21,850/- for alleged wrongful availment and utilization of Input Tax Credit. The petitioner stated it could not file an appeal because the online status reflected it as time-barred, and it alleged neither the order nor the DRC-07 summary dated 16.12.2025 was communicated by e-mail, SMS, or physical service, but only uploaded on the GST portal.

The Court acknowledged that the Appellate Authority is bound by the limitation provisions of Section 107 of the RGST/CGST Act, 2017. However, it considered the petitioner’s explanation for not filing within time—premised on non-communication and later knowledge during recovery proceedings—to be reasons beyond the petitioner’s control. It further held that denial of consideration of the appeal on merits in such circumstances would cause grave injury and prejudice. The Court also noted earlier Division Bench decisions cited by the petitioner in which similar writ relief directing merits consideration was granted when sufficient cause was shown.

The writ petition was allowed to the extent of condoning the delay. The Appellate Authority was directed to entertain and adjudicate the appeal on merits, subject to the petitioner filing the appeal within 30 days of the High Court’s order being uploaded on the Court’s website. Pending applications were disposed of.

In Tata Unistore Ltd. v. Commissioner CGST & Ex. and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 76 GSTAT, the Tribunal considered denial of transitional ITC for July 2017–March 2018 by proceedings initiated under Section 74(1) of the CGST Act, following a show cause notice dated 18.01.2022. The appellant had transitioned closing balances of CENVAT credit from service tax returns and VAT ITC on stock through TRAN-1 under Section 140; the demand with interest and 100% penalty was confirmed by lower authorities on the premise the appellant failed to substantiate eligibility through invoice-level evidence, including a component relating to Krishi Kalyan Cess (KKC).

The Tribunal held the proceedings were beyond jurisdiction insofar as they sought, under the CGST Act, to deny migrated credit by adjudicating whether credit was admissible under erstwhile laws when no such proceedings had been initiated or were pending under those laws at the relevant time. Relying on Sections 142(6)(a) and 174(2)(e) and precedents including Usha Martin, Steel Authority of India, and Kunjal Synergies, it held recovery for wrong availment under the earlier regime must be pursued under that regime, and GST officers could not re-open erstwhile eligibility through Section 74/Section 140. It further reasoned that the closing balance transitioned is a derivative figure not attributable invoice-wise, rendering invoice-by-invoice justification of the closing balance impermissible in the circumstances recorded.

The Tribunal also held transitioned KKC demand was unsustainable in view of Godrej & Boyce and the Board circular noted, upheld transition of VAT stock credit under Section 140(6) for lack of specific contrary findings, and found the 100% penalty under Section 74 wholly unjustified given disclosures in TRAN-1 and submissions. The impugned order was set aside and the appeal allowed with consequential reliefs.

In Commissioner CGST & CX v. Power Tech Global Pvt. Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 77 GSTAT, the Tribunal decided three connected departmental appeals challenging an appellate order that had set aside reversal of proportionate ITC (with interest and equal penalty) computed by treating sale of MEIS duty credit scrips as exempt supplies for FY 2017–18 to 2019–20, and by applying a 2022 rule amendment as retrospective.

On maintainability, the Tribunal rejected the taxpayer’s reliance on CBIC Circular No. 207/1/2024-GST monetary limits, holding the circular (though binding on officers) did not bind the Tribunal and, in any event, the revenue’s reliance on the composite-order clause and the recurring/interpretative-issue exclusion supported entertainability. On merits, it focused on the commencement clause of Notification No. 14/2022 inserting Explanation 1(d) to Rule 43 and held the rule-maker, despite power under Section 164(3), chose a prospective start date (05.07.2022), so the exclusion of duty scrip value from “aggregate exempt supplies” could not be extended to 2017–2020 transactions.

The Tribunal held the appellate authority erred in granting retrospective benefit, but also held invocation of Section 74(1) failed because the record did not show fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression to evade tax; returns and invoices had been filed and no material evidence was pleaded. Applying Section 75(2), it directed the proper officer to determine liability as if under Section 73, after hearing, and disposed of the appeals with that direction.

In SKG Metal Trading v. Commissioner Central Goods and Services Tax, (2026) taxcode.in 1249 HC, the petitioner sought writ relief against an ex parte Order-in-Original under Section 74 confirming a penalty equal to the ITC allegedly wrongly passed on, asserting non-service of the show cause notice and hearing notices after business closure and an application for cancellation of registration.

The Court emphasised the rule that writ jurisdiction is ordinarily not exercised where an efficacious statutory appeal lies under Section 107, subject to limited exceptions (e.g., lack of jurisdiction or clear, undisputed breach of natural justice). It found the petitioner’s principal grievance—non-service—was contested by the revenue, which asserted service via Speed Post to the registered address and uploading on the GST portal under Section 169, and also disputed the petitioner’s premise by noting the cancellation application had been rejected and registration remained subsisting. The Court noted the address used for service was the same as in the petitioner’s cancellation application, reinforcing that the controversy required appreciation of evidence.

Holding that the alleged natural-justice violation was not apparent but turned on disputed facts regarding service and the effect of cancellation proceedings, the Court declined to entertain the writ and left the petitioner to pursue the Section 107 appeal. It directed that the period during which the writ remained pending would not be reckoned for limitation and that the appellate authority would decide uninfluenced by the judgment’s observations.

In Amar Coop LC Society Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1266 HC, the petitioner challenged a show cause notice, an ex parte order-in-original, and a rectification order, after its appeal was dismissed as time-barred; the dispute centred on whether uploading on the GST Common Portal alone constituted valid service.

The petitioner relied on the Court’s earlier decision in Luxmi Traders to argue that portal-uploading did not amount to valid service, especially where the assessee had not meaningfully received the notice/order and suffered serious civil consequences. The revenue contended Luxmi Traders overlooked the Finance Act, 2022 (Section 115 and Fifth Schedule) which retrospectively amended the notification under Section 146 to allow functions under the CGST Rules to be performed on the Common Portal. The Court nonetheless declined to depart from Luxmi Traders merely due to that amendment, accepting the petitioner’s core submission that the 2017 Rules did not contemplate service of SCN/order merely by portal upload; it noted the argument that Rule 142 dealt with electronic communication and that absent express specification for service, “uploading” could not substitute formal service.

The writ was disposed of in terms of Luxmi Traders, with directions that if 10% statutory pre-deposit had been made the appeal should be heard on merits. The Court further ordered that any recovery would abide final adjudication and that any bank-account attachment pursuant to the challenged order stood revoked, alongside disposal of pending applications.

In Shivam Wood Products v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1265 HC, the writ petition questioned whether uploading a notice and order-in-original in the “View Additional Notices and Orders” tab on the GST common portal amounted to proper service under Section 169 read with Section 146 of the CGST Act.

The Court treated the controversy as concluded by Luxmi Traders and its clarification in Amar Cooperative LC Society. It reproduced the governing principles: portal uploading alone is not sufficient service unless receipt is acknowledged or a reply is filed; where only portal upload occurred and no reply was filed leading to ex parte adjudication, proceedings are to be restored to the SCN stage with liberty to reply within four weeks and a hearing thereafter; where an order is served only by portal upload after contest, limitation for appeal is not triggered, and the assessee may file appeal within four weeks; and where appeals were dismissed as time-barred in such circumstances, appellate orders are to be set aside and appeals restored for merits hearing. The revenue’s reliance on Section 115 of the Finance Act, 2022 and the Fifth Schedule was noted, but the Court followed the earlier clarification that these provisions did not, by themselves, warrant a different view on service under the Rules.

Applying the above precedents, the Court disposed of the writ petition in the same terms as Luxmi Traders and Amar Cooperative LC Society, and disposed of pending miscellaneous applications.

In S. Muthukumar v. State Tax Officer, (2026) taxcode.in 1259 HC, the petitioner challenged a rectification order rejecting his Section 161 application against an assessment order for 2021–22, contending the assessment was passed without an opportunity of hearing.

The Court examined the assessment record, which stated issuance of two intimations in Form GST DRC-01A (09.05.2025 and 20.05.2025) and a show cause notice in Form GST DRC-01 (01.04.2025), followed by reminders without response. The petitioner’s only explanation was non-service and consequent unawareness. The Court rejected that explanation, observing the petitioner could not plausibly claim to have missed the DRC-01 process given the GST regime’s operation since 01.07.2017, and concluded the writ petition lacked merit and was otherwise liable to dismissal.

Nonetheless, to enable adjudication on merits, the Court remitted the matter back to the respondent on conditions recorded by consent: the petitioner must deposit 25% of the disputed tax in cash within 30 days and file a reply to the DRC-01, treating the earlier assessment as an addendum. The respondent was directed to pass a fresh final order after hearing. Non-compliance would result in the writ being construed as dismissed, leaving the department free to proceed under Section 79.

In Anukul Bindal v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1286 HC, the petitioner invoked writ jurisdiction over a dispute on whether an appeal under Section 107 could be insisted upon only after depositing 10% of the disputed penalty, when the show cause notice preceded the stated enforcement date but the adjudication order coincided with it.

The petitioner asserted the right of appeal vested from issuance of the show cause notice (31.03.2023) and could not be burdened by a later pre-deposit requirement said to be enforced from 01.10.2025, and also argued the earlier proviso to Section 107(6) related only to penalties under Section 129. Reliance was placed on Hoosein Kasam Dada. The revenue relied on the Supreme Court decision in Chandra Sekhar Jha and a coordinate Bench decision in M/s Ganesh Yadav. The Court observed that the controversy required consideration; it noted, on the submissions then advanced, that the petitioner “may be” covered by Hoosein Kasam Dada, while Chandra Sekhar Jha could be relevant to the appellate authority’s stay considerations, and therefore entertained the writ.

Pending affidavits (four weeks for counter, two weeks for rejoinder), the Court issued an interim direction: if the petitioner filed the statutory appeal within two weeks, it would be entertained without requiring the 10% pre-deposit, noting its jurisdiction to grant waiver in appropriate cases. No final decision on merits was rendered at this stage.

In Royal Petro and Chemicals v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1287 HC, the petitioner sought a direction to entertain and decide an appeal against an Order-in-Original dated 17.12.2025 (FY 2018–19) raising a GST demand of Rs. 3,77,469 related to ITC, contending it could not file the appeal as the GST portal reflected it as time-barred.

The petitioner pleaded the order was never effectively communicated and was merely uploaded on the portal; having filed a detailed reply and allegedly not receiving personal hearing, it believed no final order had been passed and later discovered the order belatedly, by which time the portal showed the appeal as barred. It invoked Section 75(4) (mandatory personal hearing) and relied on earlier Division Bench decisions of the Court that had directed appeals to be heard on merits upon writ intervention. The respondents opposed, maintaining limitation barred the appeal. The Court noted the Appellate Authority is bound by the limitation scheme in Section 107, but assessed the reasons for delay as beyond the petitioner’s control and considered that denial of merits adjudication would cause grave prejudice.

Following its consistent earlier Division Bench approach, the Court condoned the delay and directed the Appellate Authority to entertain and decide the appeal on merits, provided it is filed within 30 days of the order being uploaded on the Court’s website. Pending applications were disposed of.

In Royal Petro and Chemicals v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1288 HC, the petitioner sought directions to entertain an appeal against an Order-in-Original dated 26.12.2025 (FY 2021–22) raising a demand of Rs. 75,38,940 for excess ITC, reverse charge issues, and scrutiny differences, asserting the GST portal showed the appeal as time-barred.

The petitioner attributed delay to the order being only uploaded on the portal and not effectively communicated, and to absence of personal hearing despite a detailed reply, leading it to believe no final order had been passed until later knowledge, when the portal limitation status prevented filing. The petitioner relied on multiple earlier Division Bench decisions of the Court granting similar relief. The respondents opposed on the basis that the order was correctly passed and limitation applied. The Court reiterated that the Appellate Authority is statutorily constrained by Section 107 limitation, but held that the reasons preventing timely filing were beyond the petitioner’s control and that refusal to adjudicate on merits would cause grave injury and prejudice.

Applying the Court’s consistent earlier view, the writ was allowed to the extent of condoning delay, and the Appellate Authority was directed to entertain and decide the appeal on merits, subject to filing within 30 days from uploading of the Court’s order. Pending applications were disposed of.

In Veerapandi v. Union of India and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1257 HC, the petitioner challenged proceedings dated 21.02.2025 by which his savings bank account was frozen under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017, and sought defreezing and permission to operate the account.

The Court proceeded on an undisputed factual basis that the freezing arose solely from the Section 83 attachment order. It considered the statutory limitation in Section 83(2), which restricts the lifespan of a provisional attachment to the period prescribed in the Act, and treated that limitation as controlling. On that footing, it held that provisional attachment of a bank account cannot be continued beyond the statutory period and must cease to have effect once the permissible duration expires.

The Court set aside the impugned attachment proceedings and declared that the petitioner was at liberty to operate the bank account. It directed the concerned bank manager to permit operation forthwith and specifically ordered that the bank should not insist on any further communication from the Directorate General of GST Intelligence. The writ petition was allowed, with no order as to costs and connected miscellaneous petitions closed.

In Mukesh Steels v. Commissioner of Central GST and Central Excise and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1254 HC, the petitioner challenged blocking of its input tax credit from 13.03.2026, stated to be on the premise that its suppliers were non-existent, despite the petitioner asserting bank-backed transactions and supporting e-way bills and transport documents.

The Court noted the petitioner’s assertion that it had already moved an application under Rule 86A of the GST Rules, 2017, and treated Rule 86A(2) as providing the relevant pathway for relief where the officer is satisfied that the conditions for disallowing debit of the electronic credit ledger no longer exist. It accepted the respondents’ position that the petitioner’s application was not available on record, coupled with the undertaking that a served copy would be considered and disposed of in accordance with law.

Disposing of the writ petition, the Court directed the petitioner to serve a copy of its application within two weeks. The respondents were directed to consider it on merits and pass orders expeditiously, preferably within two weeks thereafter. The respondents were also directed to return the petitioner’s records unless required, in which case photocopies were to be given. No costs were awarded and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.

In Jaseena Sadik v. State Tax Officer and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1283 HC, a registered taxpayer challenged an order under Section 73 of the CGST Act declining input tax credit for December 2017 and March 2018, and the consequential recovery notice, on the stated ground that returns were not filed within Section 16(4).

The petitioner’s case was that Section 16(5) contemplated entitlement to credit where returns were furnished before the cut-off date of 30.11.2021. The Court focused on what was apparent from the assessment order itself: returns for December 2017 and March 2018 were filed on 07.07.2019 and 22.11.2019. It treated these filing dates as falling within the cut-off date identified with Section 16(5), and therefore found that denial of credit solely by invoking Section 16(4), despite returns being filed within that later cut-off, required interference to that extent.

The Court quashed the assessment order and recovery notice to the limited extent they denied input tax credit for December 2017 and March 2018 on the Section 16(4) ground. The Assessing Officer was directed to reconsider and grant the benefit of input tax credit in the light of Section 16(5), if the petitioner was otherwise entitled. The writ petition was disposed of on these terms.

In Premier M Plex v. Assistant Commissioner Anti-Evasion and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1282 HC, the petitioner challenged an order under Section 73 of the CGST Act denying input tax credit for multiple periods on the ground that returns were not filed within the time stipulated by Section 16(4), while expressly not contesting other findings in the order.

The Court confined its adjudication to the Section 16(4)-based ITC denial and considered the petitioner’s reliance on Section 16(5), under which entitlement was argued to follow where returns were furnished within the cut-off date of 30.11.2021. From the order and returns produced, the Court noted the filing dates: 18.12.2019, 23.12.2019 and 02.01.2020 (for December 2018 to March 2019), and 29.11.2021 (for November 2019 to March 2020 and April 2020 to March 2021). It held these were within the cut-off date referenced to Section 16(5), entitling the petitioner to reconsideration on that basis.

The Court quashed the assessment order only to the extent it denied ITC by invoking Section 16(4) and directed the assessing officer to reconsider and grant ITC in light of Section 16(5), if otherwise eligible. It also directed that the petitioner’s bank account freeze, imposed in recovery, be lifted consequent to the limited quashing, subject to the condition stated regarding remittance excluding the Section 16(4)-related tax and penalty component.

In Vikash Gupta v. Union of India, (2026) taxcode.in 1279 HC, the applicant’s second bail application arose from his arrest in Crime No. 156/2026 for alleged illegal manufacture/packing of tobacco products and evasion of central excise duty and cess, with custody since 21.03.2026.

The Court considered authorities emphasizing both the seriousness of economic offences and the continued applicability of liberty-focused bail principles for offences punishable up to seven years. It accepted that economic offences affect public revenue, yet held there is no absolute rule mandating refusal of bail in every such case regardless of facts. It then applied the Arnesh Kumar and Satender Kumar Antil approach, requiring examination of whether continued incarceration is genuinely necessary, particularly where investigation and trial can proceed without custodial detention.

On the case-specific factors—offences noted as punishable up to five years, triable by JMFC, complaint filed and charges framed, co-accused already on bail, and witnesses being official witnesses (reducing the risk of influencing them)—the Court allowed the application without commenting on merits. Bail was granted on a personal bond of Rs.1,00,000 with one solvent surety, subject to conditions including cooperation, non-tampering, not leaving India without permission, and automatic cancellation upon repetition of a similar offence.

In Mohan Reddy Thippireddy v. Assistant Commissioner (ST) and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1278 HC, the petitioner filed a batch of writ petitions challenging show cause notices and consequent orders-in-original (with DRC-07 summaries) for multiple tax periods spanning July 2017 to March 2022, alleging that orders were unsigned and that no effective personal hearing was granted.

During hearing, after some arguments, the petitioner sought liberty to pursue the statutory appellate remedy and requested that delay, if any, in approaching the appellate authority be dealt with sympathetically. The State Tax side indicated the petitioner could file appeals and raise all available grounds. Given this shift to the appellate route, the Court chose not to comment on the merits of the petitioner’s contentions regarding signature defects or denial of hearing, and restricted itself to facilitating the statutory process.

The Court disposed of the writ petitions by granting liberty to file appeals within two weeks, accompanied by statutory pre-deposit and applications for condonation of delay. All grounds on law and facts were left open. The appellate authority was directed to consider the question of delay in light of the circumstances referred to before the Court, and, if satisfied, to decide the appeals on merits in accordance with law. No costs were awarded and pending miscellaneous applications were closed.

In Harsha Developers v. Joint Commissioner of Central fax Hyderabad CST Comrnissionerare and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1275 HC, the petitioner challenged an order-in-appeal dated 30.09.2025 insofar as it upheld reversal of input tax credit, interest, and penalty by applying amended Rule 42(3) of the CGST Rules, 2017 to ITC availed prior to 01.04.2019.

The petitioner asserted that applying the amended rule to earlier ITC was illegal, ultra vires the parent Act, and removed benefits under the unamended rule, while also indicating additional grounds on merits. The respondents pointed out that the order-in-appeal was further appealable before the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal. In response to the availability of this alternative statutory remedy, the petitioner sought withdrawal of the writ petition with liberty to file an appeal before the GSTAT.

The Court accepted the request and disposed of the writ petition as withdrawn, granting liberty to file an appeal before the GSTAT along with statutory pre-deposit and to raise all available grounds of fact and law. The Court expressly recorded that it expressed no opinion on merits. No order as to costs was made, and pending miscellaneous applications, if any, were closed.

In S K Swamy and Company, (2026) taxcode.in 125 AARGST, the Karnataka AAR considered the GST rate on loading ballast stacked adjacent to railway tracks into railway wagons using a JCB loader, in the context of the applicant’s railway works involving supply of ballast and related activities.

The Authority first rejected classification as works contract because the described scope—supply of ballast and loading into wagons—did not satisfy the essential requirement of activities relating to immovable property under Section 2(119). It then examined composite supply under Section 2(30) and found the contract and execution treated supply and loading as distinct: separate items with separate rates, separate instructions and schedules for loading, transfer of ownership to Railways upon delivery of ballast, and separate invoicing at different times. As the supplies were not “naturally bundled” and not supplied in conjunction in the ordinary course, the principal-supply analysis under Section 2(90) was held inapplicable.

The Authority held the loading activity to be an independent service classifiable under Heading 9967 as supporting services in transport, specifically SAC 996719 (other cargo and baggage handling services), since it involved only handling/loading into wagons with no transportation, shunting, towing, marshalling, or wagon movement. It ruled the service taxable at 18% under Entry 11 of Notification 11/2017-CT (Rate), as amended.

In Commissioner CGST & C. Ex. Raigad Commissionerate v. Kairav Chemofarbe Industries Ltd., (2026) taxcode.in 78 GSTAT, the revenue’s appeal against an order allowing/considering cash refund of accumulated/unutilised CENVAT credit raised a threshold question: whether the GST Appellate Tribunal (GSTAT) had jurisdiction, given that both the Order-in-Original and the first appellate order were passed under the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, though the refund was claimed “in terms of” Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017.

The Tribunal construed Section 142(3) as expressly directing that refund claims of CENVAT credit and other amounts paid under the “existing law” shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the existing law, with the eventual amount to be paid in cash (subject to the carve-out for Section 11B(2)). On this reading, the authorities below correctly applied Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, and the CGST transitional provision did not convert the proceedings into a GST proceeding for forum purposes. The Tribunal also relied on the CESTAT Larger Bench ruling in Bosch Automotive Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. holding that such appeals are maintainable before CESTAT.

The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable before GSTAT, with liberty to the revenue to approach the proper forum, i.e., CESTAT, for adjudication in accordance with law.

In Dinesh Kumar v. Superintendent Tuticorin North Range, (2026) taxcode.in 1252 HC, the petitioner sought to quash an order dated 30.12.2024 and to direct revocation of cancellation of GST registration. At hearing, both sides agreed the matter was covered by the Court’s earlier decision in Tvl. Suguna Cutpiece Center, and the Court extracted the operative directions (paragraph 229) from that precedent.

The extracted directions imposed structured conditions for revival: filing returns for the pre-cancellation period (if not already filed) within 45 days, with payment of defaulted tax, interest, fine and late fee; mandatory cash payment (no payment/adjustment from unutilised or unclaimed input tax credit); and restrictions that any previously utilised ITC could not be further utilised until scrutinised and approved by a competent officer. The directions also required payment of GST and filing of returns for the post-cancellation period, with cash payment and subsequent-period ITC usage also subject to scrutiny/approval, alongside departmental powers to impose limitations to prevent undue ITC passing or bill trading. Administrative directions to GSTN to enable portal functionality for such compliance were also part of the operative framework.

Applying the precedent, the Court set aside the impugned order dated 30.12.2024 and allowed the writ petition on the same terms as paragraph 229 of Tvl. Suguna Cutpiece Center, with no costs and closure of the connected miscellaneous petition.

In Annai Enterprises v. Deputy State Tax Officer- II/Deputy Commercial Tax Officer Tuticorin Assessment Circle, (2026) taxcode.in 1253 HC, the petitioner challenged an order dated 13.08.2025 rejecting its Form GST SPL-02 application dated 15.03.2025 seeking benefit under the Amnesty Scheme in Section 128A of the CGST Act, 2017; the order also recorded non-appearance and alleged failure to prosecute despite opportunities.

The Court noted that the Principal Seat was seized of a batch of cases addressing whether Section 128A relief should extend in similar circumstances, and a decision was awaited. On facts, there was no dispute that the petitioner disclosed tax liability in GSTR-1 but did not discharge the corresponding liability while filing GSTR-3B, and the assessment order (09.06.2023) appeared to be under Section 73. The Court observed, prima facie, that there appeared to be no statutory embargo to entertain a Section 128A application, subject to satisfaction of prescribed conditions. It also recorded indications that the GST Council recommended insertion of Section 128A after noting practical difficulties following the GST rollout, an aspect likely relevant to the pending batch.

Without expressing any view on merits, the Court disposed of the writ by remitting the matter to the respondent for fresh consideration after the Principal Seat’s decision, directing reconsideration and fresh orders consistent with the law declared therein, with no order as to costs and closure of the connected miscellaneous petition.

In Tans India Brushes v. Superintendent of CGST and Central Excise, (2026) taxcode.in 1269 HC, the petitioner sought to quash an Order-in-Original dated 22.07.2024 for AY 2019–2020, asserting it was based solely on belated availment of input tax credit under Section 16(4) and that, due to retrospective insertion of Section 16(5) (Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024) read with the relevant notification, the returns were filed within the extended period and the demand’s foundation no longer survived.

The respondent opposed writ maintainability, pointing to an effective statutory remedy by appeal under Section 107(1) of the CGST Act. The Court accepted that an efficacious alternative remedy existed and expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on merits, including the petitioner’s reliance on the retrospective amendment. It treated the issue as one suitable for examination within the appellate framework, where both facts and law, including statutory changes, could be addressed.

The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to file a statutory appeal within four weeks of receipt of the order; if filed within that time, the appellate authority was directed to entertain it without insisting on limitation, consider all contentions (including the effect of Section 16(5)), and decide on merits after affording personal hearing. No costs; connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.

In K.V. Nagaraj v. Deputy Commissioner Mysore District and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1270 HC, the petitioner sought reimbursement of GST amounts (Rs.28,22,100/- and Rs.12,50,238.81) deducted at 18% from compensation awarded for compulsory acquisition of his lands for highway widening, along with interest. The respondents asserted GST was leviable on works contract/structure valuation and applied uniformly to landlosers, while acknowledging that land compensation may not attract GST but the structural component assessed under the award was liable.

The Court treated it as undisputed that the property (land and building/s) was acquired and that GST was deducted from the compensation. Referring to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, it held buildings attached to land are immovable property. Emphasising that GST is a tax on “supply” under Article 366(12A), the Court reasoned immovable property cannot be construed as “goods” and that compulsory acquisition is an expropriation by statutory power, not a transaction of sale or provision of service by the landowner. Even on a wide reading of “supply,” acquisition under eminent domain was held not to fit. The Court also noted the respondents failed to identify a statutory provision under which such acquisition becomes supply, and referred to a Madras High Court order recording NHAI’s admission that no GST levy applied to compensation.

The Court quashed the award notices dated 18.10.2024 insofar as they deducted GST, directed refund of the deducted amounts with 15% p.a. interest from the date of award, ordered personal recovery of the interest component from respondent No.2, and awarded costs of Rs.50,000/-.

In Ayaz Traders v. Commissioner State Goods and Service Tax and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1272 HC, the petitioner challenged an adjudication order dated 17.11.2023 under Section 73(9) of the UKGST Act and an appellate order dated 12.12.2024 dismissing the appeal as time-barred. The firm’s registration had been cancelled on 12.08.2021 (effective 31.07.2021); thereafter, a show cause notice dated 27.07.2023 and the adjudication order were served only by uploading on the GST portal.

The petitioner argued that post-cancellation there was no occasion to keep checking the portal, and relied on the Court’s earlier order in Raj Shekhar Pandey (itself relying on Allahabad High Court decisions) recognising that Section 169 provides multiple modes of service; uploading on the portal is permissible but not exclusive, and the department must ensure effective communication, particularly when registration is cancelled. The Revenue did not dispute the factual position that service was only by portal upload. The Court treated the prior law as squarely applicable and noted the extracted discussion also referred to the hearing requirement in Section 75(4) where requested or where adverse decision is contemplated.

The Court quashed both the adjudication order and the appellate limitation order, reserved liberty to the Revenue to proceed afresh from the stage of show cause notice, and directed that if the petitioner seeks personal hearing it shall be provided in terms of Section 75(4). Pending applications, if any, were disposed of.

In Manjula and Anr. v. Deputy Commissioner Mysore District and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1271 HC, the petitioners sought reimbursement of Rs.1,84,655.59 deducted as 18% GST from compensation paid pursuant to compulsory acquisition of land (and building/s) for highway widening, together with interest. The respondents maintained GST was leviable on works contract/structure valuation and uniformly applied, while also indicating that land compensation may not attract GST but the structural component assessed under the award was liable.

The Court recorded as undisputed the acquisition and the deduction of GST from compensation. Referring to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, it held buildings on land are immovable property. It then emphasised GST’s constitutional character as a tax on “supply” under Article 366(12A), holding immovable property is not “goods” and that compulsory acquisition is expropriation through statutory power, not a supply of goods or services by the landowner. Even on a broad meaning of “supply,” eminent domain acquisition was held outside its scope. The Court found the respondents failed to identify any GST provision authorising deduction on acquisition compensation, and also noted a Madras High Court order recording NHAI’s admission that no GST levy applied to compensation amounts.

The award notice dated 10.09.2024 was quashed to the extent it deducted GST; refund with 15% p.a. interest from the date of award was directed, with the interest component to be recovered personally from respondent No.2, and costs of Rs.50,000/- awarded to the petitioners.

In Molecraft Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (ST) Agapura Circle and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1274 HC, the petitioner challenged a Form GST DRC-01 show cause notice (31.05.2024) for FY 2019–20, the adjudication order and DRC-07 summary (28.08.2024) under Section 73 of the CGST/TGST Act, and an order-in-appeal (30.04.2025) dismissing the appeal as time-barred; the writ was filed in June 2026.

The petitioner sought setting aside of the appellate order and remand for fresh consideration on delay, pointing to multiple grounds raised in appeal (including alleged non-compliance with mandatory procedure, invalid service, authentication of digital/electronic signature, and inadequate hearing time). The State contended the petitioner had an opportunity to file a second appeal before the GSTAT (to be constituted). The Court held that, on the petitioner’s own alleged grounds, the writ had been filed after considerable delay and that an alternative statutory remedy of second appeal under Section 112 was available, before which all questions of law and fact could be urged.

The writ was disposed of with liberty to approach the GSTAT within four weeks of its constitution upon making statutory pre-deposit of 10%; if such appeal is filed with the pre-deposit within the prescribed time, an automatic stay of the impugned demand would operate until disposal of the second appeal. No costs; pending miscellaneous applications were closed.

In The Coffee Boys v. Inspector Gachibowli-II Central Tax and Anr., (2026) taxcode.in 1273 HC, … the petitioner’s GST registration had been cancelled by Form GST REG-19 dated 17.07.2025 for non-filing of returns for a consecutive six-month period, and its statutory appeal against that cancellation had become time-barred. The petitioner approached the High Court seeking procedural relief to enable revocation, stating that the GST portal did not permit filing an online revocation application after expiry of the prescribed time limit.

The Court noted the petitioner’s explanation that financial difficulties disrupted business operations and led to non-filing of returns, asserted to be neither wilful nor deliberate. It also recorded the respondents’ stand that the cancellation was for non-filing of returns for six consecutive months. Against that background, the Court focused on the practical impediment created by the portal’s refusal to accept a delayed online revocation application and the appropriate direction to the competent authority for receiving and deciding such a request.

The writ petition was disposed of with limited directions: if the petitioner approached the competent authority within two weeks to submit a physical application for revocation of cancellation, the authority was directed to entertain it and decide the application in accordance with law within three weeks thereafter. No costs were awarded, and pending miscellaneous applications were closed.

In S.Shivraj Reddy Constructions v. Assistant Commissioner (ST) Hyderguda – Ashoknagar Circle and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1277 HC, … the petitioner, engaged in quarry-related mineral operations and working under an MoU-cum-agreement dated 23.10.2020, challenged a show cause notice in Form GST DRC-01 dated 24.01.2025 for 2021-22 that cited identified discrepancies and called for payment (via DRC-03) or objections (via DRC-06). During hearing, the petitioner restricted its writ challenge to the levy of GST on royalty, leaving other issues to proceed.

The Court recorded the respondent’s submission that the impugned notice contained multiple discrepancies beyond the royalty issue and that proceedings could not be stalled on a single disputed component while other allegations remained to be adjudicated. In that procedural posture, the Court treated the matter as one suited to statutory adjudication on the full contents of the notice, rather than fragmented writ intervention limited to one issue.

The writ petition was disposed of by directing the petitioner to participate in the proceedings by filing objections to the show cause notice. The Court clarified that, if aggrieved by the eventual adjudication order, the petitioner would be at liberty to challenge both the levy of GST on royalty and the other discrepancies in appropriate proceedings. No costs were awarded, and pending miscellaneous applications were closed.

In Bengal Cold Rollers Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (ST) Basheerbagh-Nampally-1 Circle and Ors., (2026) taxcode.in 1276 HC, … the petitioner challenged an assessment order dated 28.03.2026 for April 2019–March 2020 passed under Section 74(1) (TGST/CGST) and the related show cause notice dated 18.10.2025, after multiple prior writ proceedings concerning documents, hearing opportunities, and missing files. The petitioner contended, inter alia, that the notice was issued less than six months before the assessment order contrary to Section 74(2), and also relied on earlier High Court observations regarding timing of fresh notices.

The Court emphasised the litigation history and the effect of the Supreme Court’s orders dated 13.05.2026 and 29.05.2026, which had noticed that final assessment orders (including for 2019–20) were already passed and had relegated the petitioner to statutory appeals under Section 107 with a 5% pre-deposit, while allowing contentions (including alleged prejudice from 14 missing files) to be raised before the appellate authority. On Section 74(2), the Court held that, on a combined reading of the provisions, the six-month issuance requirement did not appear mandatory because the statute did not prescribe a consequence for breach; mere use of “shall” was not determinative. The Court further held that the issue must be tested on prejudice, and noted the petitioner had multiple opportunities to reply and attend hearings after 18.10.2025, including participation on 23.03.2026.

The Court found no real prejudice from the timing of the notice and recorded that the order dated 28.03.2026 was within the limitation ending 31.03.2026. Given the Supreme Court’s categorical relegation to the appellate remedy, the High Court declined to entertain the writ petition and dismissed it, leaving the petitioner at liberty to pursue statutory remedies under Section 107 as per the Supreme Court’s observations. No costs were awarded; pending miscellaneous applications were closed.