Gauhati High Court Upholds Validity of Second FIR in Lottery Scam Case, Dismisses Quash Petition by Atul Bokriya and Others

In a significant judgment delivered on March 2, 2026, the Gauhati High Court, presided over by Mrs. Justice Yarenjungla Longkumer, dismissed a petition filed by Atul Bokriya and others seeking quashing of an FIR and consequential criminal proceedings in connection with the Kohima North Police Station Case No.09/2023. The petitioners had invoked Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, read with Article 227 of the Constitution, contending that the FIR was a second complaint on the same subject matter as earlier FIRs registered in Kolkata, and thus impermissible in law.

The background of the case reveals that the petitioners were accused of offences under various sections of the IPC, including forgery, cheating, and defamation, as well as violations under the Lotteries Regulation Act, 1998. The FIR at Kohima was lodged by the then Director of the Nagaland State Lotteries, alleging that the petitioners had forged his signature and the official logo of the Nagaland State Lotteries to manufacture and sell fake lottery tickets, causing substantial financial loss to the state exchequer. The petitioners argued that similar FIRs had already been filed in Kolkata, where they had been discharged in one case, and that the Kohima FIR was a form of malicious prosecution intended to harass whistleblowers who had exposed malpractices in the lottery trade.

The petitioners relied on several Supreme Court precedents, including T.T. Anthony v. State of Kerala, Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, and Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI, to argue that a second FIR on the same facts is not permissible and should be quashed. They contended that the alleged offences, if any, occurred within the jurisdiction of Kolkata, and that the Kohima FIR was unsustainable for lack of territorial nexus and for being barred by the principle against multiple FIRs on the same transaction.

In response, the State, represented by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, argued that the Kohima FIR disclosed distinct and separate offences, including forgery of official documents and misuse of confidential agreements, which were not covered by the Kolkata FIRs. The State further submitted that the complainant in Kohima was a direct victim whose signature had been forged, and that the investigation had revealed a broader conspiracy and additional offences, justifying the registration of a separate FIR. The State also cited Supreme Court authorities, including Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash and Surendra Singh Rathore v. State of Rajasthan, to support the permissibility of multiple FIRs where rival versions or distinct offences are involved.

The Court undertook a detailed analysis of the legal principles governing the registration of multiple FIRs. It distinguished the facts of the present case from those in T.T. Anthony and Babubhai, noting that the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions where rival versions or a broader factual matrix justify separate FIRs. The Court referred to Surender Kaushik v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Surendra Singh Rathore v. State of Rajasthan, emphasizing that when the ambit of two FIRs is different, or when new facts or a larger conspiracy are revealed, a second FIR is permissible.

Upon examining the contents of both the Kolkata and Kohima FIRs, the Court found that while there was some overlap in the allegations, the Kohima FIR disclosed additional and distinct offences, including the forging of the Director’s signature and misuse of confidential documents, which were not the subject of the Kolkata FIRs. The Court observed that the grievances of the complainants in the two FIRs arose from different spectrums and that quashing the Kohima FIR would deprive the complainant of justice and hinder a full investigation into the alleged offences.

The Court also addressed the issue of whether Section 500 IPC (defamation) could be included in the FIR, leaving it to the trial court to decide at the appropriate stage. It reiterated the Supreme Court’s guidance in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal that the power to quash FIRs should be exercised sparingly and only in cases where the allegations are inherently improbable or maliciously instituted, which was not the case here.

Concluding that the present case was distinguishable from the authorities relied upon by the petitioners, the Gauhati High Court held that the petitioners had not made out a case for quashing the FIR under Section 528 BNSS or Article 227 of the Constitution. The petition was accordingly dismissed and disposed of, allowing the criminal proceedings in Kohima to continue.